Contents

Introduction

Title: The War in Syria and Europe’s Refugee Crisis.
Author: Tim Anderson

Title: Adjusting the Migrant Narrative.
Author: Sonia Anwar - Ahmed Martinez

Title: Beyond Human Rights: Being a refugee in the 21st century.
Author: Zaruhi Baghdasaryan

Title: Migrating to Europe: Racism, Imperialism, Politics Now and a Politics for the Future
Author: Mike Cole

Title: Radicalizing Democracy in schools.
Author: Orestis Didimiotis

Title: Refugees, State and State-corporate crimes. Lesvos case.
Author: Stratos Georgoulas

Title: Οι Επιπτώσεις Της Οικονομικής Κρίσης Στην Μεταναστευτική Πολιτική Στην Ελλάδα
Author: Φιλιώ Κυπρίζογλου

Title: The madness of working as a human rights lawyer in times where rights are (treated as) useless.
Author: Dimitris Koros

Title: Commons beyond/against/underneath the nationstate. Notes on the crisis of the european border regime 2015 and the antiracist potentiality of encounter.
Author: Niki Kubaczek

Title: The Middle East Refugee Crisis and the Foundations of Solidarity.
Author: Radmila Nastić

Title: Το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης στην Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια της προσφυγικής κρίσης.
Author: Πολιτάκη Αλεξάνδρα

Title: Waiting and Mobilisation in the ‘Jungle’ camp of Calais.
Author: David Leone Suber

Title: Turkey’s Europeanisation: A Case of Self-Induced Divergence.
Author: Petros Violakis

Title: Ευρώπη, or: The Border that therefore I am.
Author: Sebastian Weier

Title: Greece. The Birthplace of a New Cultural Revolution.
Author: Evy Yannas
Introduction

Today, “the West” is facing the worst crisis of human dispossession since the aftermath of the Second World War. Neocolonial exploitation, authoritarian regimes, imperialist wars, economic crises and ecological disasters have displaced over 60 million people, triggering a huge humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people, many of them children, have lost their lives in the attempt to reach safety. Yet Fortress Europe, whose imperialist actions have driven this crisis, keeps its borders shut for the refugees except for a tiny few, and even they must still endure dehumanizing conditions and policies. Meanwhile, ultra-right and fascist parties around the world are manipulating this situation for political gain and many countries, including Australia and the USA, are already considering closed-border policies. Within the EU, border-controls have been reintroduced by more and more member states. By linking terrorism with migration, governments and media are spreading a politics of fear that not only targets refugees and immigrants, but curtails basic democratic rights for all citizens.

These conditions demand that radical scholars and thinkers reimagine our paradigms, our methods and our priorities. How do the border-crossing actions of migrants force us to rethink the power and violence of borders, the definition of “illegal, “forced” vs. “voluntary” migration and the power of “status”? How do these conditions, along with the drama of austerity, necessitate a reconsideration of the power and potential of the state, political parties and the promise of “democracy”? What can we learn from the transnational solidarity efforts that have arisen in Lesbos, Eidomeni and elsewhere to meet common needs beyond the capacities and imagination of NGOs and the state? How can we find new ways to care for the dispossessed in an age of widespread and deepening inequalities? How can we understand today’s crises as continuous with global legacies of imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, racism, ecological destruction and primitive accumulation? How are they deepened and shaped by the dynamics of gender, sexuality, (dis)ability and other forms of oppression and exploitation? How can we build solidarity networks capable of not only providing the necessities of life but creating the transnational movements of systemic transformation that can overturn the forces that lead to displacement, neocolonial and imperialist exploitation and austerity?
These urgent questions and conditions necessitate that radical activists, artists, politicians, refugees, scholars and students a gather, discuss and debate. This edited volume is a product of a conference held in Lesbos where all these urgent questions are being addressed and negotiated in practice, making it a space to share, to learn and to develop a common and collective courage and knowledge for the struggles to come. These 15 chapters address issues in a global view (from the war in Syria to the Middle East refuge crisis and Turkey’s Europeanisation), in an European (Ευρώπη, or: The Border that therefore I am, Beyond Fortress Europe), in an national (Greek migration policy, Refugees in Greece, Birthplace of a cultural revolution) and in a local view (Refugees and state corporate crime in Lesbos, Jungle camp in Calais).

Maria Nikolakaki
Stratos Georgoulas
Andrej Grubacic
The War in Syria and Europe’s Refugee Crisis
Tim Anderson

Abstract

The roots of refugee crises lie in much larger human displacement crises, though Eurocentrism may not see it that way. In 2015 the top three sources of asylum seekers in the EU were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, countries subject to invasions and proxy wars involving several European powers. The numbers of displaced people within and without those countries are 20 times higher than those seeking refuge in Europe. Further, the Middle East wars have been driven systematically by the Washington-NATO plan for a ‘New Middle East’, not simply by factors endogenous to the region. These refugees are not fleeing oppressive regimes; they run to escape invasions and proxy wars backed by the western powers. Evidence makes it clear that NATO countries have backed every single terrorist group in Iraq and Syria, directly or indirectly, to weaken and dominate these countries.

With Iraq and Syria we have seen an aggravation of the standard war-drives-emigration phenomenon. The terrorism fomented by NATO and the Gulf monarchies has ‘blown back’, provoking further European intervention. Yet disinformation campaigns have driven racial reactions in Europe to the target cultures and their emigrants, adding to the confusion over just who is responsible for the crisis. There is legitimate fear of terrorists joining the waves of refugees. Europe’s militarised responses in turn enhance European fears of an emigrant threat. In short, the USA and European powers are in large part responsible for the creation and aggravation of the displacement crisis, which led to a European refugee crisis. No real solution is conceivable without addressing the repeated wars, the root of the problem.

Those concerned about refugees cannot ignore the wars that drive them, especially when they share responsibility for those wars. Many of the Europeans powers have backed wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria which have caused massive displacements of peoples, a small fraction of which end up as refugees in Europe.

In April 2016 Syria’s Grand Mufti, Sheikh Ahmed Badreddin Hassoun told this writer: “Tell [the Europeans] to stop the war on Syria. The refugees will stop within one day. Within one month they will return” (Hassoun 2016). His words were reinforced by Professor Francis Boyle: ‘All these refugees are fleeing because the
United States government has been destroying their states’ (in Nebradakis 2016). These messages contradict some popular western myths, that the Syrian conflict is a ‘civil war’, that the Syrian Government is mainly responsible for the refugees, that displaced people are ‘fleeing the regime’ and that the western powers are playing some angelic, humanitarian role.

It is widely acknowledged that the Syrian refugees arriving in Europe would prefer to go home. It has even been reported that many refugees in Germany have trouble when they try to do so (ABS 2016). Some in Canada and many in Lebanon say they want to return (Tharoor 2016; Holt 2016). So how might we best appreciate the mass displacement and the links between war and refugees?

This paper argues that the US and European driven wars of the last 15 years, and in particular the proxy war on Syria, must be properly understood to appreciate the roots of displacement and the refugee issue. It begins by distinguishing actual history from the key myths of the war on Syria, then addressing the links between that war, human displacement and the subsequent refugee crises, before commenting on some appropriate understandings of these very human tragedies.

1. Disinformation in the War on Syria

How can we credibly assess the ongoing war in Syria, where a large number of interested parties have invested such a lot in both its image and its outcome? The starting point must be by reference to principle, including international law and independent evidence. International law presumes that a sovereign country will resolve its own internal problems, and urges other nations to support that sovereign process. It follows that an intervener, in breach of international law, must present some extraordinary rationale. Failure to do so, or the presentation of fabricated pretexts for intervention, must attract concern that this is a war of aggression, the supreme international crime.

To judge any such extraordinary claim, including that of ‘humanitarian intervention’, we should look for independent evidence and discount ‘self-serving’ evidence, which bolsters the propaganda of an aggressive power. Where there is little independent evidence, we can resort to evidence against interests, such as admissions. Such principles are common in criminal investigation. It so happens that, after more than five years of armed conflict in Syria, there is substantial independent evidence and many admissions. If reasonable discussion matters, we must examine this evidence.
This section will demonstrate some key false pretexts and fabrications, characteristic of a war of aggression. It will also demonstrate links between the war in Syria and the previous interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

1.1 ‘Peaceful protestors’ took up arms

The centrepiece of the Washington-led story is that there was a popular uprising in Syria during the 2011 'Arab Spring’ and, after many months of repression, peaceful protestors felt obliged to take up arms against the government, to defend themselves. The war is thus an internal or organic conflict, a ‘civil war’. That story is succinctly expressed by the semi-official US NGO, Human Rights Watch: ‘The protest movement in Syria was overwhelmingly peaceful until September 2011’ (HRW 2012). However, independent evidence shows that claim is quite false.

There certainly were large rallies in Syria in early 2011, both anti and pro-government. Yet most people in and around these rallies had nothing to do with the violence. Criticisms of the government and calls for ‘reform’ came from a longer standing opposition movement which was chiefly concerned with corruption and the Baath Party monopoly. The most widely inclusive opposition statement on demands for reform, the Damascus Declaration (2005), made a long list of demands; but all parties rejected violent attacks on the Government and opposed outside interference. Almost one year into the conflict a genuinely independent poll run by a Turkish agency said only 5% of Syrian people backed violent attacks on the government (TESEV 2012). Yet police, doctors and civilians were targeted and killed by snipers, in the first serious violence in the southern city of Daraa (Anderson 2016: 54-72). After that the army was called in. More than eighty soldiers were killed, in the first month of the violence (Narwani 2014).

Those responsible for the initial violence were extremist Islamists around the al Omari Mosque in Daraa. Saudi official Anwar Al-Eshki later admitted his country had armed the jihadists (Truth Syria 2012). This insurrectionary violence mirrored a Muslim Brotherhood insurrection almost 30 years earlier, which began with sniping and sectarian massacres. At Hama in 1982 the Syrian Army crushed the insurrection in several weeks. US intelligence (DIA 1982) estimated 2,000 were killed, many of them Muslim Brotherhood fighters. The Syrian Government said 3,000; British writer Patrick Seale said it could have been 5,000 to 10,000 (Seale 1988 : 335). The contemporary myth, from Muslim Brotherhood sources, is that as many as ‘40,000
civilians’ were slaughtered; and no mention of a violent jihadist insurrection (Lefèvre 2013). In Daraa as in Hama, jihadists began rooftop sniping, attacked local government agencies, drew in the army then, when confronted by the army, cried ‘civilian massacre’. In March 2011 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Muhammad Riyad Al-Shaqfa, issued a statement which left no doubt that the enemy was ‘the secular regime’ and that Brotherhood members would ‘have to make sure that the revolution will be pure Islamic, and with that no other sect would have a share of the credit after its success’ (Al-Shaqfa 2011). The Brotherhood went on to dominate the first groups given arms by a western-backed arms supply group called the ‘Free Syrian Army’ (Ramadani 2012).

From Daraa the violence spread to Homs, reinforced by jihadists from Lebanon. Al Jazeera, the principal Middle East media channel backing the Muslim Brotherhood, blacked out the reinforcement of the Homs offensive by armed foreigners. Former Al Jazeera journalist Ali Hashem was one of many who resigned from the Qatar-owned station, complaining of deep bias over Syria. He had footage of armed men arriving from Lebanon, but this was censored by his Qatari managers. ‘In a resignation letter I was telling the executive … it was like nothing was happening in Syria’ (Hashem 2012).

Western governments and media backed the jihadist story of a revolution of ‘freedom’; but there were independent witnesses. One was the late Father Frans Van Der Lugt, who lived in Homs for 48 years and was murdered there by Jabhat al Nusra in 2014. In early 2012 he said:

"Most citizens in Syria do not support the opposition … from the beginning the protest movements have not been merely peaceful. I have seen from the beginning armed protestors … they were the first to fire on the police. Very often the violence of the security forces comes in response to the brutal violence of the armed insurgents’ (Van der Lugt 2012).

The ‘peaceful protestors turned gunmen’ story was contradicted by multiple reports throughout 2011. On 6 June 2011 the BBC reported ‘the deaths of at least 120 security personnel in battles with hundreds of gunmen in the north-western town of Jisr al-Shughour [Idlib]’ (BBC 2011). A report by Hala Jaber from demonstrations at Ma’arrat al-Numan [Idlib] show that protest numbers were decimated – from 5,000 to 350 - after ‘bearded militants’ began shooting police (Jaber 2011). Gunmen drove
peaceful protestors off the streets. After one year, when the total death toll was about 5,000, the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported: ‘a total of 478 police officers and 2,091 individuals from the military and security forces [i.e. 2,569] were killed between 29 March 2011 and 20 March 2012’ (OHCHR 2012: 2; Narwani 2014). That is, half the casualties in the first year were government forces.

The Saudi backing of jihadists in Syria, and the US aim of ‘regime change’ in Damascus were not isolated acts. Five years earlier US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had announced plans for a ‘New Middle East’, which would be sought through ‘creative destruction’ (Levine 2006). Indeed, the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were followed by the failed Israeli operation against Hezbollah in South Lebanon (2006), then the jihadist-NATO partnership (2011) which overthrew the Government of Libya. Unilateral disarmament moves against Iran had been stalled by an international process. Syria was next.

Contrary to western assertions that there was a secular internal rebellion in Syria, US intelligence knew the violence was led by jihadist extremists and observed that ‘a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria [i.e. an ‘Islamic State’] … is exactly what the [NATO-GCC] … want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime’ (DIA 2012). In that same year Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wrote in a private email that: ‘The best way to help Israel deal with Iran's growing nuclear capability is to help the people of Syria overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad (Wikileaks c2014). These statements confirm that ‘regime change’ as part of a regional strategy was underway in Syria.

1.2 The ‘humanitarian intervention’ pretext

In the manner of war propaganda everywhere, the enemy leader and the enemy army must be demonised and vilified, to help defuse any sentiment of pity or sympathy for those under attack. That is why the war mantra of a ‘brutal dictator … killing his own people’ was recited over Syria for years on end, with stories of mounting atrocities that built on the ‘gunning down of peaceful protestors’ opening gambit. The popular media of western countries said little about Syria confronting armies of jihadists, instead claiming almost endless and ‘indiscriminate’ Army attacks on ‘civilians’.

It is widely accepted that the Syrian secret police (Mukhabarat) was feared, that the Syrian Arab Army has killed captured terrorists, and that in war of this scale there must have been some ‘collateral damage’ from the Army’s actions. Yet two things
stand out. First, the jihadist armies set against Syria regularly filmed and publicise their own atrocities against Syrian soldiers and civilians alike. The Syrian Army did not do that. Second, when major atrocity stories against the Army are examined closely, most emerge as fabrications. In particular, there is little credible evidence, upon careful examination, that the Syrian Army has targeted or gassed civilians or bombed civilian hospitals. Table 1 shows several major massacres and other incidents which were wrongly blamed on the Syrian Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>US and Jihadist claims</th>
<th>Rebuttal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Houla massacre, May 2012</strong></td>
<td>Syrian Govt. “thugs” said to have murdered 108 villagers, no motive.</td>
<td>15 independent witnesses identify Farouk (FSA) leaders as responsible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Daraya massacre, Aug 2012</strong></td>
<td>245 killed: “Assad’s army has committed another massacre”</td>
<td>FSA massacres hostages after a failed prisoner swap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aqrab massacre, Dec 2012</strong></td>
<td>120 villagers killed. “Members of Assad’s sect were responsible”</td>
<td>FSA held Allawi villagers hostage, then killed many as the Army closed in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Ghouta chemical weapons, Aug 2013</strong></td>
<td>Incident during visit of UN CW inspectors, claims 1400 killed. Eight bodies buried. SyG blamed.</td>
<td>US MIT experts: “these munitions could not possibly have been fired from the … Syrian Government controlled area”. Other evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar: ‘mass prisoner murder’, Jan 2014</strong></td>
<td>Qatar-paid defector ‘Caesar’ shows 1000s of photos of bodies from a Syrian morgue. Said to be prisoners.</td>
<td>HRW admits almost half the bodies are ‘soldiers or members of the security forces’ and other victims of terrorist attacks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Let’s briefly explain the evidence on these notorious incidents, before moving on to the question of what multiple fabrications say about the character of this war.

The terrible Houla massacre (near Homs) of 108 villagers, in May 2012, took place on the eve of UN talks. Many of the families killed were government supporters or those who had participated in recent elections. A first UN committee, which went to Houla, then under jihadist control, heard conflicting stories. A second UN committee, co-chaired by a US diplomat, tried to blame unnamed Syrian Government supporters. At stake were talks which might have authorised UN military intervention in Syria, as had happened the previous year in Libya. However Russia and China, concerned at NATO’s abuse of UN Resolution 1973 over Libya (which called for protection of civilians; NATO instead used the opportunity to help overthrow the Libyan Government) refused to support a similar move against Syria. As I demonstrate in my book The Dirty War on Syria, the report of the second UN committee was a travesty. That committee ignored published evidence from 15 independent witnesses who blamed specific members of the US-backed Farouq brigade (FSA) and their local collaborators (Anderson 2016: Chapter 8).

Three months later an even bigger massacre of 245 people in Daraya, just south of Damascus, was blamed on the Syrian Army. A Reuters report headlined ‘Syria activists report ‘massacre’ by army near Damascus’ (Oweis 2012). A few days later this ‘activists’ story was exposed by Robert Fisk as the slaughter by Free Syrian Army’ jihadists of kidnapped civilian and off-duty soldier hostages, after a failed prisoner swap (Fisk 2012). Similarly, the New York Times blamed the massacre of over 100 villagers at Aqrab (close to Houla) on the Syrian Army. Their headline, based on ‘activist’ sources, read: ‘Members of Assad’s Sect Blamed in Syria Killings’ (Stack and Mourtada 2012) . Once again, just days later, another western journalist exposed the fabrication. British reporter Alex Thompson (2012) went to Aqrab and discovered that armed groups linked to the ‘FSA’ had held 500 Alawi villagers for nine days, murdering many of them as the army closed in and the gang fled. There were no retractions or corrections by Reuters or the New York Times for their false headlines. Gross defamation of the Syrian Army did not trouble them. Instead, the privileged media treatment given to jihadists boosted their relative impunity, allowing them freedom to continue with their public executions and ‘false flag’ crimes.
The most famous scandal of this nature came with the East Ghouta chemical weapons accusations of August 2013, from jihadists of Jabhat al Nusra (Al Qaeda) and Jaysh al Islam, who were occupying parts of eastern countryside Damascus. They blamed the Syrian Army for what they claim was a sarin gas attack which killed many, including children. Blaming the Government was implausible, without motive, and very soon all the independent evidence contradicted it. The incident occurred just as UN chemical weapons inspectors were in Damascus, at the invitation of the Syrian Government. They had been called to investigate a sarin attack by jihadists at Khan al Assal (Aleppo), earlier that year, where a toxic rocket had killed 25 people, both soldiers and civilians (Barnard 2013).

The Khan al Assal investigation was delayed because of the East Ghouta scandal; and because the White House, Human Rights Watch and other western groups backed the jihadists’ claim, the al Qaeda groups had a free ride in the western media. The New York Times backed the White House claim ‘that only Syrian government forces had the ability to carry out such a strike’ (Gladstone and Chivers 2013), arguing that vector calculations of the rocket trajectories suggested they must have been fired from Syrian Army bases in Damascus (Parry 2013). The rest of the western media followed this line, with few exceptions.

Yet independent evidence came in quickly to demonstrate that the White House, Human Rights Watch and the New York Times were wrong. I have documented this evidence in a chapter of my book The Dirty War on Syria (Anderson 2016: Chapter 9) and provide just a brief summary here. A Jordanian journalist interviewed people in the East Ghouta area who blamed Saudi agents for bringing chemical weapons to the jihadists (Gavlak and Ababneh 2013). A Syrian team led by Christian nun Mother Agnes Mariam demonstrated that video and photographic evidence had been staged manipulated, casting doubt on the claim that many of the pictured children even came from the East Ghouta area (ISTEAMS 2013). US intelligence officers said that Jabhat al Nusra, which earlier had been caught with sarin gas in Turkey, ‘should have been a suspect’. They said President Obama had ‘manipulated’ the evidence to justify a strike on President Assad (Hersh 2013). Importantly, two MIT scientists discredited the rocket telemetry evidence, saying that the range of the rockets was much shorter than suggested and that put the affected areas out of range of any nearby Syrian military base. Their final report said that the rockets ‘could not possibly’ have been
fired at East Ghouta from the ‘heart’, or from the eastern edge, of the Syrian Government controlled area ‘shown in the intelligence map published by the White House on August 30, 2013’ (Lloyd and Postol 2014). Later on, a UN report determined that the chemical agents used in Khan-Al-Assal attack ‘bore the same unique hallmarks as those used in al Ghouta’ (HRC 2014: 19). All that evidence should have been conclusive. Sarin was used in the East Ghouta, but the numbers affected was unknown and the charges against the Syrian Army were false. The only logical consequence was that this incident was another provocation on the part of the jihadists, in their search for greater western support.

One final incident deserves comment. In January 2014 a Syrian defector was publicised by the monarchy of Qatar (a key financier of jihadist terrorism in Syria) as showing thousands of photos of dead bodies. They were said to have been prisoners tortured and killed in Syria’s jails (Black 2014). The defector, called ‘Caesar’, remained anonymous and was uncorroborated. Yet this event attracted massive publicity. The photos were shown throughout the US and at the UN, like a traveling roadshow. However there was no corroboration of Caesar’s story on how or at whose hands these people had died. Almost a year later Human Rights Watch (HRW) got access to the entire file and published its own report called ‘If the dead could speak’. The report basically adopted Caesar’s story, noting that most photos seemed to have come from a morgue attached to a Damascus Hospital. However there was a telling admission at pages 2 and 3: ‘over 46% of the photographs (24,568) do not show people ‘tortured to death’ … [rather] dead Syrian soldiers and victims of car bombs and other violence’ (HRW 2015). That is, before any critical evaluation, almost half the entire file did not at all relate to ‘prisoners tortured and killed’. This HRW admission did not seem to be reported in the western mass media.

By extreme bias the western media channels were sending a clear message to the jihadists and their ‘activist’ sources: commit any massacre you like, blame it on the Syrian Government and Syrian Army, we will run your story, virtually uncontradicted. The existence of several demonstrable fabricated incidents, or false flag crimes, shows not only a modus operandi on the part of the jihadist groups, but also complicity in the promotion of fabricated stories on the part of the US Government and much of the western media.
1.3 The 'protective intervention' pretext

In 2014 there was a switch in US intervention strategy in Syria, away from ‘humanitarian intervention’ and towards ‘protective intervention’. This may have been due to the failure of multiple pretexts for humanitarian intervention, or because the sectarian jihadist character of the ‘revolution’ had become apparent. In any case the Obama administration, which had by then made public that it was providing arms and finance to what it called ‘moderate opposition’ groups, announced it would support those groups to fight against the extremist jihadist groups, Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS/DAESH. On 10 September 2014, after the cinematically publicised murders of some US citizens, President Obama announced that:

‘ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and … American citizens, personnel and facilities … we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists … [and] we will increase our support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground’ (Obama 2014). Those ‘forces’ included Iraqi security, US operatives and anti-Syrian armed groups. A US ‘coalition’ renewed its military presence in Iraq (on invitation from the Iraqi Government) and from there set up operations in Syria (without invitation from the Syrian Government).

This was an odd proposition to begin with, as both the widely banned terrorist groups had openly worked together in Syria (despite the odd violent squabble) with the various US-backed FSA groups (Anderson 2016: 244-245). Indeed, when Jabhat al Nusra was banned in the USA in December 2012, most of the openly US-backed armed groups protested with the slogan ‘We are all Jabhat al Nusra’ (Sherlock 2012). In late 2016, after an apparent Russian-US agreement to attack al Nusra (rebadged as ‘Jaysh Fatah al Sham’) and ISIS, the US-backed armed groups once again refused to dissociate themselves from al Nusra (Hill 2016).

The bizarre character of this alleged protective intervention was underlined by admissions from senior US officials that their ‘major allies’ had been arming and financing the very groups against which they now pretended to fight. Just a few days after Obama’s effective renewal of the former President Bush’s global ‘war on
terrorism’, the head of the US armed forces General Martin Dempsey told a US Senate committee that their ‘major Arab allies’ were financing ISIS: ‘I know major Arab allies who fund [ISIS]’. To this committee chair Senator Lindsey Graham replied: ‘They fund them because the Free Syrian Army couldn’t fight [Syrian President] Assad, they were trying to beat Assad’ (Rothman 2014).

Three weeks later US Vice-President Joe Biden admitted that those same allies were financing and arming every variety of anti-government armed groups in Syria, including ISIS. He said that Turkey, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia: ‘were so determined to take down Assad … they poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens, thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad … [including] al Nusra and al Qaeda and extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world … [and then] this outfit called ISIL’ (RT 2014). While Biden was trying distance the US from the actions of its close allies, he confirmed what Syrian officials had been saying for years, only to have their statements treated with disdain by most of the western media.

Remarkably, neither the repeatedly expressed loyalty from the Syrian jihadists for the mostly foreign al Nusra jihadists, nor the admissions at the most senior levels of the US administration that their closest allies were funding all the anti-Syrian armed groups, made any difference to the official war story. The US and its coalition of dozens of loyal state partners were still said to be backing the ‘moderate rebels’ and fighting the extremist terrorists.

There was little ideological difference between the ‘moderates’ and the extremists. The brutal and genocidal actions of ISIS and al Qaeda are well known; while those of the so-called ‘moderate rebels’ have been suppressed, as a matter of war-time media control. Yet western media sources did report, in mid-2011, the Farouq Brigade (FSA) slogan: 'Alawites to the grave and Christians to Beirut!' in Homs, over April and May 2011 (Matheson 2011; Krause-Jackson 2011). Farouq acted on that slogan. The FSA group was identified by eye-witnesses as responsible for the Houla massacre (Anderson 2016: 181-186) and for the ethnic cleansing of Christians from the Homs area (CNA 2012). After Farouq and al Nusra were expelled from Homs, the remnants of these groups, backed by the Saudis, formed a base in rural areas around Damascus. The FSA jihadists formed new groups, Jaysh al Islam and Ahrar as Sham, working closely with Jabhat al Nusra.
Despite the often violent squabbles between these armed groups, and despite the failed merger of al Qaeda in Syria (Jabhat al Nusra) and al Qaeda in Iraq (ISIS), the US knew very well that attacks on the Syrian Government were always led by extremists. US intelligence in 2012 had welcomed the jihadists’ plan to form an Islamic state in eastern Syria (DIA 2012).

The language of FSA ‘moderates’ remained genocidal. In 2015 US-backed FSA leader and lawyer Lamia Nahas praised Adolf Hitler and the Ottoman Sultan Abu Hamid, writing on her Facebook page:

‘The more arrogant Syria’s minorities become I become more certain that there should be a holocaust to exterminate them from existence and I request [God's] mercy upon Hitler who burned the Jews of his time and Sultan Abdul-Hamid who exterminated the Armenians … we need to rid and to cleanse Bilad Ash-Sham from them … to finish off all those filth from Kurds to Alawites’ (Angry Arab 2015).

Another FSA leader, Abdullah al Ali wrote that: ‘exterminating Nusayri [Alawi-Christian] villages is more important than liberating the Syrian capital’ (Fadel 2015). This genocidal talk combined with public atrocities did little to shift the western war narrative.

The combined myths of the massively internationalised Syria conflict as a ‘civil war’ has malformed understandings of Europe’s refugee crisis. Neither the evidence refuting false stories about supposed Syrian Army massacres nor evidence of the genocidal intent of the ‘moderate rebels’, did much to alter the popular narratives that fuel this war. Nor did the multitude of polls and informed estimates, including from Syria’s enemies, that show President Bashar al Assad as remaining very popular in Syria (Anderson 2016: 96). Yet, to reasonable people, evidence must matter.

2. War and the Displacement Crises

It is essential to understand the character of the Middle East wars, especially the proxy war in Syria, to properly appreciate and address the refugee phenomenon in Europe. This is especially the case in a war where, even after more than five years, every tragedy and accusation is contested, and the official war narratives remain poles apart.

For example, if Europeans accept the myth that there is simply a ‘civil war’ in Syria they would regard the flood of refugees from that country as an external imposition;
perhaps a threat but in any case, an external development which must be met, probably with some mix of regulation and ‘charity’. If, on the other hand, that war were recognised as an attempt by the NATO countries to overthrow yet another Middle Eastern government, there might be greater reflection on European responsibility for both the war and the refugees. Observers would be more conscious of aggravation of the mass displacement by the European states arming and financing the many thousands of internationalised ‘jihadists’, often wrongly called ‘rebels’ or ‘opposition’. Misunderstanding the character of the Middle East wars and their relationship to the displacement appears through several inter-related myths: that a ‘civil war’ in Syria has little to do with Europe, that Middle Eastern peoples pose a threat to Europe peoples (rather than the reverse) and that the priority must be to block or regulate the refugees, rather than end the war.

2.1 ‘Civil war’, ‘revolution’ and ‘fleeing Assad’ myths

It is logical to imagine that people would flee from terrorist groups who publicly chop off heads and declare war on minorities and other ‘unbelievers’. Indeed, after the genocidal slogans of 2011 in Homs (‘Alawites to the grave, Christians to Beirut’) and the violence of the first ‘Free Syrian Army’ groups, 50,000 Christians were said to have been driven to Lebanon (CNA 2012).

Nevertheless, in propaganda wars, the image of such tragedies can get turned on its head. A US-funded organisation called ‘The Syria Campaign’ helped drive a claim that most of the Syrian refugees were ‘Fleeing Assad’. One of several interlocked groups (Avaaz, Purpose, the White Helmets) which have campaigned for a Libyan-style ‘no fly zone’ in Syria, this one worked for NATO intervention (see Sterling 2015). The Syria Campaign (2015) commissioned a poll in Germany which was carried out by German academic Heiko Giebler. In it, 889 Syrian refugees were said to have been interviewed in Berlin, Hanover, Bremen, Leipzig and Eisenhüttenstadt. Candidates ‘were approached on entering or leaving registration centers’. However the survey does not specify how sampling choices were made, nor is there any mention of a sampling error (TSC 2015). Yet without a clear sampling method and a stated sampling error, we cannot know to what extent the survey might represent a broader population. The results are then almost useless, except as anecdotes.
CROSSING BORDERS CONFERENCE

The poll cover note, headline and graphics highlight a claim that ‘70% of refugees are fleeing Assad’. To begin with, this is a false characterisation of the actual survey (TSC 2015). It had no question at all about fleeing Assad, nor anyone else. It did have questions on whom the respondents blamed for the violence and of whom they were afraid. Of the 30 survey questions the three relevant ones seem to be number 9 (‘Who was responsible for the fighting?’), number 14 (‘Who did you fear getting arrested or kidnapped by?’), and number 18 (‘What was the main reason for you to leave Syria?’).

The Syria Campaign’s headline and graphics have drawn, very loosely, on some combination of those three questions. In response to question 18, 69% said that ‘the main reason’ for leaving Syria was an ‘imminent threat’ to life, but without an identified source of that threat. In Question 9, 70% identified ‘Syrian Army and allied groups’ as ‘responsible for the fighting’. However this was a multiple option question in which we also see that 82% have identified other armed groups (ISIS, al Nusra, FSA, YPG, other rebels). If we remove the Kurdish YPG, which has generally fought in coordination with the Syrian Army, the total is 74% anti-government armed groups. Question 14 shares the ‘multiple option’ structure of Question 9. Here 77% said they feared ‘getting arrested or kidnapped by’ the ‘Syrian Army and its allied groups’. However the combined total of anti-government groups is 82% and, if we add the YPG, 90%. The answers to both questions suggest these respondents feared the anti-government armed groups more than they feared the Syrian Army. Most likely many feared getting caught in the crossfire.

So, even before we examine the representative validity of the poll, there is no basis in any of those three questions – or anywhere else in the poll - for saying that ‘70% of refugees are fleeing Assad’. To the contrary, the poll shows that more are fleeing anti-government armed groups. This contradicts The Syria Campaign’s quite dishonest headline. Nevertheless, a Deutsche Welle report faithfully noted: ‘Survey leaves no doubt: Syrians are fleeing Assad’ (Fuchs 2015). Apparently this reporter did not read the survey.

Further internal analysis, combined with UNHCR (2016) data on the wider Syrian refugee population, shows The Syria Campaign’s survey to have been quite unrepresentative, and therefore no basis for claims about the wider Syrian refugee population. As Table 2 shows, the respondents in Germany had massive over-
representation from young men. Put together we see a 1.76 over-representation of males and a 2.25 over-representation of people between 15 and 55 (UNHCR: 18-59; TSC: 15-55). Women and children barely exist in this poll. The poll also shows that 51% came alone to Europe, 61% had no children and that 68% (0.78 x 0.88) were young men between 15 and 35 years old.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Syria refugee population profile, 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR, Syrian refugee registration (4.8 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-35 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-59 / 15-55 years old</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other data within the poll indicates that 74% were from areas held by anti-government armed groups, as they reported government shelling. There is no credible evidence that suggests the Syrian Army shells areas which do not contain armed anti-government groups. That is reinforced by Question 1 on area of origin, which shows hardly any respondents (just 19 people) from Tartus, Latakia and Sweida, areas which in 2015 had a combined population (swollen, from internal refugees) of at least 5 million. Respondents from Damascus (170 or 19%) are also seriously under-represented. Damascus in 2015 held over 7 million, or one-third of Syria’s population. There were many displaced people in all these areas, controlled by the Government.

On the other side, we can see an over-representation of respondents from Hasakah (164 or 19%). There are certainly a lot of refugees from the Hasakah district, in large part due to the presence of ISIS and Turkish-Kurd clashes; but its population of half a million, less than 10% that of Damascus, had almost equal representation in respondents. In other words, the TSC survey has a very large over-representation of young men, many from anti-government or jihadist held areas. Quite a number of them are likely to be ex-fighters.

Putting this all together we can conclude that the poll commissioned by The Syria Campaign (2015) did not show anything like ‘70% fleeing Assad’. To the contrary, results of the poll (TSC (2015) suggested that slightly more amongst that cohort were
fearful of anti-government armed groups. On top of that, that poll was quite unrepresentative of the Syrian refugee population, as it contained a very large group of young men from anti-government or jihadist held areas, some of them likely former fighters, and many of whom had indeed come under Syrian Army fire. Reasons for corruption of the data most likely include a combination of biased selection in Germany (selection was made by the associates of a partisan group) and a possible over-representation of young men and former fighters amongst the actual cohort of refugees arriving in those German cities. The absence of a sampling process and a stated sampling error simply underlines the unprofessional nature of this survey.

Other western polls of Syrians and refugees, during the conflict, have looked for acceptance or approval of outside military intervention. They have used ‘push poll’ techniques (loaded questions) and their sampling methods are often obscure. For example the British ORB poll of 2014 suggested that ‘Three in Five Syrians Support International Military Involvement’ (ORB 2014: Table 1). ORB’s undisclosed sampling method, erratic claims and inconsistency with other polls casts doubt on its results. Their 2014 poll showed 4% of support for ISIS/DAESH (4% agreed that ISIS/DAESH ‘best represented the interests and aspirations of the Syrian people’) yet, that number rose dramatically in 2015, when 21% were said to view the terrorist group ‘positively’ (ORB 2015: Table 3). That sort of support for a foreign-led group, best known for its massacres of opponents and ‘unbelievers’, is simply not credible, and does not sit with the other genuinely independent polls, such as the Turkish poll (TESEV) of 2012.

If it were imagined that most Syrian refugees are ‘fleeing Assad’ then the illegal foreign backed attacks on Syria might not seem so bad. Yet the weight of evidence is strongly against those claims. First, the great bulk of displaced Syrians remain within Syria, where they overwhelmingly flee to government controlled areas, for example, to Damascus, Sweida, Western Aleppo and the coast. The population of jihadist-held Eastern Aleppo, over 2015-2016, was estimated at somewhere between 40,000 (Chulov 2015) and 300,000 (Rycroft 2016), compared to 1.5 million in western Aleppo (Bartlett 2016). The UNHCR at 31 December (2016) put Syrian refugees at 4.8 million and internally displaced Syrians at 6.6 million (IDMC 2016). The vast majority of these displaced people have sought shelter with Syrian Government agencies.
2.2 Displaced peoples: threat to Europe or victims of European policy?

It is useful to get some perspective on the relationship between displaced people and refugees arriving in Europe, and also some idea of the links between the war in Syria and the large movements of people. A Eurocentric focus simply on refugee arrivals is insufficient.

Let us get some perspective on the displaced peoples. First, in 2015, the top three origins of people seeking asylum in EU countries were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (Eurostat 2016), all countries subject to NATO backed invasions and interventions. From Europe the UK, Norway and Germany participated in the invasion of Afghanistan; another 18 European countries (Poland, Spain, UK, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia) assisted the USA in its the invasion and occupation of Iraq; and at least another three (the UK, France and Germany) have backed anti-government armed groups in Syria.

In 2015, one in three asylum seekers in Europe came from Syria (Eurostat 2016). However these were quite a small fraction of the numbers of displaced peoples. Table 3 shows us that asylum seekers in Europe from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, for 2015 were between 3.3% and 5% of the total numbers of displaced peoples (IDPs + refugees). That is, the impact on Europe of the movements of displaced peoples from the wars in which Europeans have engaged is relatively small.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Displaced peoples in and from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>data as at 31 December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking asylum in Europe, 2015 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers (Euro) as % of IDPs + refugees, 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is apparent from the IDP figures that the societies and governments of those countries carry most of the burden of displaced peoples. Neighbouring countries have carried the greatest burden of refugees. After the US-led invasion of Iraq, Syria took around 2 million Iraqi refugees. A UNHCR survey in late 2010 shows that many Iraqi refugees in Syria were reluctant to return home (Wilkes and Dobbs 2010), while the Syrian Arab Red Crescent estimates that, prior to March 2011 there were still 1.2 million, the majority unregistered with the UNHCR (al-Saadi 2014).

The UNHCR reported 28,919 Iraqi refugees in Syria in mid-2014, after two years of war, but the Syrian Arab Red Crescent said the number was around 450,000, and that they were getting aid from local agencies (al-Saadi 2014). Even after five years of war in Syria, many thousands of Iraqi refugees were still occasionally fleeing into the ‘relative safety’ of Syria, for example in Hasakah, which also held many Syrian IDPs (Hasan and Alazroni 2016).

In the case of Afghanistan, most refugees went to Pakistan but most have since returned; overall since 2002, 4.7 million have returned (UNHCR 2016c). With the Syrian conflict, the great majority of the four million refugees have been camped in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, often in very poor conditions. Another 6.6 million IDPs were cared for within Syria. In late 2015 thousands of refugees were returning to wartorn Daraa, in south Syria, because of a lack of supplies in Jordan’s al Zaatari camp; indeed ‘departures [from that camp] by far outnumbered arrivals’ (AP 2015). This illustrates the fact that the impact of displacement within the region has been 20 times greater than that of the sea arrivals in Europe.

The Syrian arrivals in Europe in 2015 (about one third of the one million asylum seekers) seem to have been driven by a combination of war events in Syria plus internal developments in Turkey. Around 80% of the European arrivals in 2015 came from Turkey, and almost none directly from Syria (Bajekal 2015). Figure One shows a timeline of the numbers of sea arrivals in Europe, between April 2015 and 2016, and certain key war events. First was the invasion by a Turkey-Saudi-Qatari sponsored ‘Army of Conquest’ (Jaysh al Fatah), an alliance of Jabhat al Nusra and various ‘FSA’ groups, launched from Turkey into northern Syrian in March-April 2015. This militia soon took over much of Idlib and large parts of Hama, driving many people south to Homs and Damascus, west to the Syrian coast or north into Turkey. In May
2015 ISIS took over Palmyra and, over July-September the Government of Turkey carried out attacks on the Turkish Kurds, along the Syrian border. This war activity must have contributed to displacement and refugee flows within Turkey. However the timing of the transformation of these populations into the coastal exodus from Turkey must be questioned. One important indicator of the likely manipulation of these peoples is the fact that President Erdogan was able to reverse the flows after the conclusion of an October 2015 refugee agreement with EU leaders. The deal was that the EU would pay Turkey six billion Euros plus some political concessions to contain refugees from various countries, the largest group from Syria (Alkousaa et al 2016). Turkey already held a ‘reservoir’ of 2.2 million refugees (Bajekal 2015).

The invited intervention of Russian air power in Syria began on 30 September and was more or less consistent over following months. This period is associated with a steady decline in sea arrivals. There is thus a negative correlation between European sea arrivals and greater Russian involvement in Syria. We can conclude that new waves of the war in Syria and southern Turkey may have contributed to the spike in Turkey-Europe asylum seekers, but that internal Turkish policy considerations may also have facilitated this big outflow, and its fairly rapid reversal.

The deal with Turkey may have initially ‘worked’ because Mr Erdogan had the power to turn off the ‘tap’ he had most likely helped turn on. However the European attempt
to avoid its responsibilities under the refugee convention is causing a number of problems: Turkey is hardly a ‘safe haven’ for repatriation, the commitments to numbers of refugees accepted has not been met; and there is European dissatisfaction with a selection process which leads them receiving ‘serious medical cases or refugees with very little education’ (Alkousaa et al 2016).

2.3 Priority: end the war or stop the refugees?

Greater involvement of Russian air power and greater Iranian assistance with ground forces, led to a turning of the military tide in favour of Syria, over 2015-16. At the same time there have been multiple reports of Syrians returning to their homes. Those returns provide substance to the argument that helping stop the proxy war on Syria is foundational to dealing with displacement and the refugee problem.

As with the internally displaced, it is logical that refugees flee war and jihadists, following years of well-publicised atrocities against civilians. Public mutilations and beheadings must be intended to terrify. Anecdotal evidence that refugees want to go home is widespread. Video interviews with individual refugees show many non-politicised statements, such as: ‘I miss everything’, ‘I want to go back and see my friends and family in Syria’, ‘I wish to come back to the lovely country when the war will end’, and ‘Just stop the war … we don’t want to go to Europe’. Even the above-mentioned and flawed survey of refugees in Germany records a large majority wanting to go home. Top of their conditions for return was, unsurprisingly, that ‘the war has to stop’ (TSC 2016). The most logical understanding is that ‘going home’ means to the Syria of recent decades, before the conflict.

Wider evidence of refugee or IDP returns has emerged in the last year, since Syria’s alliance has reclaimed hundreds of villages and towns from the jihadists. Some of this was due to poor conditions in the refugee camps. In October 2015 several dozen per day were returning from Jordan to Daraa, preferring to face war at home than starvation in Jordan’s al Zaatari camp. At the same time, 94,000 returned to Syria from Turkey, half of these to Kobani after ISIS was defeated there; while another 140,000 left Lebanon, some for Turkey and some for Syria (AP 2015). In January 2016 hundreds of displaced families returned home to parts of Damascus, after some ceasefires took effect (AP 2016). After six months of Russian air power support for the Syrian forces, dozens of ‘reconciliations’ (ceasefires or surrenders) had been signed and, with the relative calm, there were steady returns of IDPs. In March dozens
of families returned to rural Hama, after jihadist groups had been ejected under Syrian Government ‘reconciliations’ (Syrian Observer 2016). More than 1,000 IDPs were said to be returning home every day (Valiente 2016).

By April, Syria Deputy Prime Minister Omar Ghalawanji told the IOM in Damascus that 1.7 million IDPs had returned to their homes, that the government was constructing more than 500 temporary shelters and another 2,000 houses in Damascus and Homs (SANA 2016a). In May Syrian Reconciliation Minister Ali Haidar reported that 35,000 families were expected to return home, after improvements in the security situation (SANA (2016b). These reports show an ongoing trend towards return of IDPs and refugees, once they are reassured the conflict has abated. That should reinforce calls to prioritise ending the conflict, as the key means of stemming the movement of displaced persons and refugees.

The conduct of the dirty war on Syria has caused confusion over the displaced peoples, aggravating the refugee crisis in several ways. First, the terrorism fomented by sponsors of the jihadist groups has ‘blown back’ to Europe and Turkey, helping provoke further European intervention and generating fear of terrorists joining the waves of refugees. Second, disinformation campaigns over the responsibility for this conflict has helped inflame European racial reactions to the asylum seekers. Third, militarised responses to the refugee phenomenon (the multi-national naval presence between Turkey and Greece) enhance European fears of an emigrant ‘threat’, reinforcing NATO hostility to the Syrian state.

3. Failures in responsibility

We have seen an aggravation of the standard war-drives-emigration phenomenon, with consistent disinformation over the proxy war on Syria and its links to the European refugee crisis of 2015. Terrorism fomented by NATO and the Gulf monarchies against Syria has ‘blown back’, helping provoke further European intervention and greater displacement. Disinformation about the series of Middle East wars has helped drive confusion and fear over the refugees.

Disinformation over the war in Syria, in particular, has been founded on the repeatedly asserted myth that ‘peaceful protestors’ took up arms against the government, that the Syrian government targeted, gassed and murdered its own civilians and that the western powers were then obliged to re-enter the region to protect both themselves and the world from extreme terrorism. In fact, as independent
evidence makes clear, those same powers with their regional allies (particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey) remain the key patrons of every single anti-government group in both Syria and Iraq.

Looking at displacement more widely, we can see that the burden has fallen far more heavily on the war targeted countries and their neighbours. Only 3 and 5 percent of displaced peoples in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria became sea-arrivals in Europe, in the peak year of 2015. Some of the spike in 2015 arrivals might be linked to war events in Syria and Turkey in the first half of 2015. However as 80% of sea-arrivals in Europe came from Turkey, the Turkish government’s management of peoples within Turkey is probably a significant factor. The Turkey-EU deal over refugee management led to a strong, controlled decline in sea arrivals. The Turkish Government most likely knew how to turn on and turn off the ‘tap’. There is no link between arrivals in Europe with the entry of Russian air power into the war in Syria, in fact there is a negative correlation. There is evidence of significant returns of IDPs within Syria, as Syrian forces advance against the western-backed jihadist groups, with ceasefires, ‘reconciliation’ agreements and the liberation of hundreds of towns and villages.

Western liberals often imagine that assimilating refugees from other countries is a great charity, but that is not the case when their governments are fuelling wars which drive those refugees. Archbishop Jean-Clément Jeanbart, the Melkite Archbishop of Aleppo said he was ‘not happy’ to see Syrians driven out of their own country. He would rather see western countries ‘making more efforts to allow the Syrian population to stay in Syria’ (in Vaillancourt 2016).

The USA and several of the European powers are in large part responsible for the creation and aggravation of the Middle East displacement crisis, which produced a European refugee crisis. Many millions are affected, yet no real solution is conceivable without addressing the roots of the problem. The series of Middle East wars must be fully understood, along with their aggravating factors. The European and NATO states’ acceptance of responsibility for their part in both the wars and the refugees remains central to any lasting solution.

Bibliography


Alkousaa, Riham; Giorgos Christides; Ann-Katrin Müller; Peter Müller; Maximilliam Popp; Christoph Schult; and Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt (2016) ‘The Many Failures of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal’, Spiegel Online, 26 May, online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-refugee-deal-between-the-eu-and-turkey-is-failing-a-1094339.html


Anderson, Tim (2016) The Dirty War on Syria, Global Research, Montreal


AP (2016) ‘Video: 100s of displaced Syrians families return home in Damascus’, Globe and Mail, 20 Jan, online:


Bartlett, Eva (2016) ‘Western Corporate Media ‘Disappears’ over 1.5 Million Syrians and 4,000 Doctors’, Global Research, 14 August, online: http://www.globalresearch.ca/western-corporate-media-disappears-over-1-5-million-syrians-and-4000-doctors/5541005


CROSSING BORDERS CONFERENCE


Hassoun, Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun (2016) Personal communication from Syrian Grand Mufti Hassoun to this writer, 12 April, Damascus


Jaber, Hala (2011) ‘Syria caught in crossfire of extremists’, Sunday Times, 26 June, online: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/article657138.ece


Rothman, Noah (2014) ‘Dempsey: I know of Arab allies who fund ISIS’, YouTube, 16 September, online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nA39iVSo7XE

RT (2014) ‘Anyone but the US! Biden blames allies for ISIS rise’, 3 October, online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11l8nLZNPSY

Rycroft, Matthew (2016) ‘Eastern Aleppo City is now encircled by the regime...300,000 people are now effectively besieged’, UK Government, 25 July, online: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eastern-aleppo-city-is-now-encircled-by-the-regime300000-people-are-now-effectively-besieged

SANA (2016a) ‘Ghalawanji: 1.7 million displaced citizens returned to their areas, 11 April, online: http://sana.sy/en/?p=74121

Seale, Patrick (1988) Asad: the struggle for the Middle East, University of California Press, Berkeley CA


Tharoor, Ishaan (2016) ‘Some Syrian refugees in Canada already want to return to the Middle East’, The Washington Post, 26 January, online:


Truth Syria (2012) ‘Syria – Daraa revolution was armed to the teeth from the very beginning’, BBC interview with Anwar Al-Eshki, YouTube, 7 November, online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FoGmrWWJ77w


Vaillancourt, Philippe (2016) 'Archbishop tells Canada: accepting refugees won't help Syria', Catholic Herald, 2 May, online: http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2016/05/02/archbishop-tells-canada-accepting-refugees-wont-help-syria/


Wikileaks (c2014) ‘NEW IRAN AND SYRIA 2.DOC’, Hillary Clinton Email Archive, online: https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/18328

Adjusting the Migrant Narrative
Sonia Anwar-Ahmed Martinez

Abstract

The paper is sparked by the recently-gone-viral Save the Children video depicting the effects of the Syrian war on children. Tangentially motivated by my recent work with unaccompanied minors in a camp in Lesvos, Greece, and in Calais, France, this paper seeks to achieve three aims. Firstly, it looks to expose the material realities of the crisis on children. Secondly, it seeks to scrutinize the establishment of international and domestic laws that fail to protect the rights of children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Thirdly, it equally criticizes the absence of targeted discussion in academia and social media, the effects of which are largely detrimental. At its broadest, it contributes to an understudied dimension of the crisis — that associated to unaccompanied minor’s displacement.

Using insights from literature concerned with the emotional and material realities of (any) migrating children, it uses empirical evidence collected in the aforementioned camps and academic material to illustrate the particular effects of international institutionalized failures.

Due to the exceptionally extensive scope of the topic, the focus will revolve around minors who seek asylum in European countries.

Keywords: unaccompanied minor, detention centres, Lesvos, institutionalized
failures, literary dearth

Introduction

Allow me to begin by posing a simple question to which the answer is, as will gradually become evident, rather complex: what does it mean to be a child borne out of a migrant crisis? And why is this inquiry even important? Surely it would be antithetical to make the journey of a 30-some year old Pakistani tantamount to that of a 15-year-old unaccompanied Afghani, and not necessarily by way of context nor origin, but simply by way of age and legal status.

In my earliest analyses, I began to think about the ways in which to understand those outstanding hurdles (i.e. those differentiated from the common obstacles of migrants generally) of an unaccompanied minor\(^1\) (1997), and perhaps, I too, got lost in translation. Naively, I thought I could propose that we see them as an intensification of ‘third culture kids’\(^2\), without accounting for their inseparable idiosyncrasy.

With that in mind, we should begin by providing (1) an account, by no means exhaustive, of the realities of unaccompanied minors occupying squats, camps, and detention centres, (2) the issues arising therefrom, and should not, this time, shy away from (3) critically evaluating the dearth of literature on this very topic. It may be noteworthy to understand that the importance of raising this latter issue is derived

\footnotesize{\(^1\) An unaccompanied child is a person who is under the age of eighteen, unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is, attained earlier and who is “separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has responsibility to do so.” (1997)}

\footnotesize{\(^2\) This term, coined by Dr. Ruth Hill Useem, describes children of expatriates, missionaries, military personnel and those children that, due to for example parents’ occupation, have migrated away from their homeland to numerous other countries.}
from its very consequences: academic blindness. Such carelessness yields to problems of misdirected psychological and legal treatment (or lack thereof altogether) towards persons whom are vulnerably unaccompanied, legally disregarded, politically discriminated, socially isolated, and culturally shocked.

My objective at this stage is not to provide a solution to what I perceive as faulty, but rather to canvas the faultiness in its different manifestations. Ultimately, considering reform is futile if we do not think that there is something wrong with our current establishment.

1. A Peek into Reality

Children roughly constitute half of the total refugee population worldwide. Amongst the European crisis travelers in 2015, 90,000 registered asylum applicants were unaccompanied (2016). The response? Notably, (i) overstretched and slow asylum systems and readily available detention centres (Collett, 2016), and (ii) a faulty international legal system under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC hereinafter; Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990/1577/UNTS 3).

(i) In 2015, 850,000 people entered Greece. In 2016 alone, the small island of Lesvos witnessed 94,970 arrivals (86,473 population in 2011 - a 110% population increase; 1997). This human overload coupled with the present state of the Greek economy and the little political incentive for effective intervention has led to systematic sluggishness and overcrowded camps which have forced the emergence of detention centres. For instance, despite Care and Custody being a key feature under the CRC that protects unaccompanied minors from arbitrary detention (Somers Landsberger and Pobjoy, 2007), places like Greece and Italy have been internationally castigated for using adult detention centres as an initial form of reception. Consider the case of Moria in Lesvos, Greece. This camp was, until recently, alleged to be a reception centre. Yet, the minors that I had been working with in a subsequent camp in Mandamados told me that they had been held in, essentially, ‘captivity’ (and I use this term loosely) for over 4 months.

(ii) Against this backdrop, the Dublin System (EU Regulation 2013) is also the subject of cynicism.\(^3\) Despite its premise promising to “create a legal framework\(^3\) Essentially makes the first country a refugee enters accountable for their claim.
for determining states’ responsibilities for assessing asylum claims” (Fratzke, 2015), the sheer influx of refugees means it has the perverse effect of placing the burden on particular southeastern coastal European countries. The result is a tacit obligation imposed on migrants to live in such insalubrious conditions insofar as other countries are consenting (or succumbing) to the political pressure to welcome unaccompanied minors.\(^4\) Clearly, the dystopian regulation was not drawn with these figures in mind, but somehow still lingers (Robinson, 2016).

1. Another questionable regulation has to be the EU-Turkey deal which allows for the return of migrants back into Turkey (Ulusoy 2016). Despite its intention to alleviate the latter of the exodus, it is seemingly paradoxical. Where the European Union has long boasted about its high asylum standards (Collet 2016), this treaty has effectively created a wall between the European ‘safe countries’ and the (not so) ‘safe third country’, Turkey.\(^5\) This label may be regarded as a way for European Union countries to justify their stringent border enforcement but raises serious eyebrows when analyzing the events in Askale\(^6\) and the unmissable attempted coup d’état, which effectively conclude the complete contrary of a ‘safe country’.

2. A Recapitulation of Research

This panorama is merely a small reflection of the current situation in many European refugee hotspots, but the reverberations of this are great in detriment. Academia has made an effort to describe the migratory effects on refugee children

---

4. See the ‘Dubs Amendment’ in regards to the United Kingdom.

5. The EU Asylum Procedures Directive, in light of Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention for Human Rights protecting the right not to be deported or extradited where an individual faces a real risk of degrading and inhumane treatment, provides that readmission (to Turkey, in this case) can only be done where the host country is a ‘safe third country’ (which can provide access to protection) (Ulusoy, 2016).

6. Reports have been made by local lawyers of unlawful practices of the employees working in deportation centres, including the denial of asylum claims in the absence of appropriate contemplation, and most pertinently to this paper, isolating minors from family members by placing them in cells where ill-treatment and torture are likely practices (Ulusoy, 2016).
generally; whether it is sufficient and satisfactory is a matter discussed subsequently. Notwithstanding, we must make a distinction between the general category of refugee children and unaccompanied minors. The latter, by nature of their circumstances, are far more vulnerable subjects of domestic and international deficiencies and illicit private organizations.

2.1 Procedural Shortfalls

On one hand, there are terminological discrepancies which allow states discretion as to the recognition of the protection of a child. For example, there is an absence of consensus upon the definition of ‘unaccompanied minor’ and upon the idea of the ‘best interest of the child’ (1987) providing a wide margin of appreciation to states in the context of their immigration and asylum laws, despite definitions being provided by the CRC (Somers Landsberger and Pobjoy, 2007). Other procedural issues include the age assessment and identification, considering that many unaccompanied and separated children lost their documentation in the process of fleeing or migrating. In effect, this makes the process of registration lengthier.

On the other hand, due to the inherent mass of migrants that have entered Europe vis-à-vis the incessant movement of refugees from camps and countries, the refugee status determination is incrementally more difficult particularly when many unaccompanied minors are not, in actuality, assigned a representative who is “familiar with the child’s background and who would protect his/her interests” (1997). Because the unaccompanied minor is not legally independent, s/he becomes increasingly invisible in the face of the law. So what? Inability to claim asylum, inaccessibility to education, inability to seek familial reunification are only a few of the obstacles faced therefrom. These systematic inadequacies are the direct effects of the domestic and international shortfalls. If we take a step further, we realize those embedded consequences of being an unaccompanied minor in this current political climate go beyond the summary refugee migration of the past.

2.2 Direct Effects

Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, unaccompanied minors are extremely susceptible to abuse and human trafficking, with over 10,000 disappearances in 2015 (2016). In addition, the unsatisfactory conditions of reception centres and squats means that there is a higher incentive for children, who have no real guidance (the
proportionality of social workers to unaccompanied minors is negligible) in many makeshift camps to join criminal gangs (Sherwood, 2015).

Secondly, we may identify ‘forced multiculturalism’ as a product of refugee migration. Several factors, notably political turmoil and violence in their country of origin, leaves children little to no time to contemplate the abrupt cultural change that would become imminent to them. This makes the process of assimilation or adaptation exponentially more challenging particularly where children develop forms of post-traumatic stress disorder. This was something that became quickly apparent to me when working in the camps in Lesvos. I could see a wide detachment not only between the Greek locals and the migrants, but between themselves. The camp was composed of Afghans, Pakistanis, and Syrian unaccompanied minors, many with initial biases towards each other. More than once did we witness surmounting cultural tensions erupting into full-blown fist fights.

Thirdly, we turn to identity issues. UNICEF has suggested that while many migrating children flourish in their new host country, there too are some who are prone to experience “marginalization and discrimination in the country of settlement, challenges in identity, and social and cultural dislocation” (Migration and Children, 2005). This cannot be more reflective of the current climate. Like other migrants, minors face xenophobic attacks, hate speech and stigmatization affecting their sense of identity. In light of the journalist who tripped the refugee and the present push by Viktor Orban to amend the constitution to avoid migrant quotas, Hungary is a prototypical example of the drawbridges to repress the refugee tide (Than, 2016). Other (micro) examples include the curfew (11pm) imposed on the children in Mandamados lest a local outcry would ensue alleging theft and intimidation. More specifically, shifting familial responsibilities also seem to have an incontestable impact on childhood. For example, in my time in both Calais and Lesvos, I noticed a trend whereby the eldest boy of a group of unaccompanied minors would be obliged to be implicated in the intercultural conflicts, in the grievances of the others, and most notably in their protection, mimicking a parental role. Notwithstanding its admiration, it is not unknown that separation from caregivers causes an important disruption in the nurture of adolescents, and premature parental responsibilities act as obstacles to the development of interpersonal skills (which are normally developed at this stage).

Lastly, perhaps it is most useful to illustrate manifestations of psychological effects by recounting an anecdote from my time in Lesvos. The shelters that the 50+
children lived in were quite skeleton-like: they simply had dismountable beds and curtains that would wrap the tent with a zip. It was a rule that children were not allowed to eat inside of their shelters for obvious hygienic issues (rotting food which could attract rats, snakes, and insects). When one of the other workers approached a group of boys who decided to eat inside and explained this to them, one of the boys vigorously stood up and started shouting in broken English, “We are living outside, so we will eat here”. It became clear to me, after the incident, that many boys did not make the distinction in their living condition between inside and outside. Effectively, they felt as though they were living in the streets save with a makeshift bed.

3. A Look Askance at the Wrongdoer

While children must be, in accordance with international law, afforded special protection, it seems the gaps in international and domestic law aren’t the only obstructions to human rights corridors. The discussed consequences of migration are topped off by a comparatively alarming dearth of literature on this topic. Material that is found tends to lack specificity, is often inconclusive and intuitive, and is mainly qualitative. There is an absence of tailored discussion on unaccompanied children pertaining to these conflicts, whether in academia or on social media. Children of the crisis are potential key players in the foreseeable future and yet they remain endnotes to sometimes misdirected and verbose discourse. In essence, it becomes hard to target the absolute rights of children when the narrative revolves around either our preconceived notions of migratory effects or on the catchall term ‘migrant’ that often deflects calls for specific action (which is an issue in itself). This portmanteau term, when unpacked, conflates economically motivated migrants, forcible migrants, environmental migrants, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers into one overwhelming ‘European Migrant Crisis’. Such a narrative is past its sell-by date.

It is because of this that it remains challenging to illustrate the effects of war and subsequent migration on children. The question then becomes extensively more premature than that which we tend to ask: what does it mean to be an unaccompanied child? I sustain the argument that we are hesitant to delve into a thorough analysis of this question because we simply cannot reconcile the entrenched conception of childhood with the instability of migration, conflict, and much less so with solitude. Granted, visual attempts were made by, for instance, Save the Children in 2015 when they published a YouTube video juxtaposing images of British and Syrian children as
they get on with their (very different) everyday lives. But even this latest optimistic indication of media traction is unfortunately flawed. Its purpose appeared to be to attract sympathy by making the Syrian child somewhat more relatable to the average Englishman or woman. However, the conflicts in Syria, Sudan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, amongst others, are too idiosyncratic to simply apply our preliminary knowledge of migration’s effects on children.

Conclusive Remarks

All things considered, it seems that we do not bear the means and appropriate mechanisms to perceive the severe ramifications of institutionalized legal letdowns. This, as has been evidenced, is the product of an outstanding limitation of this type of research: most figures are ballpark numbers. The lack of accessibility to statistics which rely on reception centres’ provision of registration numbers is blanketed by the problematic Dublin Regulation. This is because, in order to avoid its implications (i.e. having to be answerable to the claims of refugees), many countries let scores of people through their borders without registration, which means they remain oblivious to the legal system.

From the questionable conditions of certain camps, to the detention centres being used as arbitrary reception centres, to the very system that disables expeditious decisions on asylum claims lest the instability of their political and economic interests were to be hindered, it seems to me but a tragedy. That being said, despite outward appearance, this article does not seek to be pessimistic, simply critical. Notwithstanding, we must not forget the attempts made to create safeguards and better access to resettlement programs. For example, the current Catholic-Protestant Initiative (from nonprofit organizations) are seeking to obtain Italian humanitarian visas for refugees while simultaneously incurring the full costs of the entire process (Poggioli, 2016). However, it is the ability that states retain to derogate or exempt themselves from international legal obligation that seek to protect children’s rights and the specific legal obstacles that deter the obtainment of legal means to cross borders.7

---

7 For instance, Belgium’s asylum secretary Francine refuses to provide visas to Syrians for their resettlement in Belgium on the grounds that it would essentially open the floodgates to thousands of claims (2016).
What can we learn about the crisis by studying it through the lens of a minor? We may, effectively, see state indifference as a product of a wider political strategy (which is a discussion in its own right), which considers death and depression as collateral damage at the behest of border enforcement. In turn, the apparent stagnation and austerity measures on asylum and immigration law affect all dimensions of the migrant crisis, and in particular, as has transpired throughout this paper, the extreme vulnerability of an unaccompanied minor.

Reference List


EU Regulation No 604/2013.


Than, K. (2016) *Business Insider UK*: Hungary's president says he will amend the constitution to ensure the EU can't resettle migrants there.


**Author’s Biographical Note**

Sonia Anwar-Ahmed Martinez, is an LLB student at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and an active member of the volunteering community in the Calais and Greek camps. While engaging with a diverse variety of legal and non-legal topics, she has a particular affinity toward asylum and
"Beyond Human Rights: Being a refugee in the 21st century"

Zaruhi Baghdasaryan, Lund University, Master's degree in Middle Eastern studies

The following presentation attempts to provide an overview of the current deteriorating humanitarian conditions that most of the refugees are subject to, analysing them through the philosophical lens of Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben and his concepts of the state of exception and bare life.

In 1993, Agamben published a text about the status of the refugee, 'Beyond Human Rights', in which he linked the issue of refugees with human rights. The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights incorporates the motto of the French Revolution (freedom, equality, fraternity): 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' Yet while the article speaks of 'human beings', Agamben argues that human rights are not compatible with 'the human', the
merely alive, as such. In the case of the refugee, his or her political and legal status is considered a temporary state, Agamben writes in 'Beyond Human Rights'. Having arrived in another country, he or she, following a positive assessment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, is subjected to all sorts of control mechanisms (citizenship exams, language tests, etcetera) intended to turn him or her into a 'full-fledged citizen'.

To Agamben this politics did not originate in the contemporary age, but rather dates back to the Ancient Greeks’ distinction between 'the human', which was called simple or natural life (zoë), and a 'qualified life' by which the specific form of life or lifestyle of an individual or group (bios) was meant. According to Agamben, the position of the refugee coincides with that of the homo sacer, a figure in Ancient Roman law whom anyone could kill without committing a murder (in the legal sense). Agamben sees the ambiguity contained in this definition in the status of the refugee. Although he or she is a living being, he or she has far fewer rights than the citizens of nation-states. This cancels out the principle of the equality of all human beings as sentient beings.

Agamben argues that the expression 'birth' in the first article of the human rights declaration coincides with 'citizenship'. The consequence of this analysis is that there is no longer any room for merely being alive, the most elementary characteristic of any living being. Life is consequently absorbed in abstract variables called 'nation-state' or 'society' or 'law' or 'citizen' (and so forth). From this perspective, human rights turn out not to be genuinely universal, but in fact the property of citizens.

In Roman times, the homo sacer could not, under any circumstances, live in the city of the citizens. He was driven out (like the illegal refugee today) to the margins or the 'black holes' of society, situated far from the sight of the average city dweller. Today the refugee also appears as a margizen, whose life is qualitatively distinct from that of the citizen and of a temporary resident (denizen). He or she is a person who has no access to the collective goods and services of our society (security, insurance, work, education etcetera).

Another thinker, German-American political theorist Hannah Arendt asserted, that the conception of human rights based on the supposed existence of a human being as such, proves to be untenable as soon as those who profess it find themselves
confronted with the people who have lost every quality and every specific relation except for the pure fact of being human.

At last, Agamben claims, that even though non-citizens often have nationalities of origin, however, as they don’t seek the protection of their own states, they find themselves as refugees, in a condition of de-facto statelessness.

Nowadays refugees fleeing the wartime situations, persecution and violence, arriving at host countries find themselves in a similar de facto stateless situation, described by Agamben, while being deprived of their basic and fundamental human rights.

After the World War II, a multilateral Refugee convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees have been signed, accordingly in 1951 and 1967, setting out the rights of individuals who are seeking asylum and the responsibilities of the nations that grant asylum. According to some provisions of the convention, refugees are entitled to the rights of wage-earning employment, self-employment, public education, freedom of movement and family reunification, that obliges host countries to accord to refugees the same treatment as it is accorded to the nationals of their own societies.

Later, the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol have been ratified by 146 states around the world. According to international law, countries that have ratified the Refugee Convention are obliged to protect refugees that are on their territory, in accordance with its terms. Nevertheless, in many host countries, the basic rights assigned to refugees by the international convention, are being either not fulfilled or violated by the implementation of new domestic laws introduced by host states.

For example, the convention sets explicit obligations for host countries to permit asylum seekers and refugees to engage in both wage-earning and self-employment. The right to work has been recognized to be so essential to the realization of other rights that “without the right to work, all other rights are meaningless.” In practice, however, according to the 2014 report by Asylum Access and the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, efforts to implement work rights have been limited, and many of the world’s refugees, both recognized and unrecognized, are effectively barred from accessing safe and lawful employment for at least a generation.

A comprehensive response must extend beyond short-term needs if it is to enable refugees to rebuild their lives and achieve self-sufficiency during displacement.
Restricting the rights of refugees and delaying the attainment of durable solutions for years causes frustration and tension among refugees and in the host community. In such situations refugees, in particular women and children, become more vulnerable to various forms of exploitation such as trafficking and forced recruitment, and may develop a long-term dependency on humanitarian assistance. Often, the result is the marginalization and isolation of refugees, which can lead to an increase in irregular movements and even to security and stability problems for the host State, as well as for other States in the region.

Furthermore, the rights of refugees to public education have also been curtailed in many host societies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 recognised compulsory primary education as a universal entitlement.

Nevertheless, the UN figures show that access to education for refugees is very limited and uneven across regions and settings of displacement, particularly for girls and at secondary levels. Enrolment in primary school is only 76% globally and drops dramatically to 36% at secondary levels. Girls are at a particular disadvantage; in Eastern and the Horn of Africa, only 5 girls are enrolled for every 10 boys.

Moreover, the living conditions of refugees are being worsened by the implementation of national laws, introduced by host countries. Many European countries, that are signatories of 1951 UN Refugee convention hosting the highest proportions of refugees in Europe, have recently introduced domestic laws, which go against the basic provisions of the UN convention.

The Convention, states that the host countries are obliged to protect refugees by upholding the basic human rights and treating asylum seekers in accordance to humanitarian standards irrespective of their modes of arrival. However, many of the host states violate these laws. For instance, Austria has recently passed a law, according to which, the government will be allowed to declare a state of emergency over the migrant crisis, and limit the number of refugees to those facing persecution or who already have relatives in the country, while the rest can simply be subject to deportation. In addition, Austria, built a control centre and border fences on the borderline with Italy in the Alps, in order to control the influx of migrants into its borders.

Furthermore, another European country and party to UN convention, Hungary, has also enacted a law securing the borderline with Serbia, where the refugees come from,
by building a fence alongside of it. The new legislation makes anyone who illegally passes the border subject to a 3-year prison sentence. Besides, the Hungarian government declared a state of emergency or crisis, enabling a special protocol and threatening to deport the majority of migrants, while deploying police and army troops on the Serbian border.

It is worth mentioning, that even those refugees who follow the legal procedures, are not likely to receive a positive decision on their case. According to the Hungarian government's office of statistics, only 146 of more than 170 thousand applicants were granted asylum in the country in 2015.

In addition, Sweden's government, has recently proposed legislative changes which may take effect in the summer of 2016. The proposals involve limiting the asylum seekers' possibility to obtain a residence permit and to be reunited with their families.

And eventually, arguably, the most inhumane conditions for refugees have been created by the Australian government, when since 2012 it has reopened its detention centre on Manus Island, where hundreds of refugees are being detained awaiting the decision on their asylum application. According to Amnesty International, refugees living in the detention centre are subject to unbearable living conditions, having to share a room with 112 persons, where the diseases are widespread in the absence of adequate sanitary conditions, and where sexual assaults and suicide attempts are being reported constantly. Thus, Australia, yet another signatory of UN convention, treat refugees like criminals, denying them basic human rights of security, legal advice and immediate medical attention.

These are just fractions of responses from western host countries to the surge of humanity, which leaves refugees in the state of exception, marginalized and ostracized within the host societies.

Perhaps, it would be fair to end the presentation, by quoting the words of Hannah Arendt, from the article published in 1943, titled “We Refugees”:

‘If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an attitude more dangerous, since we live in a world in which human beings as such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered discrimination as the
great social weapon by which one may kill men without any bloodshed; since passports and birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction. It is true that most of us depend entirely on social standards; we lose confidence in ourselves if society does not approve us; we are-and always were-ready to pay any price in order to be accepted by society. But it is equally true that the very few among us who have tried to get along without all these tricks and jokes of adjustment and assimilation have paid a much higher price than they could afford: they jeopardized the few chances even outlaws are given in this topsy-turvy world’’.

Migrating to Europe: Racism, Imperialism, Politics Now and a Politics for the Future

Mike Cole

Abstract 200-250 words

In this chapter, I begin by looking at some conceptual issues surrounding migration and racism. As a case study, I consider the role of the Ideological State Apparatuses in the UK. I go on to examine the nature of hegemonic western imperialism and capitalism. I then summarise changes in policies on refugees one year after the death of Alan Kurdi. I conclude with some speculations about the future, focusing on the possibilities of a further financial crisis and what this means for the future of social democratic politics and socialism.

Keywords: migration, racism, imperialism, Ideological State Apparatuses, social democracy and socialism
Migration and Racism: some conceptual issues and why they are important.

It is a commonly held belief that racism is conscious antagonism and hate directed at people on the basis of the colour of their skin, and that concerns about migrants coming into one’s country are not racist but normal. With respect to skin colour, I would argue that while colour-coded racism remains a major global problem, racism is not necessarily based on skin colour: it can be non-colour coded. For example, racism can be ‘white’ on ‘white’, as, for example, with racism directed at Eastern Europeans in the UK by other white people (xeno-racism; Sivanandan, 2001); it can be ‘black’ on ‘black’, as in that racism meted out to migrant workers from other African countries in South Africa; it can be Asian on Asian, as is the case in some Asian countries: anti-Vietnamese racism in Cambodia is one example.

With respect to current migration into Europe, racism may be termed ‘hybridist’ in that whether colour of skin is the motivating factor is not clear. Such racism may be based on a general hatred of ‘immigrants’ or ‘migrants’ or ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘refugees’ or so-called ‘illegals’. This may be compounded by Islamophobia, another form of racism, where people perceived to be Muslims are ‘marked out not so much by … colour as by … beards and headscarves’ (Sivanandan, 2009, p. x).8

Categorising different forms of racism is important because it alerts us to the plethora of forms of racism in the modern world, making it more difficult to dismiss antagonism as ‘understandable.’ It also forces to the table a discussion

Racism is not, of course, just related to current migration. Descendants from former colonies are also subject to racism, such as people of Asian, black and Chinese origin in the UK. Anti-Gypsy, Roma and Traveller racism, often not colour-coded, has long been a feature in Europe, while antisemitism, another ongoing a long-standing form of non-colour-coded racism, is on the increase and has become a major talking point in political life, particularly in the UK at the moment (Cole, 2016a). Anti-Irish racism continues to be an unpleasant feature of life in the UK and elsewhere (Cole, 2016b).
of racism rather than the weaker term ‘xenophobia’, not really an appropriate term to describe the rampant racism directed at refugees, and others in the twenty-first century. In conceptualising different forms of racism, it is also important to point out that racism can be unconscious and/or unintentional as well as conscious and/or intentional. The effects are still racist, whether unconscious or conscious, unintentional or intentional.

A brief discussion of the rhetoric of Prime Minister Theresa May and the arguments of Opposition (Labour Party) leader Jeremy Corbyn may serve to exemplify the points I am trying to make. Is a concern about immigration racism or a legitimate fear? In many ways 'It's not racist to worry about immigration' works in the same way as 'I'm not racist but', an epithet which invariably is followed by a racist comment.

May’s speech, then Home Secretary, to the 2015 Conservative Party Conference, often seen as a bid for Conservative leadership, is particularly revealing and even offended the right-wing Tory-supporting online ‘broadsheet’, The Telegraph. As Executive Editor – Politics, James Kirkup put it, ‘It's hard to know where to start with Theresa May's awful, ugly, misleading, cynical and irresponsible speech to the Conservative Party conference today’. He summarised it thus:

If you haven't seen reports of it, allow me to summarise: ‘Immigrants are stealing your job, making you poorer and ruining your country. Never mind the facts, just feel angry at foreigners. And make me Conservative leader’ (Kirkup, 2015).

Kirkup analysed two of May’s key sentences as follows:

1. ‘And we know that for people in low-paid jobs, wages are forced down even further while some people are forced out of work altogether’. He then points out that a review of the evidence by May’s own officials concluded that ‘There is relatively little evidence that migration has caused statistically significant displacement of UK natives from the labour market in periods when the economy is strong’.
2. Immigration makes it ‘impossible to build a cohesive society.’ As Kirkup rightly points out, this is more of a subjective issue. However, as he reminds readers there is (considerable) ‘evidence … that the less personal acquaintance with migrants a person has, the more worried they are about immigration’. As he goes on, if immigration makes UK society less cohesive, that might be partly the result of ‘politicians pandering to ignorance and prejudice and wilfully distorting the evidence to persuade people to be angry and afraid?’ (Kirkup, 2015) (see my comments on the communications ISA in the section on ‘Racism in the UK’, later in this chapter). Kirkup concludes his comments on this particular line in her speech:

The Home Secretary says she's worried about immigration social cohesion. If she really wants to help, she could start by abandoning this cheap and nasty speech and the politics behind it … But then … political ambition is more important than talking responsibly and honestly about immigration, isn't it? What a curious form of leadership.

Jeremy Corbyn’s views on immigration stand in stark contrast to those of Theresa May.’ As Corbyn put it, as newly elected Labour Party Leader for the second time9 at the Labour Party Conference in 2016, despite pressure from key backbenchers to shift party policy after the Brexit vote, ‘A Labour government will not offer false promises. We will not sow division or fan the flames of fear. We will instead tackle the real issues of immigration – and make the changes that are needed’ (cited in Anka, 2016). Corbyn called for an end to to blaming issues in the UK on migrants, arguing that it was ‘shaming’ that hate crime against migrants had spiked since the EU referendum (Anka, 2016; see Cole, 2016a for a discussion). He went on:

9

After a protracted and viscous campaign from Blairites and others to force Jeremy Corbyn to resign, he was comfortably re-elected by nearly 62% of the vote, increasing his 2015 mandate.
It isn’t migrants that drive down wages, it’s exploitative employers and the politicians who deregulate the labour market and rip up trade union rights. It isn’t migrants who put a strain on our NHS, it only keeps going because of the migrant nurses and doctors who come here filling the gaps left by politicians who have failed to invest in training. It isn’t migrants that have caused a housing crisis; it’s a Tory government that has failed to build homes (cited in Anka, 2016).

‘We will act decisively to end the undercutting of workers’ pay and conditions’, he promised, ‘through the exploitation of migrant labour and agency working which would reduce the number of migrant workers in the process’. ‘And we will ease the pressure on hard pressed public services - services that are struggling to absorb Tory austerity cuts, in communities absorbing new populations’, he affirmed. Corbyn concluded that this is the ‘Labour way to tackle social tension investment and assistance, not racism and division’ (cited in Anka, 2016).

A spokesperson for Corbyn stated that Corbyn ‘is not concerned about numbers’, adding that rather than seeking controls on immigration, Labour would seek to mitigate its effects on low-paid workers by reintroducing a ‘migrant impact fund’ (cited in Stewart and Mason, 2016). ‘As long as the consequences of immigration are tackled, it is not an objective to reduce the numbers, to reduce immigration,’ the spokesperson concluded (cited in Stewart and Mason, 2016).

As Heather Stewart and Rowena Mason point out, ‘Corbyn repeatedly said during the referendum campaign that he did not believe Britain should seek to cut immigration’.

The Role of the Ideological State Apparatuses: the Case of the UK

On September 3, 2015, Britain’s most popular newspaper, the right-wing Rupert Murdoch-owned The Sun’s headline proclaimed, ‘Mr Cameron, Summer is Over … Now Deal with the Biggest Crisis Facing Europe Since WW2’. Accompanied by a photo of the dead body of 3 year old Alan Kurdi, on a Turkish beach, the paper went on, ‘Our Nation has a proud record of taking in desperate people and we should not flinch from it now.’ Seven weeks later The Sun (October 22) returned to its usual
racist rhetoric, with a headline declaring, ‘Illegals Have Landed.’ It went on to label 114 people who arrived at the RAF base in Akrotiri, Cyprus as ‘alleged refugees’, while accusing them of trying to find ‘a back door into the UK’, and employed alarmist rhetoric like ‘boatloads’ and ‘on Brit soil.’ Such discourse of derision (Ball, 2012) and exclusion, as several commentators have pointed out, functions ideologically like ‘Schrodinger’s Cat’\(^{10}\), since immigrants are seen contradictorily as a ‘threat’ both in the sense of ‘taking our jobs’ (absolutely hard working) and ‘living off the state’ (absolutely lazy) and undermining the welfare state. This underlines the point that even ‘seemingly positive attributes’ – ‘absolutely hard working’ - can have racist implications and recalls other such attributes (historically) such as ‘black children are good at sport’, followed by ‘but they aren’t much good at academic subjects’ or ‘Asian families have strong cultures’ and ‘they are taking over our culture.’

A report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2016) found a ‘number of areas of concern’ with respect to racism in the UK, in both what French neo-Marxist, Louis Althusser (1979) referred to as the communications Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) (press, radio and television, etc.) and the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties).\(^{11}\) In an article in the broadsheet, the Independent, Lizzie

\(^{10}\) ‘Shrodinger’s Cat’ refers to a theory of quantum mechanics known as ‘indeterminacy.’ Mathematically, a particle can be in two states at the same time. Schrodinger wanted to show that it was not true, so he came up with an illustration. This experiment is only hypothetical, and can't really be done. According to one observer:

Schrodinger said that if you put a cat in a box with a poison that might kill it, at the end of an hour the cat has a 50% chance of being alive, and a 50% chance of being dead. According to quantum mechanics, since we can't see in the box to know if the cat is alive or dead, the cat is both alive and dead. Of course, we know that this is not possible, nothing can be alive and dead at the same time … just what Schrodinger wanted to show.

Submitted by Sean (Michigan, USA) (May 6, 1998) [http://www.windows2universe.org/kids_space/scat.html](http://www.windows2universe.org/kids_space/scat.html)

\(^{11}\)
Dearden cites ECRI chair Christian Ahlund who notes ‘it is no coincidence that racist violence is on the rise in the UK at the same time as we see worrying examples of intolerance and hate speech in the newspapers, online and even among politicians’. David Cameron and Nigel Farage are the most prominent politicians who are singled out, the former for his reference to a ‘swarm’ of asylum seekers trying to get to the UK, the latter and his party UKIP for claims that people believe some Muslims want ‘to form a fifth column and kill us’. The ECRI also referred to another piece in The Sun, which likened refugees to “cockroaches” and a headline that claimed, ‘1 in 5 Brit Muslims’ sympathy for jihadis.’

**Western Imperialism and the Hegemonic Capitalist Politics of the Twenty-first Century**

Althusser (1979) contrasted the ISAs and the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs). The ISAs include:

- the religious ISA (the system of the different churches),
- the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘schools’),
- the family ISA
- the legal ISA (an RSA also)
- the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties),
- the trade-union ISA,
- the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),
- the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.).

The RSAs comprise:

- the Government
- the Administration,
- the Army,
- the Police,
- the Courts,
- the Prisons, etc.,
Western Imperialist Powers have, of course, been instrumental in creating more refugees now than at any time since World War II by never-ending wars. As Chris Marsden argues, for almost a quarter of a century since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reintroduction of capitalism in Russia and China, world imperialism has been seeking to take advantage to bring about what President George Bush senior proclaimed in 1991 to be the ‘new world order’ (Marsden, 2015). As Bush put it, the end of the 1990-1991 Gulf War against Iraq (when coalition forces from 34 countries led by the US led by the United States attacked Iraq in response to its invasion and annexation of Kuwait) would herald, a world ‘where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind [sic]—peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law’ (George Bush senior, cited in Marsden, 2015).

Since Bush senior’s pledge, the major imperialist powers have visited destruction and death on millions of people—overwhelmingly Muslims and people of colour—in wars in the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. In the words of the International Committee of the Fourth International (2014), ‘[t]ime and again they have proven their indifference to human suffering.’ Shortly after 9/11 (September 11, 2001) George W. Bush junior declared the ‘war on terror.’ The purpose of this ‘war,’ as Chris Marsden (2015) argues, both in its international and domestic manifestations, is ‘to provide a political rationale for the re-division of the world between the major imperialist powers’. Military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and elsewhere, he goes on, have taken place to install puppet regimes in order to secure control of oil, gas and other geostrategic resources, as part of an attempt at global hegemony. In the course of these bloody conflicts, the ‘imperialist powers have rained down bombs on defenceless civilians, carried out torture and assassination, and committed war crimes. Entire countries have been ravaged’ (Marsden, 2015).

Millions of people have been presented with no choice but to flee. Summarising a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Report (UNCHR, 2016), Adrian Edwards (2016) points out that wars and persecution have driven more people from their homes than at any time since UNHCR records began, with 65.3 million people (greater than the population of the UK, or of Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined) displaced at the end of 2015, compared to 59.5 million a year earlier. One in every 113
people globally is now either an asylum-seeker, internally displaced or a refugee (Edwards, 2016).

Three countries produce half the world’s refugees, Syria at 4.9 million, Afghanistan at 2.7 million and Somalia at 1.1 million. Colombia at 6.9 million, Syria at 6.6 million and Iraq at 4.4 million had the largest numbers of internally displaced people (Edwards, 2016). While the communications ISA in the West focuses on more than a million refugees and migrants who arrived via the Mediterranean, the vast majority of refugees are in the global south (UNCHR, 2016). In 2015, Turkey was the biggest host country, with 2.5 million refugees. With nearly one refugee for every five citizens, Lebanon hosted more refugees compared to its population than any other country (Edwards, 2016). Children made up over 50 per cent of the world’s refugees, many separated from their parents or carers or travelling alone (Edwards, 2016).

The EU-Turkey Deal

The plight of refugees is, of course, exacerbated by the sealing of borders in the European Union and by the EU-Turkey Deal in March, 2016, via which the European Union struck a £4.6 billion deal with Turkey, plus loosened visa restrictions on Turkish citizens, in exchange for Turkey taking back migrants arriving in Greece. There was, of course, nothing benign about this move. It was an attempt mitigate the ‘crisis’ in the EU and deflect it away. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2016) has given five reasons why this is a bad arrangement for refugees.

First, their rights are in jeopardy, since the deal ‘is putting at risk the very principle of the right to seek refuge’. As the NRC explains, civil society cannot fully assess whether the rights of refugees and migrants are being upheld both prior to and after return to Turkey since timely access to information on this is challenging. ‘The refugees and migrants’, it goes on, ‘that NRC staff interact with express fear of what will happen if returned to Turkey, if they will be detained there, and if it means onwards return to their country of origin’.

Second, there is insufficient legal information, counselling and assistance in Greece to ensure fair asylum hearings, which is part of the deal:
it is not realistic to believe that the 26 lawyers deployed to six islands and six lawyers for the mainland, in addition to a few other legal projects by NGOs and volunteers, is sufficient to cover the legal needs of 13,080 people on islands and 46756 on the mainland – thousands of people who all need various degree of legal information, individual counselling and assistance (NRC, 2016).

Third, asylum seekers are kept in detention. While the majority of new arrivals are no longer detained, those who arrived after the EU-Turkey deal are not allowed to leave the islands without special permission. Moreover, while the number of people arriving in Greece since the deal has drastically reduced, among the thousands that still make the hazardous sea journey, there are ‘security threats and violence, gender and sexual based violence; self-harming among minors, hunger strikes and suicide attempts’ (NRC, 2016). In addition to the gap in mental health and psychosocial support services, refugees and migrants relate their despondency directly to the slow and confusing asylum process (NRC, 2016).

Fourth, as is well known, Europe is not taking its fair share of responsibility.

Finally, the deal may well push people towards more dangerous routes (NRC, 2016) in ever more dangerous boats (Kingsley, 2016a). At the time of writing (November, 2016) 4,220 people have drowned in the southern Mediterranean – the highest in the Mediterranean on record (Kingsley, 2016a).

The death of Alan Kurdi one year on

As Patrick Kingsley (2016b) points out, ‘A year ago, Alan’s tragic death seemed to have shifted the political discourse on refugees. European leaders appeared to have been shocked into forming more compassionate policies, while previously hostile media outlets took a more conciliatory tone’. However one year later, the small shifts in policy and discourse have been shown to be temporary (Kingsley, 2016b). As Kingsley explains:

With rightwing populists on the rise across the continent, and a perceived connection between migration and terrorism, Europe has gradually abandoned the humanitarian approach of last winter. Austria,
which was once a key German ally on migration policy, now wants an Australain-style approach that could see Greece formally used as a giant holding bay for asylum seekers … Even Sweden, which previously gave Syrians indefinite asylum, has reined in its generosity ‘The Balkan humanitarian corridor’, Kingsley goes on, ‘has shut’ … The relocation scheme has proved dysfunctional: the rest of Europe has accepted just 5142 people from Greece, instead of the 66,400 promised’. ‘And’, Kingsley argues, ‘if the EU had its way, most of the few people still arriving on the Greek islands – the weekly numbers are now in the hundreds, rather than the tens of thousands – would now be deported back to Turkey under the EU-Turkey migration deal’ (Kingsley, 2016b).

The one lasting and positive result, Kingsley concludes, in the year since Alan’s death is ‘a wave of grassroots aid groups have been set up to respond to the crisis – founded by the public, and funded by thousands’, with many ‘working on the ground in Greece, Calais and the Balkans’

The coming financial crisis in Europe

According to Dick Nichols (2016) the ‘trials of major European banks, starting with “venerable institutions” like the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (the world’s oldest bank) and Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest), have raised the spectre of another 2008 — a “Lehman Brothers times five” in the words of one finance market analyst’. As Nichols points out, Deutsche Bank:

has been found to be seriously undercapitalised, both according to the international bank regulation standards … as well as in relation to its own targets. The bank, whose US division failed Federal Reserve stress tests earlier this year, has been described by the International Monetary Fund as probably ‘the most important net contributor to systemic risks.’

The immediate cause of Deutsche Bank’s plight, Nichols goes on, was the insistence of the US Justice Department in September 2016 that it pay $14 billion in compensation for peddling worthless mortgage-backed securities to US housing finance providers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the 2008 crash. Moreover, according to Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf, Deutsche Bank, a specialist
in financial derivatives, is also ‘structurally weak … [and] highly leveraged by the standards of its peers. Roughly half of its €1.8 trillion in assets are linked to its trading activities … [It] is a highly-leveraged bank with a doubtful business and opaque assets’ (cited in Nichols, 2016). As analysed by German bank Berenberg, Deutsche Bank held 96% (€32 billion) of its assets in the lowest grade … whose nominal value is established by the best guesses of risk managers. These financial instruments contributed a lot of the dynamite that made the 2008 finance markets implosion so globally devastating (Nichols, 2016).

As Nichols explains, Monte dei Paschi is a simpler case. The only bank to fail the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) most recent stress test, Monte dei Paschi has lost €15 billion over the last five years because it has nearly €30 billion in non-performing loans on its books. Non-performing loans for the entire Italian bank sector total €360 billion (18% of all loans), and, according to Euromoney magazine, are causing great anguish for European banking regulators (cited in Nichols, 2016).

Enormous collapses in share values for both banks, Nichols, points out, would seem to confirm predictions of impending disaster. As he concludes:

> The low profitability of banking is set to continue because it is driven by three very intractable factors: the huge stock of non-performing loans; the low, even negative, interest rate environment caused by the low demand for credit; and the ongoing overcapacity in an industry that it also being challenged by developments in new financial technology (‘fintech’) such as crowd-funding, peer-to-peer lending and private money systems like Bitcoin … This is the brink on which both Deutsche Bank and Monte dei Paschi di Siena are now perched: they are at the point where paper thin confidence in their future could give way before any more bad news, producing the ‘rush for the exits’ that finished off Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Nichols, 2016).

**Conclusion**

Political Polarisation in Europe is, of course, much greater than the last financial crash in 2008, as indeed it is in the US and worldwide.

To take the UK as an example, politicians are not just divided on issues of immigration, as discussed briefly above. Despite Theresa May’s rhetoric of using the
power of the state as ‘a force for good’, to help the working classes and her promise to ‘come for’ tax avoiders and irresponsible bosses (cited in Grace, 2016), there is another agenda. While May intends, in a clear attempt to gain the centre ground in the light of the move to the Left in the Labour Party, to put flesh on the bones in the coming months on housing; broadband; regional growth; and corporate governance, as well as the energy firms, and perhaps herald the end the era of quantitative easing or printing money because it helps those at the top rather than the bottom (Grace, 2016), the reality is a proposal for a new wave of grammar schools, and a criticism of ‘activist left-wing human rights lawyers’ (cited in Grace, 2016).

If May’s politics are, as yet, light on specific policy, those of Jeremy Corbyn are more specific. As I wrote in the Huffington Post, following his first election to the leadership of the Labour Party in 2015, ‘Corbyn’s campaign agent and fellow left-winger John McDonnell told a packed pub of campaign staff soon after Corbyn’s election to leader of the Labour Party that they had ‘changed the world ... changed the Labour Party and ... opened up a whole opportunity now to change our country’ (Independent, 12 September).

Corbybn’s remarkable original landslide victory (nearly 60% at the first round of votes) has indeed changed the Labour Party. His policy commitments - renationalizing the railways; bringing back the 50% tax rate for the top 1% of earners; opposing Trident and wars generally; rent controls; a mandatory living wage; and scrapping tuition fees and reintroducing maintenance grants for the poorest university students - represent a renewed and revitalised social democratic politics, and a move away from austerity/immiseration capitalism (Corbyn’s insistence that austerity and poverty are not inevitable itself signifies a major shift in Labour Party policy).

Other central policy planks include, real equality for women; the creation of a low-carbon economy and the championing of community-owned renewable energy; the building of a million new homes, including half a million council homes; the ending of health service privatisation.

If this were to happen, there would a basic shift away from neoliberalism to social democracy. What is important for socialists is that, as a result of the ascendance of Corbyn and others like him in mainland Europe, and indeed the rise of Bernie Sanders in the US, socialist arguments have now become mainstream. This is crucially important, given the worldwide growth of racism and the resurgence of fascism.
References

Althusser, L.


European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2016) ECRI Report On The United Kingdom (fifth monitoring cycle), October 4, Strasbourg: Council of Europe


Sivanandan, A. (2001) ‘Poverty is the new black’, Race and Class 43 (2)


Radicalizing Democracy in schools

Orestis Didimiotis, Ph.D. Candidate, Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens.

Corresponding author:
Orestis Didimiotis
Delvinou 72, Kypseli, 11362, Athens, Greece
Email: orestisd@otenet.gr

Abstract

Democracy refers to a supplementary region of being that neutralizes the oppositions through which domination and allegiance come into play at the level of the social: i.e. the older over the younger, the rich over the poor, the wise over the ignorant etc. To what extent is the “democratic supplement” (Rancière, 2001) compatible with the institution of school - an institution that by definition embodies the distance that separates those who know from those who do not know? How it can be reconciled (if it can) with the idea of truth and the epistemological concept of break (Althusser, 1996) – so essential to the construction of knowledge and to any pedagogy of the science to be taught? In few words, what is the relationship between emancipation and learning?

Keywords: democracy, emancipation, equality, learning, schooling.
Radicalizing Democracy in Schools\textsuperscript{12}

To be radical means to grasp the root of the matter. But what is the root of democracy? According to Rancière (2001), the constitution of the demos (from PIE *da- to divide, to distribute) comes to a rupture with the logic of arche, namely the assumption that there is a correspondence between a capacity for ruling and an (in)capacity for being ruled. This rupture should be understood in a structural sense: the demos is a political “artifice”, a supplement that denies any principle of dissymmetry as the ground of the common. What is identified by democracy with the role of the community is the collective embodiment of the “power of whoever” (Rancière, 2009a, p. 10), the power of those who are not "entitled" to exert power by the privilege of any quality either wealth, age, wisdom, origin or else. Democracy is that state of exception where all the axioms of domination are suspended; where our intellectual capacity to think, to speak, to make decisions etc. is indifferent to the unequal social order.

Plato used to blame democracy that it cannot be founded on truth. The institutionalized equality between what has value and what has not value, between the equal and the unequal hinders any access to the real difference between true and falsehood or between a process of truth and freedom of opinion. The virtue of wisdom (the principle of enlightened guiding) is undermined; “the scholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike»; […] “the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic” (Plato, 2008). Since the “thirsty for freedom” has pervaded the city, unlimited semblances and opinions may appear but not the truth. The democratic world is a world of universal substitution; therefore it is not a world but an anarchist regime of appearances.

\textsuperscript{12} In this paper I elaborate some of the ideas underpinning (although in a latent form) the project “democratic education” – an academic initiative of the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration and the Department of Early Childhood Studies of the University of Athens. For more information about the project visit the website www.demopaideia.gr (in Greek). Regarding the paper, I take the full responsibility for what is written.
Behind the Platonic critique (which do not cease to return in various variations of aristocratic nostalgia) lies something more than a conservative hostility against democracy: the question at stake is bigger: what is the meaning, the forms and the challenges of an existence deprived of any founding declaration? Perhaps, we should accept, agreeing with Nancy (2010), that democracy does not offer a program for the realization of man. The latter, always partial and temporary, is a matter of the “being-in-common”, of the communism\(^\text{13}\) of the demos that “wholly engages man as the risk and chance of himself, as a dancer over the abyss” (p. 33). Democratic politics - that is a continuous return to the politics of breach - must keep open and constantly renew the access to the multiple modalities by which sense comes into play (such as love, art, friendship, passion, science etc.), and promote existence towards undetermined ends - the accomplishment of which exceeds the responsibility of the political.

The foil of arche denotes a potentiality: the ability of people, detached from their physical place, to reinvent their own selves and to devise ways of action to contribute to the common. Democracy signifies the opening of a new history that overthrows the assumption of a destiny or a plan that precedes existence (democracy is not by essence figural) and delivers the world entirely to the responsibility of human – a human being indeterminate, undefined and capable to constantly transcend himself in a vertigo of meaning (Nancy, 2010). The ultimate markers of certainty are destroyed; the “truth” of being together takes the shape of an endless series of questions. How can we deal with this uncertainty? By declaring that the forms of scientism are endogenous to “theoretical practice”, Althusser rejects any idealist deviation: “truth identifies itself not as a Presence but as a Product” […] as it emerges in its own production” (1976a, 137). This is an anti-theological position that displaces any pattern of transcendence: truth has no origin, no telos, no subject as the guarantee of its legitimacy. The criterion of knowledge (how to distinguish between a more adequate interpretation and a less adequate interpretation, between true and false?) is interior to theoretical practice itself. Truth is produced as a conjunctural result, as an unpredictable encounter that disproves the fantasy of a self-consciousness absolutely concurrent with itself.

---

\(^\text{13}\) From PIE *ko-* "together" + *\textit{moi}-n-, suffixed form of root *\textit{mei}- (1) "change, exchange", hence literally "shared by all."
Democratic institutions such as school bear the traces of this paradox. They are democratic insofar they are obliged to inscribe the “power of whoever” and ensure some minimum but actual forms of equality. The notion of student implies a certain disconnection from the habitual conditions of sensible experience of everyday life. By separating children from their family or labor process, the school offers an aesthetic experience of universality, an exception to the logic of domination. This is not an illusion, an ideological veil concealing the inequalities of real life. Rather it is an inscription of equality in a world of inequality. In a first approach, thus, the school is indeed a democratic institution: it creates a public space-time for exercise and free play; a “profane” condition in which everything in the world is open for common use: knowledge is released from the established utilitarian usages and it is offered for its own sake (Masschelein and Simons, 2010). Here lies the significance of the struggle for widening access to education and registering refugee students into public schools. Democratic institutions may prove to be the best guarantors of democratic freedoms or even to favor democracy to dismantle the reactionary counter-movements that threaten it (Abensour, 2009).14

The school – a true inheritor of Enlightenment - is an institution that allows students to develop a relationship with knowledge completely different from that offered within the family or in productive life. In school we learn to think using concepts: the world tends to be approached as a theoretical abstraction rather than through practical exercise on the side of the father or a craftsman. School knowledge provides access to the realm of (scientific) Reason, namely to a special relationship with the world that borrows its forms from argumentation, reflection, logic, experimentation and critical thinking. However, the exploitation of this relationship and its emancipatory dynamics remains potential. We know that the best way to «neutralize» the critical, subversive content of school knowledge is to turn it into an object of instruction in a class lesson through absolute and authoritatively imposed interpretations. The explanatory model of teaching – the modern myth of pedagogy according to Rancière (1991) - maintains an oppressive structure that restricts students’ autonomy and critical thinking and perpetuates their dependency on

14 Let’s bring in mind the recent reactions of “Parents and Guardian Association” against the enrollment of refugee students in Oreokastro, Thessaloniki.
teachers’ instructions: “understanding is what the child cannot do without the explanations of a master” (p. 5). Learning as a revealing, enjoyable and potentially liberating process is undermined by the standardization of questioning, the monotonous confirmation of the rule, the dullness of the familiar, the absence of time for self-reflection, the segmented and gradual nature of instruction. Explanation implies a whole framing that contrasts two kinds of intelligence: the one who knows and the one who does not know; the one who sees the “connections of the whole” and formulates the sequence and the gradation of learning and the one who lacks the capacities for making links as it is entrapped in the idiotic\textsuperscript{15} state of things, in the platonic distribution of time that limits experience to the exercise of particular aptitudes given by instructions: “the lesson does not wait”. Far from being emancipatory, the very act of explanation constitutes a dramatic source of stultification\textsuperscript{16}, an ideological mechanism that reproduces the division between the enlightened and the ignoramus (Rancière, 2016). Teachers are being transformed - albeit unwittingly- into ideological bearers of stability, into a kind of “theoretical police”: "Old, learned, respectable bald heads edit and annotate the lines", the Irish poet William Butler Yeats writes in “Scholars” (1919, p. 25).

Enlightenment’s demand for autonomy passes through emancipation: the idea that we have to get out of a regime of guardianship or dependency - Kant talks about leaving the self-imposed nonage: “have courage to use our own understanding” without direction from another (1996, p. 17). Similarly, Rousseau writes in Emile: “Let him not learn science, but discover it for himself. If once you substitute authority for reason, he will not reason any more; he will only be the sport of other people's opinions” (1889, p. 124). The pedagogic program of enlightenment oscillates between a double order: listen to your teacher but don’t really listen to him, think for yourself (Dunne, 2016, p. 20). The effects of this ambivalence can be detected not only in the explicative logic that has penetrated many emancipatory pedagogies (keeping students in a regime of tutelage) but also in its supposed counter-tendency: a growing

\textsuperscript{15} From idios, own, private (but also ignorant person, idiot) as opposed to one taking part in public affairs.

\textsuperscript{16} A term used in the English translation by Kristin Ross (Rancière, 1991) meaning a cause to lose interest, to appear useless or stupid.
(anti)pedagogical relativism according to which we have to leave students to freely develop their ideas and interpretations by themselves using their experiences from everyday life, often against the official “truth” of the curriculum. The limits of this tendency, that at its most extreme rejects the existence of a rational criterion for the superiority of one approach against another, become more apparent if we think cases in which we have to deal with stereotypical and prejudicial thinking, not to say reactionary or nationalist, racist etc. beliefs.

Epistemology is quite clear about the question of knowledge: the latter can neither be recollected nor transmitted nor simply replaced. Rather it is the product of an intellectual activity that proceeds through ruptures and rectifications (Althusser, 1996; Bachelard, 2002). Or at least, since the break is never clean, through detours, discontinuities and surprises. We always learn against a prior knowledge. To learn means to doubt, to question, in a sense to “unlearn” what is already known or what is supposed to be known. Learning is by definition a matter of “unlearning”\(^\text{17}\): of dissolving the established and recognized as obvious interpretations. It is a process occurring at the intersection of meanings that create cognitively subversive encounters; a disruptive force that upsets the habits of thought and makes the world intellectually uncertain. “A false idea cannot be corrected by simply preaching the naked truth, and waiting for its anatomical obviousness to “enlighten” minds. A counterforce has to be applied to destroy the [ideological] force keeping them bent” (Althusser, 1976b, p. 190). How to organize this counterforce without succumbing to the logic of inequality inscribed in the explanatory model?\(^\text{18}\)

Intellectual activity performs itself within what Rancière calls a “distribution of the sensible” (2004), namely a system of self-evident facts that define what is

\(^{17}\) See the recent elaborations on the “pedagogics of unlearning” (Seery A. & Dunne, 2106).

\(^{18}\) According to Althusser (1996), traditional pedagogy registers that theoretical imperative in its forms of practical existence, that is the institutional distance that separates teachers from students. These forms embody the theory of break in a latent situation. Therefore, counterforce takes the form of an exteriority; it comes from outside: in opposition to hegelian phenomenology, there is no internal transition from ideology to science.
offered to our perception, what is visible and audible and what is not. The contrasts between speaking and hearing, board and desk, explanation and understanding, instruction and exercise, learning and pleasure etc. (institutional divisions of school life) designate a distribution of roles and positions, and of the capacities and rights associated with these positions. They are “embodied allegories of inequality” (Rancière, 2009b, p. 12) that set barriers to students’ intellectual activity defining a priori the normality of its manifestations. They maintain a pervasive ranking of intelligences that gives birth to borders, divisions and exclusions. The notion of student is broken down into a series of contrasts: good and bad students, proficient or basic, clever and slow, diligent and lazy etc. The resulted “intellectual difference” (Balibar, 2014) establishes a form of domination that rests not on the level of consciousness but on the level of the materiality of the mechanism itself within which the work of our mind is linked with that of all the other minds. In school, learning almost always refers to the use of a knowledge that is never being questioned. Students are required to appropriate a curriculum presented as self-evident truth, uncritically memorizing assumptions and conclusions. Their relationship with knowledge is a relation of storing and recalling "dead" sentences detached from any creative activity. Not accidentally, students all over the world find school lessons boring and tedious: school tends to turn into a stifling and conservative institution, immersed in boredom and the lack of meaning.

What can be opposed to the explanatory system? What does an un-explanatory method look like? The poetic work of translation, the production of “indications” that can function as points of reference, triggers or notice boards - an Althusserian idea further elaborated by Manusco, (2016) - or even developing techniques of “détournement” and “short-circuit pedagogy” (Trier, 2014) are some useful points of reference. However, according to Rancière (2016), un-explaining does not constitute an alternative pedagogical or anti-pedagogical model: “[i]ntellectual emancipation is not about teaching and learning. It is about equality and inequality. Or rather it is about teaching and learning only to the extent that their relationship embodies the logic of inequality” (p. 29). The Jacotist method for intellectual emancipation implies a rupture with the logic of pedagogy. In this sense, emancipation takes place in spite of truth rather than because of truth. It is demonstrated by a poetic action – a
“beautiful lie”- that cannot “be rationalized in the form of a discourse that separates truth from illusion” (Rancière, 2009a, p. 18).

What matters is to disturb the platonic myth of inequality that connects students to talents, capacities and positions, and attributes everyone her/his place; to oppose the assumption that there are indeed talents, dispositions and inherent qualities (natural or cultural). The main challenge is to conceive and implement practices that manifest the intellectual equality of students, “erasing the barriers that the explicative system had put on the paths of the communication between speaking beings” (Rancière, 2016, p. 41). Intellectual equality doesn’t mean that all the manifestations of intelligence are equivalent to each other. Rather it means that the same intelligence is at work in all the acts of the human mind and that equality is a starting point; a premise (“everybody is able to”) that needs to be constantly verified. That verification contributes to the framing of a new fabric of common experience that contains the possibility of new forms of political subjectivization. Emancipation starts from the moment the acts of teaching and the acts of learning begin to dissociate; when the two characters set up by the “dramaturgy of explanation”, the pais and agogos, are disputed (p. 29); when codified behaviors and identities based on institutionalized hierarchies suddenly collapse and give way to disruptive forms of action and speech.

Democracy, as we know, is the name of a transformation that can never be completed: “a revolt in constant revolution” (Nancy, 2011), a “permanent anti-oligarchical insurrection” (Balibar, 2008), a struggle or a convergence of struggles for the “democratization of democracy itself”. In a crucial sense, democracy is never something that you can claim to possess; but only something that you have to invent and reinvent (p. 526). From this perspective, democratizing schooling means more than the constant demand for widening access to it: it means to invent new types of relationships between teachers and students, to blur the dividing lines, to deny border areas and the exclusivity of powers; it means to experiment with new uses of space and time, and exercises that set to work unexpected capabilities and articulations between the ways of doing, of being and of saying in the classrooms;¹⁹ it means to

¹⁹ Fielding (2001) has developed an interrogatory framework for evaluating the conditions for student voice. These questions concern speaking, listening, spaces, organizational arrangements etc. (who is allowed to speak? In which cases? What language is encouraged? What are the spaces in which these encounters might take place? Etc.)
promote processes that enhance meaningful student engagement and self-organization (see Fletcher, 2005); it means to offer learning its playful condition. This is the case of the Self-Organised Learning Environment (SOLE) proposed by Sugata Mitra where students are encouraged to work as a community to explore their own original questions using the Internet. Another example is the production of video-tutorials by students themselves – a current tendency in peer tutoring. Students take the responsibility of presenting a concept or a theme from the curriculum to their classmates in the form of a video-lecture or screencast. By this way, they come in the unusual position of having to expound an idea or develop an argument about something (a meaning, a possible connection) they found out by themselves. Hence a new regime of understanding that develops itself through the “brouhaha of voices” and the bustle of thought rather than the customary silence required by the master (“be quiet and listen to your teacher”).

Un-explaining does not imply the abolition of teacher but rather the transformation of his role. The teacher dissociates his teaching from his knowledge. He does not attempt to teach what he knows (and thereby limit the access to meaning) but to encourage students to wander in the “forest of signs and things” (Rancière, 2009b, p. 10), to tell what they saw and what they think, to verify and be verified. He listens to his class; he selectively intervenes or stands down when needed. His role is to mobilize students' will and desire for learning. Between the teacher and the student there is always a third term, a (re)presentation that does not belong to either of them. The student learns from the teacher something that does not know either the teacher himself. His learning is the result of a teaching that urges him to investigate on his own: to choose, to compare, to experiment and to verify or disprove the results of his research. Each meaning is being developed in this way: a feeling, an idea, an emotion.

---

20 “First of all we have to be able to pose problems. […] For a scientific mind, all knowledge is an answer to a question. If there has been no question, there can be no scientific knowledge.” It is precisely having this "sense of the problem" that marks out the “true scientific mind” […] and gives to reason “reasons for developing” (Bachelard, 2002, pp. 25, 29).

21 Regarding the cognitive transformations brought about by new technologies and today’s revolution in communication, see Serres, 2014.
encounter. The student is simultaneously a speaker and a listener, an observer and an interpreter; a (co) producer of knowledge who as the translator appropriates and reproduces the meaning found in texts and connects it with his unique intellectual adventure.

The weakening of the traditional authority of the teacher – the more nostalgic still reminisce the old days: “At whose entrance do students rise?”, George Steiner (2003, p. 222) asks himself - presents a challenge which is nothing more than democracy itself: to think of the learning process based on a more active and meaningful participation of the learner. This is a deeply political decision that should be accompanied by a clear awareness that it now opens for teachers a vast and largely uncharted field of work for which we do not have but only signs or indications.

Reference List


**Author’s bio**

Orestis Didimiotis studied Psychology at Panteion University in Athens. He undertook postgraduate studies at the London School of Economics (LSE) and Birkbeck College, University of London. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens. His research interests include social and political theory, education and epistemology.
Refugees, State and State-corporate crimes. Lesvos case

Statos Georgoulas
University of the Aegean

1. In the summer 2015 some of the Aegean Islands (mainly Lesvos, Chios, Kos, Leros, Samos) received a huge influx of refugees, which by far exceeded existing capabilities in reception and hospitality. Typically, only July 2015, Lesvos received nearly 55,000 refugees/migrants, while the number of arrivals on the island in 2014 was almost 12,000 and in 2013 less than 4,000 refugees/migrants.22

In order to have a better view on the statistical reality of the total migration flows in Greece, we present tables according to a recent demographic research23.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>4994</td>
<td>3797</td>
<td>0,53</td>
<td>5484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30,34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>2557</td>
<td>2829</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2132</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>16,4</td>
<td>2491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>1254</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>4968</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>9176</td>
<td>5213</td>
<td>7,32</td>
<td>9570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>2834</td>
<td>5512</td>
<td>8830</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>2726</td>
<td>4535</td>
<td>6,37</td>
<td>4600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>0-13</th>
<th>14-17</th>
<th>18-33</th>
<th>34+</th>
<th>Men %</th>
<th>Wome n %</th>
<th>0-13</th>
<th>14-17</th>
<th>18-33</th>
<th>34+</th>
<th>Men %</th>
<th>Wome n %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>8,89</td>
<td>4,57</td>
<td>43,98</td>
<td>16,37</td>
<td>73,81</td>
<td>7,06</td>
<td>1,61</td>
<td>11,08</td>
<td>6,44</td>
<td>26,19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>8,49</td>
<td>4,96</td>
<td>56,60</td>
<td>7,42</td>
<td>77,46</td>
<td>6,31</td>
<td>1,71</td>
<td>10,50</td>
<td>4,01</td>
<td>22,54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>8,67</td>
<td>3,81</td>
<td>44,44</td>
<td>15,18</td>
<td>72,10</td>
<td>6,85</td>
<td>1,96</td>
<td>12,50</td>
<td>6,59</td>
<td>27,90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0,30</td>
<td>2,16</td>
<td>73,87</td>
<td>14,62</td>
<td>90,95</td>
<td>1,19</td>
<td>0,24</td>
<td>5,24</td>
<td>2,38</td>
<td>9,05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3,14</td>
<td>1,94</td>
<td>75,10</td>
<td>18,99</td>
<td>99,18</td>
<td>0,10</td>
<td>0,04</td>
<td>0,46</td>
<td>0,22</td>
<td>0,82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,34</td>
<td>4,44</td>
<td>48,97</td>
<td>14,02</td>
<td>75,77</td>
<td>6,48</td>
<td>1,59</td>
<td>10,61</td>
<td>5,55</td>
<td>24,23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>1,67</td>
<td>0,97</td>
<td>27,07</td>
<td>12,38</td>
<td>42,08</td>
<td>2,20</td>
<td>1,99</td>
<td>42,80</td>
<td>10,93</td>
<td>57,92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,92</td>
<td>4,22</td>
<td>47,62</td>
<td>13,92</td>
<td>73,68</td>
<td>6,21</td>
<td>1,61</td>
<td>12,61</td>
<td>5,88</td>
<td>26,32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above two tables, it is clear that more than 70% of migrants are coming from Syria and Afghanistan. They are mostly men, age 18-33 years old.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive answers</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>1.880</td>
<td>4.030</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>7.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested that have been evaluated</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>20.99</td>
<td>29.58</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>11.19</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>9.640</td>
<td>88.22</td>
<td>4722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>6.96</td>
<td>14.13</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>15.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the above tables that most migrants do not seek for an asylum and if they do, they usually do not get a positive answer.

Graphic 1
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>159.0</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>104.0</td>
<td>141.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>283.5</td>
<td>1.822.</td>
<td>668.9</td>
<td>2.285.</td>
<td>2.954.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>274.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>608</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above graphic and table, we can see the main migration roads to the EU and the rise of migration flows in 2015.

2. The 2015 summer, in Lesvos, we experienced a real humanitarian crisis, a situation that could have led to an unprecedented tragedy if hundreds of volunteers hadn’t been mobilized and hadn’t offered their unconditional and continuous solidarity to those who come from war zones across the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia and North Africa and were heading towards Europe.

Meanwhile, the painful events that have been unfolding in countries of the Balkan Peninsula and Central Europe, and the ensuing urgency for "handling" the great refugee flows to northern Europe, seem to have led the EU to a new strategy of “refugee management”. This development does not bode anything good for the future. The main objective of this strategy is to dramatically decrease the refugee / migrant flows, and for this purpose the so-called “Fortress Europe" should be reinforced.
This goal is served by specific and centrally planned European policies that are to: (a) make a clear distinction between “refugees” and “migrants”; (b) strengthen FRONTEX, and the forces that deter sea travel as well as to “militarize” sea borders both in the Aegean and the wider Mediterranean Sea; (c) create “hotspots” on the Aegean islands and elsewhere, aiming at an administratively effective separation between refugees and migrants; and (d) to appoint Turkey as the regional “policeman” so that deterrence policies are strengthened and crossing the waterways in the Aegean Sea can be discouraged. Thus, it becomes conspicuous that the EU, in the face of the huge humanitarian crisis with victims hundreds of thousands of refugees/ migrants, has chosen to stick to the hard logic of previous years, that is, (a) the logic of a hermetically “sealed” fortress that allows a very small and targeted number of persecuted people from war-ridden countries in Africa and Asia to come to the European land; and (b) the logic of these people’s assimilation and their direct incorporation into the cheap labour market (of Germany and other countries) as a “reserve army of labour”.

At the same time, drastic cuts in funding for food and health programmes by international organizations (e.g. the United Nations High Commission for Refugees) has worsened the already critical situation of refugees throughout the Middle East, and will surely create even larger refugee flows into Europe.

Furthermore, the distinction between “refugees” and “migrants” has been proven completely groundless, since it is based on an outdated conception of geopolitical reality that ignores contemporary developments. Nowadays, wars have completely different characteristics compared to those in the 1950s, a period during which it was defined administratively what constitutes a “refugee” or a “migrant” at an international level. How can one classify (and handle) as "economic migrants" people who, under the burden of war and terrorist threats, experience the fear of persecution, starvation, extermination, or simply do not possess the necessary means to educate their children? By what criteria a person coming from Afghanistan or Iraq is not a “refugee”, but only an "economic migrant"? Who defines the content and limits of an unbearable life? Does the guilt of the EU’s leadership make it forget very easily how long-lasting are the consequences of wars and other conflicts that Europe itself had instigated? How can people’s efforts to take refuge to other countries,
hoping for a sustainable life, be divided between "documented avoidance of risking death or persecution", on the one hand, and "improving their living standards", on the other hand?

Who decides who will live and who will die, either within their countries or in the "civilized West"? Who holds the power of life and death over the persecuted of this planet? Shouldn’t various clichés terms found in international law regarding the status of refugees, such as “well-founded fear of persecution” make us reflect on and try to define what "fear", “justified fear” and "persecution" mean for those who experience those extreme situations? Who gives the right to the EU to decide which countries, nationalities and ethnic groups may be excluded from the "refugee" status, implying that the members of the respective population groups are not entitled to feel unbearable conditions of life in the countries of origin? How can whole populations be collectively identified as "economic migrants" but not as “refugees”, even when the existing refugee law prescribes that the procedures for recognition of a “refugee” status should take into account the special conditions of each individual (likelihood of persecution), and this recognition is, above all, a humanitarian act?

Such a policy is a state crime, a violation of human rights. According to Amnesty International report for Greece (2015-6)25, the dramatic increase in arrivals of asylum seekers and irregular migrants on the Aegean islands pushed an ineffective first reception system beyond breaking point. Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment and excessive use of force by police persisted.

More analytically:
- More than 612 people, including many children, died or were unaccounted for in the crossing when the boats carrying them capsized.
- Several refugees and asylum-seekers reported instances of violent push-backs. Push-backs also continued at sea. Eleven push-back incidents were reported to have occurred at the Greek-Turkish land and sea borders (from November 2014 till the end of August 2015).
- The already ineffective first reception system proved incapable of adequate responding to the dramatic increase in refugees and migrants arriving on the Aegean islands.

---

- Reception conditions on islands such as Lesvos and Kos were inhuman… insufficient tents, lack of food and poor hygiene conditions
- Unaccompanied children were often held with adults and remained in detention for several weeks under poor conditions. Conditions in immigration detention areas, including police stations, often amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.
- Obstacles to accessing asylum procedures remained for both detained and non-detained asylum-seekers.
- On several occasions between August and October 2015, riot police on Lesvos reportedly used tear gas and beat refugees and migrants waiting to be admitted for screening at the Moria immigration detention centre and those being registered in Mytilene port.

Furthermore, in visits to Lesbos from April 3 to 9, 2016, Human Rights Watch\(^{26}\) found that the police-guarded camp on the island was holding a wide array of people with special needs, including women with young children, pregnant women, unaccompanied children, elderly men and women, and people with physical and psychosocial disabilities. None of the detainees had proper access to health care, sanitation facilities, or legal aid.

The Moria facility on Lesbos, with more than 4,000 people, is surrounded by fence topped with barbed-wire. Conditions at Moria deteriorated rapidly due to the fear, frustration, over-crowding, and lack of services. When Human Rights Watch came to Moria took some interviews\(^{27}\). One detainee interviewed through the fence said he was lucky to sleep in a tent. “This is because I came two weeks ago,” he said. “Whoever comes now sleeps outside, and the toilets are really dirty. You go inside and you can’t even take a breath. The food is disgusting and the water is dirty. Both me and my friend have skin problems from washing in this water and drinking it.”

Amnesty International\(^{28}\), which visited Moria on April 5, 2015, reported that the packed facility was holding people with disabilities, pregnant women, and a large number of children, including a baby with health complications from an attack in Syria. Only three doctors were regularly available to provide medical care.

\(^{26}\) https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/14/greece-asylum-seekers-locked
\(^{27}\) ibid
Moreover there have been reported incidents on state–NGO–corporate crime. Let’s describe analytically what happened mainly in Lesvos, concerning the NGO, local authorities’ relationship.

The first phase began in the middle of summer 2015, when dozens of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) massively arrived on Lesvos to support refugees, who were arriving by the thousands on the island on a daily basis. Some NGOs actually contributed to refugees’ relief, others used their presence on the island to make a profit. In August 2015, the journalists who were on Lesvos used to say that it was enough for one to have some photos with refugees from the coast of Lesvos, a website and a bank account so to solve one’s financial problem.

It is a lie that the Greek State was caught napping last summer and lost control of refugee flows. The truth is that it knew very well what was happening on Lesvos, Chios, Kos and on other Aegean islands. And there was entire service available that the state could utilize to manage the situation; it is the General Secretariat of the Aegean and Island Policy (former Ministry of the Aegean), a service that knows perfectly the insular Greece. The General Secretariat could have been used from the first time that the problem was raised. It was a conscious choice that the General Secretariat was not used. Besides the NGOs, individuals, employees’ associations and political union collectives that were not receiving any funding from anywhere created refugee support structures; they just wanted to help their fellow people.

The next period, which began late September 2015, it was the period during which the recording of NGOs that were based on the islands and in mainland Greece commenced. A series of meetings between state actors, NGOs and local and regional agencies took place. It was the period that the state was preparing for a cleanup. It wanted to banish pesky volunteers, those who are not funded by the state budget or European Union funds because they had the bad habit to talk too much, give information to journalists about refugees’ mistreatment and to reveal how government mechanisms were operating; sometimes they gave crucial information to refugees, too.

The third period started in mid-November 2015 and continues till today: the state forced small NGOs to come under the umbrella of larger ones and indirectly or...
directly threatened them that if they disobeyed they would be forced to leave the country.

It is conspicuous that the refugee issue management tested a new way of how the state was operating. Funds were allocated to NGOs, but they were also able to act as a welfare state. The official state did not take the responsibility to provide food, housing, clothing, health care to refugees. Thus, it avoided hiring staff, which was necessary to carry out the specific tasks. On the other hand, the NGOs had every chance to move quickly to bring staff and volunteers from abroad, to hire employees from the local unemployed people. Thus, an amalgam of labour relations was formed, including unpaid work, poorly paid work, unpaid overtime, contracts that are renewed every month or every three months. Labour contracts were defaulted, threats made to the employees that if they spoke they could not be able to find work in another NGO. Of course, there have been CEOs who are being paid with monthly salaries of 4,500 euros.

At the same time, the NGOs can solve other issues, such as hiring friends and voters of the government parties, local and regional authorities. Naturally, it is hardly forgotten that there must be compliance with the parliamentary balances in such cases. They can also placate local communities by renting buildings, financing local mass media or certain journalists etc.

That it has been conscious choice of the Greek government to replace the welfare state with a “benevolent” civil society is illustrated by the recent formal legislation to deal with the refugee crisis with Law 4375/2016, Article 11, paragraph 9, which states that “If the effective operation of the Regional Services of Reception and Identification is hindered due to the lack of adequate or appropriate personnel, handling individual processes ... may be assigned for a certain time based on the applicable regulations for public accounting in agencies of civil society that meet appropriate quality and safety standards ... The cost of the award may be covered by the state or co-financed or other resources.

In all the above discussion, money is too much and procedures are opaque. From my personal experience as a municipal councilor in the Municipality of Lesvos, in constant councils, I have witnessed such events that led me to send the following letter to the relevant Minister:

“Open letter to the Deputy Minister of Migration Policy, Mr. G. Mouzalas, Mytilene, 04/04/2016
Dear Mr. Minister,

I hereby address you, requesting clarification on two important issues on the management of funds of European programmes of the refugee crisis. According to official transcripts of the recordings of meetings of two recent municipal Lesvos councils (which I am attaching you), under the European URBAN programme, Ministry of Migration Policy suggested / recommended actors (specific NGOs and Universities), even the name of a colleague Professor, who will reclaim and manage two programmes, totaling 11.2 million Euros for integration actions for refugees and migrants. As you will see in detail, in the official minutes of the recommendation of the responsible Deputy Mayor, according to which the participation of Lesvos Municipality in the default partnership was requested, there are expressions, such as: “the direct award was required ..”, “We were proposed the name of the Professor …”, “there was a suggestion for the agencies which were to be involved …”, “there was guidance from the Ministry”. I would like to ask you whether during the submission of competitive European programmes – funds and before the end of the final filing date, “you guided”, “indicated”, “required”, or “suggested” specific individuals and agencies to form a partnership between public and private sector to claim and manage a very large amount (of money), or, what is officially referred to in the respective municipal councils of Lesvos (March 2016) is false”. This open letter is still unanswered.

4. Nowadays, as far as the refugee issue is concerned, the European continent is confronted with a big dilemma, which entails two opposing perspectives. On the one end, we have the neoliberal alliance of political and economic oligarchy with racism and, sometimes, fascism. State crimes and state-corporate crimes are part of this agenda, as illustrated above.

On the other end, we have the forces of solidarity to refugees: democratic citizens, ordinary people: the “underdogs” of Europe. Those of us who belong to the solidarity side need to fight to prevent the militarization of sea borders and the setting-up of “hotspots” that will decide who will stay and who will return back to a situation of continuous risking of one’s life. At the same time, we are called for fighting both to open up legal and safe migration channels to Europe, and to immediately stop the wars and disasters that cause massive exodus of the civilian population. Uncovering and addressing state crimes and state-corporate crimes is part
Οικονομική Διακυβέρνηση και Δημοκρατική Νομιμοποίηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση

ΟΙ ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ

ΚΥΠΡΙΖΟΓΛΟΥ ΦΙΛΙΩ

ΥΠΟΨΗΦΙΑ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΩΡ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟΥ ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ ΣΧΟΛΗΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΩΝ

ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΑ ΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΣ:
ΚΙΝΗΤΟ ΤΗΛΕΦΩΝΟ 694.60.31514
ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟ ΤΗΛΕΦΩΝΟ: 2241052751
E-MAIL: triantafillia2001@yahoo.gr
Το παρόν άρθρο θέλει να αναδείξει τις διαστάσεις των επιπτώσεων της οικονομικής κρίσης στην μεταναστευτική πολιτική της Ελλάδας, χώρας που θεωρείται πύλη εισόδου, αλλά ταυτόχρονα μιας χώρας στην οποία συντελέστηκαν τεράστιες κοινωνικοοικονομικές αλλαγές τα τελευταία χρόνια. Την τελευταία δεκαετία η οικονομική κρίση αλλάξει το οικονομικό και κοινωνικό τοπίο της Ελλάδας. Ταυτόχρονα οι εξελίξεις στην Αφρική, στην Ασία και στην Μέση Ανατολή, τοποθετήσαν την Ελλάδα, λόγω της γεωγραφικής αλλά και γεωπολιτικής της θέσης σε πρωτόγονα επίπεδα πολυπλοκότητας, εγείροντας το ζήτημα της μετανάστευσης, ως χώρα υποδοχής μέσα σε μια περίοδο τεράστιας οικονομικής ύφεσης.

Το αντικείμενο της μελέτης, συνοψίζεται σε μια σκιαγράφηση των συνεπειών που έχει επιφέρει η οικονομική κρίση στην μεταναστευτική πολιτική που ακολουθεί η Ελλάδα, καθώς η αύξηση των μεταναστευτικών ροών στην ελληνική επικράτεια έχει πάρει εξαιρετικά απρόσμενες διαστάσεις και η διαχείριση του μεταναστευτικού φαινομένου σε μια περίοδο οικονομικής ύφεσης θεωρείται ζήτημα ιδιαίτερης σημασίας, αφού η μεταναστευτική πολιτική αποτελεί μέρος της συνολικής πολιτικής για την οικονομική και κοινωνική συνοχή της χώρας.

Η ελληνική μεταναστευτική στρατηγική και η διαχείριση της, στην Ελλάδα του 21ου αιώνα, δεν μπορεί παρά να αναλυθεί και υπό το πρίσμα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Η εισοδοχή μεταναστευτικών ροών, ως τομέας διαχείρισης και εφαρμογής της δημόσιας πολιτικής από τις χώρες υποδοχής παρουσιάζει ασταθή και αβέβαιο χαρακτήρα. Οι ενδιαφερόμενοι κοινωνικοί και πολιτικοί φορείς μεταβάλλονται συχνά και γρήγορα. Επίσης εξελίσσονται ραγδαία τα στοιχεία του φαινομένου(αριθμός μεταναστών, προέλευση, κατεύθυνση, στρατηγικές εισόδου στην χώρα υποδοχής) και αντίστοιχα αλλάζουν οι στόχοι της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής.

Η επιλογή μελέτης εγκαίρες ερωτήματα σχετικά με τους τρόπους διαχείρισης της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής μέσα στην περίοδο της οικονομικής κρίσης ως κύριο άξονα, τις επιπτώσεις στην χώρα υποδοχής και προσπαθεί να δώσει την δυνατότητα σκιαγράφησης των όποιων προτεινόμενων λύσεων που μπορεί η ελληνική, αλλά ταυτόχρονα και η ευρωπαϊκή μεταναστευτική πολιτική να επιφέρει, έτσι ώστε να υπάρξει η πρόληψη και η πολιτική δυνατότητα μέσω των βαθύτερων θεσμών και μέσω της υπεύθυνης πολιτικής βούλησης για να λυθεί άμεσα το πρόβλημα.

Λέξεις Κλειδιά: Οικονομική Κρίση, Μεταναστευτική πολιτική, Χώρα υποδοχής, πρόσφυγες.
1. ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ

Η παγκόσμια οικονομική κρίση που ξεκίνησε στις ΗΠΑ το 2007 ήταν πρωτόγορη κυρίως γιατί χτυπήθηκε το κέντρο του παγκόσμιου κapitalισμού. Η επακόλουθη οικονομική ύφεση εξαπλώθηκε στην Ευρώπη και σχέδια να σε ολόκληρο τον κόσμο. Οι συνέπειες έχουν γίνει ήδη ορατές και βαθαίνονται στον χρονικό ορίζοντα γίνονται ολοένα και πιο πολύπλοκες ίσως και ασαφείς. Οι θεωρητικές συζητήσεις επισήμαναν πως μετά από κάθε χρηματοοικονομική κρίση εκτός από το ότι καταφέρουν οι αγορές περιουσιακών στοιχείων, μειώνεται το εισόδημα και αυξάνεται η ανεργία, το δημόσιο χρέος των χωρών τείνει να διογκόνεται και οι κοινωνικές παραχώρες χάνονται στην αναζήτηση και στην επιβολή των σκληρών δημοσιονομικών μέτρων(Σκλίας κ.α., 2012). Οι διαφοροποιήσεις που βιώνει τα τελευταία χρόνια η ελληνική κοινωνία και η διάχυση των συνεπειών της οικονομικής κρίσης στην καθημερινότητα των πολιτών, έχουν επιφέρει τρειμωγός στις σχέσεις κράτους και κοινωνίας. Το κοινωνικό κράτος συρρικνώνεται μειώνοντας συνεχώς τις κοινωνικές δαπάνες, αποκλείοντας σε μεγάλο μέρος τον ρόλο της κοινωνικής δικαιοσύνης και αλληλεγγύης(Gowan, 2009).

Κομμάτι του κράτους πρόνοιας αποτελεί και η διαχείριση των μεταναστευτικών ροών, αφού η μετανάστευση θεωρείται πλέον, και έχει αναδειχθεί ως τομέας πολιτικής της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, η οποία καλείται να αντιμετωπίσει τις επιπτώσεις της οικονομικής κρίσης σε συνδυασμό με την μή ελεγχόμενη πλέον ροή των μεταναστευτικών κυμάτων και ιδιαίτερα σε χώρες που ήταν ουσιαστικά ένας «αδύναμος κρίκος», όπως η Ελλάδα, στην παγκόσμια οικονομία, αλλά ταυτόχρονα αποτελούν όχι απλώς μια χώρα υποδοχής μεταναστών αλλά και ενδιάμεσο σταθμό(transit migration) προς τη υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη(π.χ. Ιταλία, Βρετανία, Γερμανία, Σκανδιναβικές χώρες)30.

Η μετανάστευση θεωρείται από πολλούς κοινωνικούς και πολιτικούς επιστήμονες ως ένα από τα σημαντικότερα φαινόμενα του 21ου αιώνα που συνδέονται άμεσα με το κοινωνικό πρόσωπο μιας χώρας που ορίζεται ως χώρα υποδοχής. Εκτός από τις άμεσες επιπτώσεις του μεγέθους και της κατασκευής στο δημογραφικό κομμάτι, τόσο στην χώρα προέλευσης, όσο και στην χώρα υποδοχής, υπάρχουν πολλές και

30 Σύμφωνα με τον Διεθνή Οργανισμό Μετανάστευσης 430.000 πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες διάσχισαν από τις αρχές του 2015 την Μεσόγειο με προορισμό την Ευρώπη. Τα στοιχεία του πρακτορείου προέρχονται από τον διεθνή οργανισμό για τους Μετανάστες, ενώ όποιος αναφέρεται οι 309.000 από αυτούς ταξίδεψαν στην Ευρώπη μέσω της Ελλάδας.
ΠΡΩΤΗ ΣΤΟΘΑ ΑΦΙΧΘΕΙ ΣΥΛΛΗΦΤΕΙ ΑΙΤΩΝ Ο ΜΕΥΘΥΝΗ 2013), ΚΡΑΤΟΣ Ο ΙΙΙ ΙΟΥΝΙΟΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΑΝΤΙ ΔΟΥΒΛΙΝΟ Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣ, ΚΡΑΤΗ ΕΠΙΠΛΕΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΑΦΕΤΕΡΟΥ ΝΑ ΑΦΕΝΟΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΧΡΕΩΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΤΥΧΕΙ ΕΤΑΧΥ ΜΑ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΝΑ, 2013). (ΔΗΣΕΝΗΤΡΕΠΟ, ΜΙΑ ΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΗ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΤΟΜΗ ΜΕ ΜΑΚΡΟΠΡΟΘΕΣΜΕΣ ΣΥΝΕΠΕΙΕΣ (ΤΣΙΓΚΑΝΟΥ, 2009).

ΟΙ ΠΛΗΘΥΣΜΙΑΚΕΣ ΜΕΤΑΚΙΝΗΣΕΙΣ ΠΡΟΚΑΛΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΠΟΛΛΕΣ ΑΙΤΙΕΣ ΌΠΩΣ Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΑΝΕΧΕΙΑ, Η ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΑΝΙΣΟΤΗΤΑ ΣΕ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ, ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ ΒΙΟΤΙΚΟΥ ΕΙΣΙΤΟΥ, ΑΝΑΖΗΤΗΣΗ ΚΑΛΥΤΕΡΗΣ ΖΩΗΣ, ΠΟΛΕΜΙΚΕΣ ΣΥΡΡΑΞΕΙΣ ΜΕ ΣΥΝΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΣ ΒΙΑΙΕΣ ΕΚΤΟΠΙΣΕΙΣ. ΣΕ ΑΥΤΕΣ ΘΑ ΜΠΟΡΟΥΣΑΝ ΝΑ ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΟΥΝ ΟΙ ΔΗΜΟΓΡΑΦΙΚΕΣ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΕΙΣ ΣΕ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΣ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΟ, ΜΕ ΤΗ ΣΥΝΕΧΗ ΠΛΗΘΥΣΜΙΑΚΗ ΑΥΞΗΣΗ ΣΤΙΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΥ ΤΡΙΤΟΥ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΛΛΗΛΗ ΓΗΡΑΝΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΛΗΘΥΣΜΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΗΣ, ΚΑΘΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΝΕΠΤΥΞΙΜΩΝ ΧΩΡΩΝ ΓΙΑ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΤΟ ΕΡΓΑΤΙΚΌ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΚΌ (JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY).

ΤΗΝ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΔΙΕΤΙΑ ΟΙ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΕΣ ΠΡΟΚΛΗΣΕΙΣ ΈΧΟΝΤΑΙ ΦΤΑΙΣΕΙ ΣΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΓΝΩΡΑ ΕΠΙΠΕΔΑ ΠΟΛΥΠΛΟΚΟΤΗΤΑΣ, ΕΓΕΙΡΟΝΤΑΣ ΓΙΑ ΆΛΛΗ ΜΙΑ ΦΟΡΑ ΤΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΑΡΑΤΥΠΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗΣ. Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ, ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΙΑ ΑΠΟ ΤΙΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΠΟΥ ΒΙΩΝΕΙ ΤΑ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΕΙΚΟΣΙ ΧΡΟΝΙΑ ΜΙΑ ΣΥΝΕΧΗ ΑΛΛΑΓΗ ΣΤΟ ΕΥΡΩΠΕΙΟ «ΤΟΠΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΣΗΣ», ΜΕΤΑΤΡΕΠΟΜΕΝΗ ΑΠΟ ΧΩΡΑ ΠΡΟΕΔΡΕΥΣΗΣ ΣΕ ΧΩΡΑ ΠΡΟΟΡΙΣΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΥΣΗΣ (ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΑΔΗ, 2013).

ΤΗΝ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΔΕΚΑΕΤΙΑ, Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΠΡΟΣΠΑΘΕΙ ΝΑ ΕΠΙΤΥΧΕΙ ΜΙΑ ΙΟΡΡΟΠΙΑ ΜΕΤΟΧΩΝ ΑΦΕΝΩΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ ΝΟΜΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΧΡΕΩΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΦΕΤΕΡΟΥ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΝΑ ΔΙΑΧΕΙΡΙΣΤΕΙ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΙΚΑ ΤΑ ΧΕΡΣΑΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΘΑΛΑΣΣΙΑ ΣΥΝΟΡΑ ΤΗΣ. ΕΠΙΠΛΕΟΝ, ΌΠΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΌΛΑ ΤΑ ΚΡΑΤΗ ΜΕΛΗ ΣΤΑ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΣΥΝΟΡΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗΣ ΕΝΟΣΗΣ, Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΚΑΛΕΙΤΑΙ ΝΑ ΑΝΤΙΜΕΤΩΠΙΣΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΝΟΝΙΣΜΟ ΔΟΥΒΛΙΝΟ ΙΙΙ (ΑΝΑΔΙΑΤΥΠΩΣΗ ΙΟΥΝΙΟΥ 2013), Ο ΟΠΟΙΟΣ ΑΝΑΘΕΤΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΘΥΝΗ ΣΤΟ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΜΕΛΟΣ ΣΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟ Ο ΑΙΤΩΝ ΘΑ ΑΦΙΧΘΕΙ ή/ΚΑΙ ΣΥΛΛΗΦΘΕΙ ΓΙΑ ΠΡΩΤΑ ΦΟΡΑ, ΟΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ
Η συνέχιση της κρίσης στη Συρία, η υποχρεωτική επίταξη στην Ερυθραία, η απόσυρση των αμερικανικών στρατευμάτων από το Αφγανιστάν είναι μερικοί από τους παράγοντες που συνεχίζουν να δημιουργούν μεταναστευτικά ρεύματα, τα οποία αυτή τη φορά διέρχονται μέσω του πολύ πιο επικίνδυνου θαλάσσιου περάσματος. Οι θαλάσσιες αφίξεις διπλασιάστηκαν τους πρώτους μήνες του 2014, με περισσότεροι από 25.000 μετανάστες να έχουν καταγραφεί σύμφωνα με το Ελληνικό Λιμενικό. Οι Σύροι κατατάσσονται στην πρώτη θέση, ακολουθούμενοι από τους Αφγανούς και τις αφίξεις από την Υποσαχάρια Αφρική. Οι ροές είναι μικτές και χρήζουν ιδιαίτερης προσοχής: γυναίκες με παιδιά, ασυνόδευτοι ανήλικοι, οικογένειες και άτομα τρίτης ηλικίας. Η σύνθεση των ροών σημαίνει ότι η ανάγκη για υποδοχή, φροντίδα, σωστή ταυτοποίηση αλλά και εντοπισμό τυχόν ευάλωτων ομάδων είναι περισσότερο επιτακτική από ποτέ. Παράλληλα, οι θαλάσσιες αφίξεις αποτελούν συχό φαινόμενο, ιδίως την καλοκαιρινή περίοδο κατά την οποία στο Αιγαίο πνέουν βόρειοι άνεμοι, γεγονός που καθιστά το πέρασμα ακόμα πιο επικίνδυνο, τα περιστατικά ανατροπής λέμβων πολλά, και την ανάγκη για εκτενή ήρευνα και διάσωση μεγάλη (Υπουργείο Ναυτιλίας, 2015).

Με την παραδοχή αυτή αυτόματα προσδιορίζεται η ανάγκη να καθοριστεί ακόμη περισσότερο ο τρόπος διαχείρισης των μεταναστευτικών ροών. Αν θελήσουμε να δώσουμε έναν συνοπτικό και λειτουργικό ορισμό για το τι συμβαίνει στην περίοδο της σύγχρονης μετανάστευσης στην Ελλάδα, θα πρέπει να γίνει κατανοητό ότι προκύπτει μια αυξητική τάση παράνομων μεταναστών στην χώρα από το 2008, μια χρονιά που η Ελλάδα χαρακτηρίστηκε χώρα του μεταναστεύσης μεταναστών (μετανάστες που καταγράφονται ελληνικής κεφαλής). Ωστόσο, η διέλευση για την υπόλοιπη Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

3. Η ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ.
Διάφοροι ερευνητές προσπαθούν να αναλύσουν τις βασικές αιτίες της ελληνικής οικονομικής κρίσης θεώρησαν ως βασικότερα αίτια του προβλήματος τα υψηλά δημόσια ελλείμματα, την μη ορθολογική διαχείριση του χρέους και των δαπανών, το εξωτερικό χρέος, την έλλειψη εξαγωγών, την ελάχιστη ανταγωνιστικότητα και την κατάρρευση της αγοράς εργασίας.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό παρέχονται εξηγήσεις, που δεν συμπεριλαμβάνουν τις πολιτικές και θεσμικές συνιστώσες, που στο εγχώριο πεδίο είναι πολύ σημαντικές για την ανάδειξη του φαινομένου. Προκειμένου να προσεγγιστεί το σύγχρονο πολιτικό και οικονομικό περιβάλλον στην Ελλάδα, η ελληνική κρίση θα πρέπει να αναλυθεί με συνιστώσες στο πολιτικό και θεσμικό πλαίσιο της ελληνικής πολιτικής λειτουργίας τα τελευταία τρίαντα χρόνια (Καζάκος, 2010). Κατά αυτήν την βάση ο εξευρωπαϊσμός και ο εκσυγχρονισμός δεν υποστηρίχθηκαν από τα αναγκαία πολιτικά και θεσμικά όργανα.

Κάποια πολιτικά και θεσμικά φαινόμενα θεωρούνται ως κύρια αίτια της πολιτικής και θεσμικής ανισορροπίας:

- Αύξηση της παρέμβασης του κράτους στην κοινωνική και πολιτική ζωή.
- Αναποτελεσματικό σύστημα διακυβέρνησης (Featherstone, 2005a)31.
- Συνδικάτα, ομάδες οργανωμένων συμφερόντων (Mitsopoulos & Pelagidis, 2009b).
- Διαφθορά.
- Αθέτηση ευρωπαϊκών κανόνων δικαίου- αποτυχία εξευρωπαϊσμού.

4. Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ

Η κρίση του δημόσιου χρέους στην Ευρωζώνη, σε συνέχεια της παγκόσμιας χρηματοοικονομικής κρίσης αποτελεί αναμφίβολα το μεγαλύτερο πρόβλημα για την ΕΕ κατά την ύστερη αυτή φάση της μεταψυχροπολεμικής περιόδου. Σε συνδυασμό

31 Η Ελλάδα έχει μέλος της ευρωπαϊκής κοινότητας το 1981 και το κατακεραυνιό εισόδημα βρισκόταν στο 90,4% του Ευρωπαϊκού μέσου όρου το 1990 ύψιστο στο 74,2%. Μείωση κατά 27,5% παρουσίασε το διαθέσιμο κατακεραυνιό εισόδημα, στην Ελλάδα από τις αρχές του 2007 έως και το πρώτο τρίμηνο του 2015. Την δραματική συρρίκνωση του διαθέσιμου εισόδηματος κατά την περίοδο της κρίσης στην Ελλάδα αποτυπώνει ο Οργανισμός Οικονομικής Συνεργασίας και Ανάπτυξης (ΟΟΣΑ).

32 O Featherstone εστιάζει στο πρόβλημα της διακυβέρνησης τονίζοντας ότι η σύγχρονη ελληνική πολιτική χαρακτηρίζεται από εντάσεις ανάμεσα στο αίτημα για μεταρρυθμίσεις και τα δομικά εμπόδια για την υλοποίησή τους.
με τον διεθνή ανταγωνισμό που προέκυψε από την μετατόπιση του οικονομικού κέντρου ισχύος προς την ανατολική Ασία, τις αποσταθεροποιητικές καταστάσεις και τις γεωπολιτικές ανακατατάξεις στο Νοτιοανατολικό περίγραμμα της Ευρώπης, αλλά και τις συναφείς προκλήσεις του ενεργειακού και του μεταναστευτικού, η κρίση προσλαμβάνει σύνθετες πολιτικές διαστάσεις, δοκιμάζοντας τόσο το ενιαίο νόμισμα, όσο και το ευρύτερο κεκτημένο του ευρωπαϊκού εγχειρήματος(Μπακατσιάνος,2011).

Είναι πλέον παραδεκτό ότι η κρίση στην Ευρωζώνη ανέδειξε τα πολιτικά θεσμικά ελλείμματα, τις εγγενείς αντιφάσεις και τις δομικές ανισορροπίες της ευρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης. Ένα από τα πρώτα ελλείμματα που αναδείχθηκε είναι η ατελής οργάνωση και λειτουργία της ONE του Μάαστριχτ, που στηρίχτηκε σε μια αναπτυγμένη νομισματική δομή, χωρίς το αναγκαίο συμπλήρωμα της δημοσιονομικής και ευρύτερα οικονομικής ένωσης, το οποίο θα ήταν ασφαλώς εφικτό μόνο στο πλαίσιο μιας πολιτικής ένωσης ομοσπονδιακού χαρακτήρα(Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο,2012).

Μετά από μια πορεία εμβάθυνσης της κοινωνικής συνεργασίας, μέχρι την δεκαετία του 1990, η ΕΕ του 21ου αιώνα και του ενιαίου νομίσματος αδύνατε να αναδειχθεί σε ενιαία δύναμη επιρροής στο νέο παγκοσμιοποιημένο περιβάλλον. Μέσα σε αυτό το δυσμενές περιβάλλον κλοδωνίζεται το μεταπολεμικό ευρωπαϊκό οικονομικό και κοινωνικό μοντέλο, ενώ η ΕΕ χάνει σε ανταγωνιστικότητα έναντι των αναδυόμενων δυνάμεων(Κίνα, Ινδία, Βραζιλία). Στο δε εσωτερικό της ολόενα και διευρύνονται οι ασυμμετρίες ως προς τα επίπεδα ανάπτυξης και ανταγωνιστικότητας (Μπακατσιάνος,2008).

Το ευπαθές ευρωπαϊκό πολιτικό-οικονομικό περιβάλλον, μέσα στο οποίο η τρέχουσα ελληνική κρίση αναπτύχθηκε, έχει συνεισφέρει στην μεγάλη ανισορροπία που παρατηρείται αυτή την στιγμή την ευρωζώνην. Πολλές ευρωπαϊκές χώρες, αδυνατούν να παραμείνουν ανταγωνιστικές μέσα στο αδύναμο πολιτικό και οικονομικό ευρωπαϊκό πλαίσιο. Η τρέχουσα ευρωπαϊκή κρίση και ειδικότερα η περίπτωση της Ελλάδας, αποδεικνύει την δυσκολία στις προσπάθειες για αντιστάθμιση των αρνητικών επιπτώσεων της παγκόσμιας κρίσης. Οι μικρές και περιφερειακές χώρες της ευρωζώνης δυσκολεύονται να χρησιμοποιήσουν πολιτικά και οικονομικά εργαλεία του ευρωπαϊκού οικοδομήματος(Feldstein,1997)

5. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΚΡΙΣΗ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ
Μετά από αιώνες αγώνων για την απόκτηση δικαιωμάτων στην Ευρώπη, σήμερα ξεκινά και εργάζεται παραγωγικά ένα μεγάλο κομμάτι εργαζόμενων, που διάγραψαν τη ζωή τους χωρίς ουσιαστικά δικαιώματα, πολιτικά, κοινωνικά, ατομικά και κάποιες φορές ακόμη και τα στοιχείωδη ανθρώπινα.

Ωστόσο, η ευρωπαϊκή ιστορία είναι γραμμένη με την κατάκτηση δικαιωμάτων από όλους όσους συμμετέχουν παραγωγικά στις συνταγματικές δημοκρατίες. Η έννοια της ιδίας της δημοκρατίας, βρίσκεται στον πυρήνα, της ιδίας της θεμελίωσης, της νομιμοποίησης, της αυτοεικόνας και της κοινωνικής οργάνωσης, κάθε σύγχρονης ευρωπαϊκής δημοκρατικής κοινωνίας (Παύλου, 2004).

Στην αυγή του 21ου αιώνα η ταυτόχρονη εμφάνιση των φαινομένων μετανάστευσης σε πολλές ευρωπαϊκές χώρες αποτελεί μια δύσκολη πραγματικότητα. Τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες και ιδιαίτερα τα τελευταία τρία χρόνια παρατηρείται μια τεράστια αύξηση των μεταναστευτικών ροών προς τις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και ιδιαίτερα στην Ελλάδα. Η μετανάστευση αναδεικνύεται σε ζήτημα καιρίας σημασίας για το δημογραφικό μέλλον, την οικονομική ανάπτυξη και την διατήρηση της κοινωνικής συνοχής των χωρών της ΕΕ.

Η ξαφνική αυτή τεράστια αλλαγή στην ελληνική αλλά και ευρωπαϊκή ισορροπία ζητούσε μια όριση και ουσιαστική σχεδίαση μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής η οποία πραγματικά ενεργοποιήθηκε αναδρομικά. Οι εθνικές μεταναστευτικές πολιτικές εκφράζουν τους αντίστοιχους πολιτικούς στόχους αναφορικά με τους μετανάστες, διαχωρίζοντας αν αυτοί είναι οικονομικοί μετανάστες, πρόσφυγες ή αιτούντες άσυλο, παλιννοστούντες ή εσωτερικοί μετανάστες33.

Το φαινόμενο χαρακτηρίζεται από μια τεράστια δυναμική και κατευθύνει σε μια δυναμική στοιχείωση της πολιτικής που θα εφαρμοστεί, καθώς οι ζητήματα που αφορούν την μετανάστευση, υφίστανται συνεχώς διαφοροποιήσεις, ανάλογα με την ένταση του φαινομένου, την χώρα και την εμπειρία. Οι παράγοντες που προσδιορίζουν την πολιτική που θα ασκηθεί στο ζήτημα της μετανάστευσης είναι πολλοί. Το ζήτημα της ασφάλειας, ανθρωπιστικών, διεθνών και εθνικών πολιτικών κατευθύνσεων, με κυρίωτη την οικονομική πραγματικότητα, που βιώνει η χώρα υποδοχής. Οι συνέπειες της οικονομικής κρίσης στον τομέα της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής, είναι

ιδιαίτερα σύνθετες με έντονες βαθιές, πολιτικές, κοινωνικές και οικονομικές ανακατατάξεις. Η αύξηση των κεφαλαιοποιημάτων αγαθών, σταδιακή πτώση των συνόρων, αργοίς δημογραφικές εξελίξεις, διογκούμενη οικονομική ανισότητα ανάμεσα στις Δυτικές και μη χώρες(Στίμπος,2001). Όλα τα παραπάνω προσδίδουν έναν ιδιαίτερο χαρακτήρα στις μεταναστευτικές ροές του 21ος αιώνα, αλλά και μια αναθεωρημένη πολιτική αντιμετώπισης της μετανάστευσης σε σχέση με το παρελθόν, που στηρίζεται σε τεράστιους οικονομικούς «ώμους».

Στην πρόσφατη ιστορία της μετανάστευσης και ταυτόχρονα της δομής της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής προς την Ελλάδα, οι αρμοδίων θεσμοί34 που έχουν τις αρμοδιότητες να θεσπίζουν και να υλοποιούν τις μεταναστευτικές πολιτικές,
και οι άξεστες που συνδέονται με τη δημοκρατική ιδιότητα του πολίτη, οι ηθικές, πολιτικές, πολιτιστικές άξεστες της παραγωγικής συμμετοχής και το να ανήκει σε μια δημοκρατική πολιτική κοινότητα ελευθέρων και ίσων αναρρόφηκαν και υποχωρούν στις δύσκολες οικονομικές περιόδους και σε περιόδους που η κοινωνική συμβίωση χαρακτηρίζεται καταλυτικά από τη διάκριση των ανθρώπων ανάμεσα σε δικούς μας και σε έξωνους (Μπάλιμπάρ, 1990). Σε αυτήν την δύσκολη μετάβαση προς μια νέα Ευρώπη, η ουσιαστική καθήρωση αξιών, όπως η αξιοπρέπεια, η ελευθερία και η ισότητα, πρέπει να μπορούν να συνδυαστούν με έννοιες-εργαλεία, όπως η ασφάλεια και η αποτελεσματικότητα για τον σχεδιασμό και την νομοποίηση των πολιτικών.

Ο χώρος των μεταναστευτικών πολιτικών έχει αποδειχθεί ένας χώρος εξαιρετικά ευαλωτός, δύσκολος και επίμαχος, τόσο για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, όσο και για τα ευρωπαϊκά εθνικά κράτη. Εάν και η φύση του προβλήματος παραπέμπει σε ένα παγκόσμιο φαινόμενο, το φαινόμενο των πληθυσμιακών μετακινήσεων, που όσο αποτελεί ένα "φυσικό" φαινόμενο (ροές που υπακούουν σε νόμους των παγκόσμιων ισορροπιών), άλλο τόσο είναι ένα φαινόμενο πολιτικά κατασκευασμένο, δηλαδή ένα φαινόμενο που προέρχεται από τις πολιτικές δραστηριότητες και επιλογές και οποιαδήποτε από το τεχνητό μοίρασμα του κόσμου σε έναν με γεωγραφικά σύνορα. Η μετανάστευση σήμερα μετρείται με εθνικούς και υπερεθνικούς δείκτες. Οι σύγχρονες μεταναστευτικές πολιτικές είναι οι προσπάθειες πολιτικής και κοινωνικής ρύθμισης των σύγχρονων μεταναστευτικών φαινομένων, ορίζονται όμως κατά κύριο λόγο σε επίπεδο εθνικό και έρχονται σε αντιμετώπιση και επίλυση του προβλήματος είναι περιορισμένη και έχει τα όρια των πολιτικών που την ασκούν. Οι ουσιαστικές προσπάθειες παρέμβασης από υπερεθνικά επίπεδα (διεθνείς οργανισμοί, οργανώσεις, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, κλπ.) προσκρούουν στις εξουσίες των εθνικών κρατών και έχουν το μεγάλο μειονέκτημα να είναι απομακρυσμένα από τις τοπικές
κοινωνίες. Αντιμετωπίζουν όμως συγκεκριμένα προβλήματα που πηγάζουν από την δεδομένη οικονομική κρίση (Αμίτσης & Λαζαρίδη, 2001).

Η ελληνική μεταναστευτική πολιτική θα μπορούσαμε να πούμε ότι χαρακτηρίζεται από μια σχετική υστέρηση. Εμφανίζεται στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις ως αντίδραση και όχι ως κατευθυντήρια δύναμη. Στην παρούσα ελληνική συγκυρία, το μεταναστευτικό κύμα έχει επηρεάσει την ελληνική κοινωνία τα τελευταία σχεδόν είκοσι χρόνια, που πλέον αποτελεί ένα σύνθετο θεσμικό μικρόκοσμο που για να λειτουργήσει πρέπει να καταστεί δυνατή τόσο μια πληρέστερη και σε βάθος ανάγνωση του πολιτικού, πολιτισμικού, κοινωνικού και οικονομικού γίγνεται στην Ελλάδα, όσο και μια ανίχνευση δυνητικών λύσεων στα σύνθετα προβλήματα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της χώρας, με τα οποία το ζήτημα της διαχείρισης της μετανάστευσης έχει αναπόσπαστα συνδέθει (Μπάκαβος & Παπαδοπούλου, 2003).

Στο κοινωνικό επίπεδο ο σωφρονιστικός συνδυασμός των νόμιμων και παράνομων μεταναστών, δημιουργούσε μια νέα κοινωνική πραγματικότητα, με αλλαγές στο προηγούμενο σταθερό υπόβαθρο της ελληνικής κοινωνίας, με ταυτόχρονη καθυστέρηση στον κρατικό μηχανισμό. Η απότομη αύξηση του πληθυσμού των μεταναστών, οι ελλείψεις σε επαφορμακεντική περίθαλψη, η άνοδος του εθνικισμού, η ανάγκη αλλαγής στο εκπαιδευτικό σύστημα, η θρησκευτική ελευθερία, η άνοδος της εγκληματικότητας και μια γενικότερη πολιτισμική κρίση, ισοδυναμούν με την απουσία της θεσμικής πολιτικής της χώρας σε αυτό το ιδιότυπο καθεστώς μετανάστευσης, χαράσσοντας μια διαφορετική πραγματικότητα. Οι επιπτώσεις στον οικονομικό τομέα όσον αφορά την αύξηση της ανεργίας, την απορύθμιση στην αγορά εργασίας της επιτύχεις στον οικονομικός τομέα αφορά την αύξηση της ανεργίας, την δημιουργία αποσταθεροποίησης και την παράταση μεταναστευτική εργασία παρουσιάζονται ως αποτέλεσμα της ανεξέλεγκτης ροής των μεταναστών (Μπάκαβος & Παπαδοπούλου, 2006).

6. ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΩΝΤΑΣ ΤΙΣ ΕΠΙΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΚΡΙΣΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΜΕΤΑΝΑΣΤΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ

Οι επιδράσεις της οικονομικής κρίσης στον τομέα της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής εστιάζονται σε θεμελιακά και αλληλοσυνδεόμενα ζητήματα, με βασικότερο το ζήτημα της οικονομικής θεωρίας στην οικονομική πραγματικότητα. Ανάμεσα στο επίπεδο της θεωρίας και της πράξης, αναφορικά, με τις επιδράσεις της χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης στην μεταναστευτική πολιτική σε μια οικονομία
υποδοχής, διαμεσολαβεί ένας τεράστιος συνδυασμός μεταβλητών και παραγόντων, που δύσκολα πολλές φορές αποτυπώνεται στο επίπεδο της θεωρίας, είτε λόγω της ρευστότητάς τους, είτε λόγω της αδυναμίας ή της δυναμικότητάς τους.

Ωστόσο το επίπεδο της θεωρίας είναι δυνατόν να μας αποκαλύψει προς τα πολύ κινείται η δεδομένη κατάσταση και να μπορέσει να αναδείξει βασικές τουχές σε ένα τόσο ειδικό υλικό ζήτημα, όπως οι επιπτώσεις της οικονομικής κρίσης στο κομμάτι της μετανάστευσης. Στο Knowledge and Politics, ο Unger προβαίνει σε μια αποκαλυπτική δήλωση: «Όποιος άκουσε να φιλοξενείται η δύναμη και το μεγαλείο της θεωρίας, ποτέ δεν θα υποκύψει στην απόγνωση ούτε θα αμφισβαλλεί ποτέ ότι αυτός ο ήχος του νου θα είναι σε θέση να αναστήσει μια μέρα ακόμη και τις πέτρες». Με βάση την παραπάνω παραδοχή η θεωρία και η καλή κοινωνική επιστήμη αλληλούποστηρίζονται: Η θεωρία γεννώνει πλουραλισμό, ο πλουραλισμός παράγει επιλογές, οι επιλογές ενθέτουν εναλλακτικές, οι εναλλακτικές προκαλούν συζήτηση, η συζήτηση ενθαρρύνει την επικοινωνία, η επικοινωνία ελαχιστοποιεί το δογματισμό των φαινόμενων και στοχεύει στην ανάδειξη των τρόπων βελτίωσης των συνθηκών της ανθρώπινης διακυβέρνησης(Χρυσοχόου,2010).

Οι μεταναστευτικές ροές προς την Ελλάδα όπως και προς την υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη αποτελούν πεδίο ενδιαφέροντος της ΕΕ και των κρατών μελών της. Κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία έχουν τεθεί οι βάσεις για ένα κοινό νομικό πλαίσιο για την μετανάστευση και το άσυλο που βασίζεται στο πρόγραμμα της Χάγης το 2004. Η διαχείριση των μεταναστευτικών ροών μετατρέπεται σε στόχο κοινής μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής της ΕΕ, η οποία όμως δεν αφορά μόνο την εισοδοχή των μεταναστών, αλλά και την κοινωνική ένταξη και την συμμετοχή στους κοινούς υποδοχής, αφού η κοινή Ευρωπαϊκή μεταναστευτική πολιτική, δεν μπορεί να αναγνωρίσει συγκεκριμένα ή παράγει όποια άκουσε ούτε έχει αναγνώριση, να συμμετάσχει στην αντιμετώπιση των μεταναστών(ΕC 2008a).

Τα προβλήματα που προέκυψαν από την κρίση στο χρηματοπιστωτικό σύστημα σχετίζονται με την αξιοπιστία και την εγκυρότητα στην διαχείριση των αναλόγων μεταναστευτικών ροών. Ο αριθμός των μεταναστών που εισέρχονται στην αρχή της παραμελημένων μεταναστευτικών ροών, οι οποίες επισήμαναν συγκεκριμένα ύψος απολαβών, οπότε σε χώρα επιδείκνυται άμεσα με το μέγεθος της μαύρης εργασίας και αντίστοιχα με την παραοικονομία.
Τα παραπάνω ζητήματα έρχονται να συνδυαστούν με την έλλειψη πόρων, οι οποίοι θα μπορούσαν να προσφέρουν τις κατάλληλες παροχές στους πρόσφυγες και στα ασυνόδευτα ανήλικα, που κατακλύζουν τον τελευταίο καιρό την ελληνική επικράτεια. Παροχές σε στέγαση, σίτιση, αδυναμία παροχής ειδών πρώτης ανάγκης, κατάλληλη υγειονομική περίθαλψη, είναι από τα βασικότερα ζητούμενα στους ανθρώπους που ζητούν μια νέα πατρίδα (Μουσούρου, 2003).

Παράλληλα η απουσία ενός ενδυναμωμένου διοικητικού συστήματος στελεχομένο με κατάλληλο επιστημονικό προσωπικό που θα ενδυναμώσει τα προσφυγικά κύματα. Η πρόληψη και η πρόβλεψη για τις υποδείξεις διαδικασίας, για άμεση και έγκυρη πιστοποίηση των εισερχόμενων στην ελληνική επικράτεια, χρήζουν διεθνούς προστασίας και μελέτης. Το γεγονός της μη ύπαρξης συμβουλευτικών υπηρεσιών προς τους πρόσφυγες/μετανάστες, σχετικά με την περαιτέρω μεταχείρισή τους και τα δικαιώματά τους, φέρνει στην επιφάνεια τα κυκλώματα διακήρυξης παράνομων μεταναστών, της εμπορίας των ανθρώπων και γενικότερα αναδύονται οι δομές του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος.

Επιπλέον η μεσόγειος θεωρείται ένας υγρός τάφος για χιλιάδες πρόσφυγες και ιδιαίτερα για μικρά παιδιά τα οποία είναι αδύνατο να μπορέσουν να προστατεύσουν τον εαυτό τους. Η παροχή κονδυλίων για την αντιμετώπιση του ανεξέλεγκτου πλέον φαινομένου, θα μπορούσε να αποτρέψει τις θανατηφόρες ναυάγια, με σωστό σχεδιασμό και διάνοια καθοδήγησης έτσι ώστε π.χ. προσλαμβάνοντας επιπλέον προσωπικό θα υπήρχε η δυνατότητα να προσφέρθει επιπλέον βοήθεια σε περισσότερα σημεία στην καταστροφή σύνορα.

Η δημιουργία κέντρων φιλοξενίας για τους πρόσφυγες σε μορφή κατοικιών θα ήταν εφικτή αν υπήρχαν τα κατάλληλα εφόδια, ώστε να προστατευτούν και να αναδειχθούν τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και η αλληλεγγύη, δύο αρχές που βασίζονταν άλλο το ευρωπαϊκό οικοδόμημα. Εκθέσεις διεθνών οργανισμών (ΟΟΣΑ) υπογραμμίζουν ότι ακόμα δεν έχει διεξαχθεί πλήρως το μέγεθος των επιπτώσεων της οικονομικής κρίσης στο τεράστιο μέγεθος των μεταναστευτικών ροών.

7. ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑ

Η ανθρώπινη κινητικότητα δεν ανεξαντίλαμβανε μόνο σε εύρος και σε κλίμακα, αλλά γίνεται όλο και περισσότερο περίπλοκη. Οι μετανάστες αποτελούν μια αρκετά ποικιλόμορφη ομάδα ατόμων που περιλαμβάνει διαφορετικές νομικές και διοικητικές κατηγορίες που ορίζονται από τα κράτη ή και τους διεθνείς οργανισμούς. Σύμφωνα
με την Παγκόσμια επιτροπή για την Διεθνή Μετανάστευση, τα κράτη έχουν σε
σημαντικό βαθμό στρέψει την προσοχή τους και τους λιγοτεύχους πόρους στην
ρύθμιση της μετακίνησής των πληθυσμών, ενώ ταυτόχρονα δημιουργείται μια
αυξανόμενη ένταση ανάμεσα στα συμφέροντα των κρατών, που πολλές φορές
κλείνουν τα σύνορα και υψώνουν τοίχους. Ένταση δημιουργείται επίσης και στις
αγορές και στον ιδιωτικό τομέα σε σχέση με την διεθνή
μετανάστευση (Παπαδόπουλος, 2010).
Η ΕΕ και τα κράτη - μέλη πρέπει να αναπτύξουν ένα ολοκληρωμένο σύστημα
Μετανάστευσης με στόχο την αποτελεσματική παρακολούθηση των μεταναστών. Η
υιοθέτηση πολιτικών που θα προωθούν και θα στηρίξουν την κυκλική μετανάστευση,
θα ορίσει μια νέα καινοτομία στον τομέα της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής. Στο επίπεδο
της ΕΕ πρέπει να εξασφαλίστει η ενιαία πρόσβαση όλων των αγορών εργασίας των
κρατών - μελών σε συγκεκριμένες κατηγορίες εξειδικευμένων εργατών. Το ίδιο
ισότιμον πρέπει να είναι οι προσβάσεις σε όλους όσοι αναγκάζονται να αναζητήσουν
ασφάλεια και σταθερότητα σε μια νέα πατρίδα.
Η Ευρώπη άργησε να ανταποκριθεί και στο ζήτημα της οικονομικής κρίσης και στο
ζήτημα της μεταναστευτικής κρίσης. Αντιμετωπίζει μια «δίδυμη» κρίση. Η
οικονομική κρίση επέβαλε δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή μέσω των μηνυμάτων και της
έλλειψης υποστήριξης πολιτικής βούλησης, με αποτέλεσμα στη σημαντική ζήτημα του
μεταναστευτικού, πολύ μικρό μέρος των θεσμικών προβλέψεων να έχει εφαρμοστεί
πρακτικά. Αποτέλεσμα της δημοσιονομικής αφαιρέζεται είναι οι άνθρωποι, χαλάδες
ανθρώπινες υποχές οι οποίες βρίσκονται υπό διογμό ή έχουν ανάγκη διεθνούς
προστασίας, να καταλήγουν «χάνονται» μέσα στην γραφειοκρατία (Παπαδόπουλος,
2010).
Οι νόμοι και οι κοινωνικές προτοποθείες για την μετανάστευση καθοδηγούνται από
την έλλειψη χρηματικών πόρων, την στιγμή που ακριβώς διαχειρίζονται δικαίωμα,
ανθρώπινη αξίωση, μη αναγνωρισμένη και χωρίς ασφάλεια εργασία, και τέλος
την απόλυτη εμπορευματοποίηση ανθρώπων.
Η ιστορική αυτή συγκυρία της τεράστιας μεταναστευτικής ροής σε μια περίοδο
απόλυτης οικονομικής ανέκδοτης μας φανερώνει ότι οι δημοκρατίες μας δεν είναι
υποδείγματα πολιτικής εκπροσώπησης και οικομεταναστεύσεις. Έτσι αυτή η δύσκολη
πραγματικότητα να είναι ακόμη μια ευκαιρία για τις χώρες της Δύσης να μπορέσουν
αποδείξουν ότι υπάρχει η δυνατότητα να μεταβληθεί η αντίληψη της ΕΕ, που ήθελε
μια Ευρώπη φρούριο με τοίχους και σφαίρες, και θα μπορέσει να μεταμορφωθεί σε μια Ευρώπη αξιών, δικαιωμάτων και ελευθερίας.

**ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ**

**ΕΛΛΗΝΟΓΛΩΣΣΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ**


Δημητριάδη, Α. (2013) Διέλευση και Μετανάστευση στην Ελλάδα. Η περίπτωση των Αφγανών, Πακιστανών και Μπανγκλαντεσιανών. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Νήσος.

ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ ΣΥΜΒΟΥΛΙΟ «Η Ευρώπη στην παγκόσμια σκηνή» Λονδίνο, 31 Μαΐου 2012 EUCO 107/1/12 REV 1 PRESSE 237PR PCE 91.


Καζάκος, Π. (2010), Από τον Ατελή Εκσυγχρονισμό στην Κρίση, Αθήνα, Πατάκη.


Παύλου, Μ. (2004) Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης: Κοινωνική συμμετοχή, δικαιομοστα και ιδιότητα του πολίτη / Συλλογικό έργο, Λίνα Βεντούρα, Βασίλης Καρύδης, Αθανάσιος Μαρβάκης, Μίλτος Παύλου, Κωνσταντίνος Τσιτσελίκης, Δημήτρης Χριστόπουλος, κ.ά. · Αθήνα: Κριτική (Κέντρο Ερευνών Μειονοτικών Ομάδων: Σειρά Μελετών · 8)


Τσιγκανου, Ιωάννα. (2009). Οι οψεις μετανάστευσης και μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής στην Ελλάδα σήμερα. ΕΚΚΕ.


**ΞΕΝΟΓΛΩΣΣΗ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ**


Gowan, P., (2009), Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System. Real- World Economics Reviews. CES


The madness of working as a human rights lawyer in times where rights are (treated as) useless

Dimitris Koros, Dr of Correctional Policy, Department of Social Administration and Political Science, Democritus University of Thrace

Correspondence:
Dimitris Koros
Orfanidou 2,
postal code 54626
Thessaloniki, Greece
dimikoros@gmail.com

The rights of refugees and the degree of their protection using national and international law as a tool for the enhancement of their legal and material position is a volatile field, immanent in which are mechanisms that attempt to limit their access to their established rights. Discourses on the rights of man vary, from the liberal view of rights as inherent features of all humans, to critiques of human rights in terms of their hidden, material and symbolic, aspects that favor dominant power relations. The paper will discuss the hardships of working in the field of refugee law, and will attempt to criticize the state and EU policies concerning international protection and the management of the refugee population, within a refugee crisis that has deteriorated the visibility of a frightened state in a constant despair.

The current refugee crisis is approached as a situation compressing human rights, creating an everyday dystopia which you can resist in a day to day basis, with a critical stance against dominant perceptions, and using as a guide the unreasonable dignity of these people. Human rights are critiqued within a foucauldian analysis of power relations and are approached as a strategic codification of the points of resistance, important as they are for the development of practices of freedom, towards a justice approached in terms of social struggle.

Key words: refugee law, critical human rights, Foucault, power relations, practices of freedom
1. Do refugees have human rights?

The refugee is a curious being; without a home, outside of their country, in fear and distress, prosecuted, and, according to the dominant perception, better in any condition (legal, social), than going back to the place they escaped from. A being in favor of which numerous national legislations and international treaties for the protection of human rights have been instituted, as well as international monitoring bodies, courts, etc., but which perpetually call for their respect as their implication is always trapped in logics of exclusion and otherness, and therefore refugees are treated as a burden that has to be dealt with as such, or are constructed as “the dreadful Other(s)” (Koukoutsaki 2013: 129-30), treated with deportation, hyper-incarceration or detention in police stations and storage camps, social exclusion and techniques of submission.

The human rights regime and its enforcement is a tool, among others, for the improvement of the legal and material situation of the refugee and their protection from arbitrary treatment, inside and outside of their country. Critical approaches to human rights have attempted to look beyond the perceived neutrality of the liberal discourse and shed light on their aspects that promote or ignore domination. In Marx's analysis, human rights, in distinction to the rights of the citizen (as discussed in the Jewish Question: 1844/2010) are essentially the rights of the egoistic person, the member of the civil society, and consequently, the right to liberty is in the final analysis a reflection of the fundamental for the capitalist system right to property. Moreover, even equality itself results as being the foundation of property, equality not in the sense of equal participation to the management of the community, but in the political sense (equal right to protection by law), something which leads to the need of security (as a reassurance form egoism), which returns to private property, that the security essentially protects (Binoche 1995: 141-144).

According to Balibar, persons, exactly like things, have to be supplied with functions of exchange relations (to wear legal “masks”) in order to bear commercial relations. Therefore, human rights play an important role for the capitalist system as they express the division of the human essence (between the reality of inequalities and the imaginary conception of the community) (Balibar 1996: 120-121· Binoche 1995: 137). Thus, for the marxist view, the legal system functions for the strengthening of
the workers' exploitation, despite the legal regulations that protect the weak, as the latter function for the concealment of the class origins of law (Chambliss 1975). For Pashukanis, the proletarian is in principle equal to the capitalist- this is expressed in the “free” employment contract; “but from the “materialized freedom” itself”, he says, “… derives the possibility for the proletariat to quietly die from hunger” (Pashukanis 1985: 116).

According to Hannah Arendt, the refugee is the child of the Jew, whose main characteristic is the fact that he is simply a person (Arendt 2015: 31); the rights of man rest on the confusion of the two lives (public, political life, and private life), the reduction of “bios” to sheer “zoe” (Rancière 2004: 298-300). For her, although human rights are attributed to a person solely based on the fact of her being a human, only when the human is also a citizen of a nation-state, do they have access to those rights (Limbu 2009: 265).

For Agamben, the refugee “provides the possibility of challenging the parameters of the cosmopolitan subject”, breaking with Kant's restrictive notion of hospitality and his inability to imagine a cosmopolitan community without nation-states, towards a political community to come, of which the refugee is the vanguard (Limbu: 2009: 266). The “nation-state means a state that makes nativity or birth [nascita] (that is, naked human life) the foundation of its own sovereignty [...] it is time to cease to look at all the declarations of rights from 1789 to the present day as proclamations of eternal metajuridical values aimed at binding the legislator to the respect of such values;... Rights, in other words, are attributed to the human being only to the degree to which he or she is the immediately vanishing presupposition (and, in fact, the presupposition that must never come to light as such) of the citizen” (Agamben 2015: 42-4).

Jacques Rancière criticizes the perception of both Arendt and Agamben concerning the principality of the naked life (“bare” life, Arendt's abstract life, private life, idiocy, opposed to the public life); Arendt's theory is discussed as a depoliticization of the issue and therefore a "radical suspension of politics" (Rancière 2004: 301) and Agamben's perception (an extension of Foucault's biopolitics and its equation with sovereignty) as an ontological destiny leading to a non-opposition between absolute power and the rights of man. The rights of man make natural life appear as the principle of sovereignty, and sacred life a life beyond oppression, between life and death (Rancière, 2004: 300-1, 309). For Rancière any struggle
enacting rights is thus trapped from the very outset in the mere polarity of bare life and state of exception (2004: 301), leading to an omnipotence of the powers of oppression. Therefore, “these rights are theirs when they can do something with them to construct a dissensus against the denial of rights they suffer”; then the rights of man “… are tentatively turned into real rights, belonging to real groups, attached to their identity and to the recognition of their place in the global population”, thus becoming the rights of those who have no rights, “the victims of the absolute denial of right” (2004: 305-7).

2. Michel Foucault, power relations, law and human rights

Michel Foucault, contrary to the traditional conceptions of power as a negative and strictly “bottom down” produced force, examines its positive, productive and functional sides, and its polymorphous tactics (Foucault 1987: 21). Therefore, he is critical of the marxist viewpoint, which finds power (exclusively, or mostly) in the state institutions, and considers the violent imposition of the capitalist condition as its purpose (Simos 2006: 94-5). For example, for him prison is a part of a technology of power aiming to know and govern the body, and instill to it aptitudes that will render it economically useful and productive (Macherey 2013: 11). In the foucauldian perception, the discourse on oppression and against it, is a part of the same historical mesh of that which it is against, and therefore, a different from the “repressive hypothesis” apprehension of power begins with the opposition to all its theoretical arrangements (Foucault 2005: 17, 20).

His approach of law in *Discipline and Punish* was based on a war-type analysis of power relations (Patton 2014); Foucault, in his analysis of the major role the disciplinary techniques played for the training of the body and the discipline of the society, considered law as a technology of domination; therefore, as the Enlightenment which brought the liberties, invented also the disciplines, the disciplinary modality of power, in this earlier conception of law by Foucault, which he later questioned, is the substratum of every legal freedom, as anti-law, an inhibition of law which is never total but is never canceled (Foucault 1989: 291).

Nietzsche, who affected Foucault's thought to a large extent, discusses rights in terms of power relations, and thus says that “my rights, are that part of my power which others have not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve”. According to Patton's account of Nietzsche’s analysis of rights, “... the emergence of
an institution or social practice may be quite different from the purposes that it currently serves, we can appreciate the possibility that rights that emerged in one historical context may take on a very different political significance in another context”. Thus, rights are the results of the dynamics of power relations and therefore are “... highly restrictive and limit the scope of both what we understand as human and inhuman and in so doing they have a vulnerability to become static and easily negotiable” (Patton 2014: 272).

Michel Foucault, who has been critiqued for having undermined the role of law (unjustly, according to Gordon 2015), discussed, in the Security Territory Population lectures (1977-1978) the emergence of governmental power, which, in contrast to the sovereign employment of law, establishes a liberal type of government, using “a range of multiform tactics”, of which law is one; on the other hand, this account of the emergence of governmental power cannot be considered as a non-appreciation of the importance of law, as, in his latter lectures on the Birth of Biopolitics [1978-1979 (2008): 321], he embraces its role against the Physiocrats' view (guided by a mistrust to the juridical form), as an effective instrument of regulation. Thus, a post-sovereignist analysis of law (in terms of power being “... immanent in our social practices and conduct”), breaks with an hegemonic fiction of law as a unified phenomenon, “within the context of a decentered economy of power” (Walby 2007: 552).

For him, “the normative force of rights can only be derived from historically available discourses of right”, therefore he contrasted both the reason of state (raison d’ état), in which the only limit on the exercise of power was the law (and the notions of right)- the “juridico- deductive” path (the delimitation of powers in terms of the rights of man and sovereignty), and modern liberal government, in which the emergence of political economy arose with the question of what is useful for the government: the utilitarian concept (followed by English radicalism), in terms of a calculus of interests and the independence of the governed from those who govern (Patton 2005: 279-81).

Foucault's perception on rights treats the latter as key features of liberalism and liberal practices of rule. Therefore, proposing a re-understanding and a re-appropriation of the rights discourse, means also that Foucault enters the terrain of liberalism, in order to work within and against its practices (Golder 2015: 7). For Foucault, where there is power, there is resistance (Foucault, 2013: 36-44; Simos
2006: 91-2): the points, the junctions, the sites of resistance are dispersed in space and time (Foucault 2005: 120). Therefore, in a foucauldian analytics of law, human rights could be viewed as a strategic codification of power relations, as the relational nature of the power relations presupposes a multiplicity of the points of resistance (Foucault 2005: 119).

This analytic of power, law and resistance (as an inherent feature of power relations), is contrary to Agamben's ontological approach, the attempt (in a moralist way) to “correct” Foucault for undermining the importance and centrality of Auschwitz, equating sovereignty with the state -the “cold monster” (Foucault 2004: 109), the threatening organism above civil society-; the state is seen not as a historical given, but rather as the effect of specific practices of governmentality (Deleuze 2005: 131-2; Shotten 2015: 160, 164). Agamben's approach is considered a historicist account, an “…‘anti-totalitarian’ theory of sovereignty [which]… renders any other historical or political outcome besides totalitarianism impossible”, while the foucauldian methodology, “undermining” the importance of the state (as a formation capable of dominating and occupying the whole social body), does not lead to an non-critique of it; on the contrary, it produces possibilities of counter conducts and practices of freedom (Schotten 2015: 171-6).

3. The “refugee crisis”

The legal vulnerability is an immanent characteristic of the refugee; despite the power of the defendants of rights (international treaties, intercontinental monitoring bodies and courts, political parties, NGOs, etc.), and the importance of the normativity of the legal texts protecting them, the refugee is always treated both in ways according to the legal principles that are considered as fundamental of the western world's legal civilization, and in ways that undermine basic values, which might lead to condemnations from bodies with legal jurisprudence, but can also serve as techniques for the imposition of a new normativity.

Human rights discourse is divided into the legal, the philosophical and the political. While the legal discourse is characterized by a positivist account of what human rights stand for, their “… internal logic..., elegance, coherence, extent and meaning…””, articulating “a set of neutral values to which all reasonable people should subscribe” (Evans 2005: 1052), the philosophical discourse, is supposed to enhance in a project “to discover secure foundations upon which human rights claims might
built”. On the other hand, the political discourse, indeed the most frowned upon as unscientific, is able to shed light on the hidden values and uses of the law, posing the questions of power and interests concerning the dominant conception on human rights (Evans 2005: op. cit.), thus is useful, however not sufficient per se, for a more strategically clarified image, as a tool for the protection against the new normativity.

Patton's foucauldian account states that “whether or not a body (individual or collective, personal or corporate) possesses rights will depend on facts about how that body is able to act and how it is treated in a given social milieu” (2005: 26). The constant threat of illegality, the legal vulnerability and the hyper-incarceration of third country nationals observed in most European countries, materialize their subordination and perform the task of a “less eligibility” mechanism\(^{35}\), which promotes, to use De Giorgi’s post-marxist analysis, “the reproduction of a vulnerable labor force, forced by its ontological insecurity to accept virtually any degree of exploitation…” (2010: 160).

The devaluation of labor power and the devaluation of life itself, is a mechanism of “less eligibility” (De Giorgi 2010), or “more eligibility”, as Cheliotis (2013: 740) wrote, working towards the alleviation of the vertical downgrading of our lives for its legitimation and normalization. Uncertainty, a permanent condition of detainability and deportability (De Giorgi 2010: 160), has always been a key feature both of the detention and of the legalization procedures.

Today's legal practice for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, within the “refugee crisis”, is the everyday outcome of a multiplicity of factors, that cannot be narrowed down to blaming a government. And that because, on the one hand, the state's sovereignty is restricted in terms of its international obligations: the creation of immigration law is based to some extend on the sovereign right of the states to exercise control over their borders, and at the same time is the product of various human rights obligations of the states, both from inside and from the outside, something which leads to a curtailment of their autonomy; according to Sassen, the constraints set to the states should not be considered as a control crisis, as they

---

\(^{35}\) Originally by Ruche and Kirchheimer (1939/2009) in their book about punishment and its relation to the transformations of the production relations, less eligibility is the mechanism according which the conditions of imprisonment should be worse than that of the free proletariat, for the deterrent effect of imprisonment to function as a condition for the imposition of the proletarian situation and the exploitation of the working class's labour force.
themselves have been transformed by the globalization of the economy and other transnational processes (Sassen 1996: 9-11, 15-6).

On the other hand, the crisis of the capital is (or, has brought) the crisis of the neoliberal governmentality, as it has brought with it a crisis of the state: the state is a weak player, striving to survive, as it cannot ensure the continuation of the policies planned, it cannot ensure even the survival of the population; it does not have the role it did under the neoliberal government of its issues, as it has stopped being able to guarantee the minimum management of the economic affairs, the equilibrium between society and the market, and therefore the consent of the people and its legitimation. It seems as though the patterns of neoliberalism cannot give a satisfactory explanation, to the extent that we might discuss, as Emmanouilidis says, a post-neoliberal scheme (Emmanouilidis 2013).

The result of this weakness of the state to stand on its feet and impose itself, ranges from a complete absence, to policies that have definite authoritarian characteristics; such (among others, maybe the most spectacular and harsh) was the (abolished, now) illegal extension of the detention of immigrants beyond the maximum time of 18 months set by the Greek law and the European Return Directive (Greek Council for Refugees 2014), under the euphemistic term “restrictive order to remain in the place already detained” (in conditions, of course, in violation of the article 3 of the ECHR against torture and inhuman, degrading treatment). This practice has been considered as illegal and in violation of ECHR and the Greek Constitution by most courts, when examining detainees' cases in the legal process called “objections against detention”; while this was the rule, the Administrative Court of Komotini (2014) had a different view, thus rejecting the objections as inadmissible, as the ministerial decision imposed a “restrictive order” and not detention36, as Foucault wrote, power produces truth37.

Then again, this lack of power by the state has been more evident in the period of the “open borders”, when its role in Idomeni was more of a “monitoring body”, leaving the decision of who passes, to the Macedonian police and the management of the population to the NGOs, volunteers and the UNHCR (Greek Helsinki Monitor 2016). Those having offered aid in this site of absolute variability could indeed give us a very interesting account of this madness caused by the day to day changes of the

37 “That which is considered as truth, produces obedience (Veyne 2011: 178).
practices of the police (from both sides of the borders) and the way in which the various organizations and volunteers cooperated and competed at the same time, for the aid of refugees and the promotion of their trademarks.

Also, the almost total lack of access to the asylum procedure, due to the inability of the state to receive the great numbers of refugees, was addressed with the Skype call system for arranging appointments with the asylum service, something which was a major failure and produced unfair outcomes and distress to the population\textsuperscript{38}. Now the state, unprepared for this crisis, unprepared for the end of the “open borders era” (a very comforting situation for the never ready for exceptional circumstances state), is living a crisis of visibility, therefore being in a situation of planning almost one day at a time; for the soothing of a refugee population in despair, and for the formation of a clear image of the population, the Asylum Service underwent a project for the recording of the applications for international protection: the pre-registration of all the refugees stuck in Greece, in order to get to know the population and to proceed to individualized treatment measures concerning vulnerable cases\textsuperscript{39}, the vast majority of them living in the temporary refugee camps, which are bound to become permanent, in conditions that represent the devaluation of human life\textsuperscript{40}. After the end of the pre-registration of the refugees in the camps, the Asylum Service issued appointments, in many cases irrespectively of the special characteristics of the case that called for acceleration and different procedural guarantees (unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, victims of torture and war victims, people with serious health conditions), and issuing registration dates until July 2017; until then, the refugees are the- inactive, inactivated and socially excluded-residents of the hospitality camps, which, according to the Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (KEELPNO), are dangerous and unsanitary for the people residing in them, and therefore have to close and the population be transferred to the

\textsuperscript{38} The Skype system for the access to asylum was a system were people willing to applying for international protection had to book an appointment with the Asylum Service via Skype, having to deal with a very restricted time schedule- which mirrored the service's inability to deal with a mass situation-, a system that led to a very limited access to asylum, and produced inequalities, distresss and demonstrations by the refugees. See: Refugees lost in translation and... in Skype. Available at: http://www.cnn.gr/premium/story/34753/prosfyges-xamenoi-sti-metafrasi-kai-sto-skype (in Greek).

\textsuperscript{39} The grand operation for the pre- registration of refugees in continental Greece is completed. Available at: https://left.gr/news/olokliotheke-i-megali-epiheirisi-pro-katagrafis-prosfygon-stin-iperotiki-ellada (in Greek).

\textsuperscript{40} See the report by MSF (20 October 2016): MSF calls on authorities in Greece to improve conditions for vulnerable people still trapped in migration camps. Available at: http://www.msf.ca/en/article/msf-calls-on-authorities-in-greece-to-improve-conditions-for-vulnerable-people-still-trapped.
Now, with the EU-Turkey agreement of 18 March 2016 and the return of the refugees that enter Greece after the 20th of March to Turkey, which is now considered a safe country (in an extraordinary twist of facts, and against the harsh reality of this country, especially after the recent events), we are dealing with a situation where the right to asylum, the right of non refoulement, and therefore core rules of the Greek, European and universal legal system, are abolished (Amnesty International 2016, Asylum Campaign 2016, Hellenic League for Human Rights 2016, National Commission for Human Rights 2016a), in favor of a harsh, authoritarian anti-refugee policy, especially after the failed coup d’état which was dealt with by Erdogan with even greater levels of authoritarianism.

It is a legally horrible text, which is not even dealt with from the government as a solution imposed (as was the 3rd memorandum), but as a solution favoring human rights and eliminating the dangers of deaths inherent to the journey from Turkey to Greece (as Alexis Tsipras mentioned to the General Secretary of the UN in his visit to Greece in the summer 2016), instead of promoting a policy of safe entry for those in need of international protection. The decisions on the inadmissibility of the asylum requests of the people entering Greece after the 20th of March where, in most of the cases, overturned by the Appeals Committees, which rejected the application of the agreement (despite the efforts for the opposite made by the Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy, Giannis Mouzalas) as inferior to the national and international legal rules for the protection of refugees, and arguing that Turkey is by far an unsafe country for them. Those decisions, despite using a strictly legal discourse for their judgements, have been treated as politically motivated by the Deputy Minister, who brought a law for the replacement of their members, placing


43 The National Commission for Human Rights expresses scepticism for the content of the EU-Turkey agreement, and discusses a serious setback in the field of the protection of human rights, at a European level: http://www.nchr.gr/images/pdf/EKTHESI_PROSFYGIKO.pdf (in Greek).


45 See the open letter to the Deputy Minister by 18 members of the Appeals Comittees critisizing the agreement and the intervention of Mouzalas to the composition of the Comittees:
in their composition administrative judges who, by the constitution, are prohibited from having administrative duties\textsuperscript{46}.

4. Working in hr: With rights and beyond rights

While working in the field of human rights law is indeed an intriguing and scientifically interesting job, offering the pleasure of employing the legal discourse for the advancement of the rights and liberties of those in need of protection, the (unavoidable in any work position) hierarchical dependence from the choices made by your superiors (though, itself should not be an excuse for the uncritical acceptance of a policy, no matter what), and a dominant uncritical devotion to a particular conception of rights, and mostly, of course, the “negative ones”, the ones that emphasize non-interference, instead of the always “forgotten” economic and social rights, leads to a confusion between “... the “sites” of violations...” and the “...the “causes” of violations...” (Evans 2005: 1066-7).

Working in such an unsteady environment, where similar situations are dealt in different ways, and different situations are dealt with as if they are indistinguishable, where the application of law is always a thing to fight for, is the perfect site to comprehend and live the mobility of power relations and therefore the respect or not of human rights, in an everyday life of anxiety for professional effectiveness in a turbulent site. The perfect example of this, is the result of the EU-Turkey agreement in the legal situation of Syrian refugees, who, after being dealt with no detention at all (as detention is imposed, according to the law, for the execution of the deportation decision), are now “illegalized subjects of humanitarianism” (Tazzioli 2016: 110): detained (together with all third country nationals who enter Greece from the islands after the 20\textsuperscript{th} of March) beyond the 6 months, which, after February

\textsuperscript{46} The Deputy Minister, in a rush to impose the agreement, submitted the amendment outside of the legal deadline, and was therefore rejected, and was re-submitted after some days: "Amendment ordered by Brussels": \url{http://www.efsyn.gr/arthro/tropologia-kata-paraggellia-vryxellon} (in Greek). See the criticism by the Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Refugees and Immigrants: \url{http://omadadikigorwn.blogspot.gr/2016/06/blog-post.html} (in Greek). Mouzalas considers the amendment as “fair”: \url{http://news247.gr/eidiseis/politiki/mouzalas-dikaios-oi-epitropes-asuloy-me-symmetoxh-dikastikwn.4120026.html} (in Greek). The National Commission for Human Rights (an Independent advisory board to the state on human rights issues) issued a statement on the matter, considering the practice of the Deputy Minister as problematic, since the government had already passed the law 4375/2016 (regarding asylum procedures, two months before the amendment), stating that the amendment serves only the illegal imposition of the agreement: \url{http://www.nchr.gr/images/pdf/apofaseis/prosfuges_metanastes/Dimosia%20dilwsi%20EEDA.pdf} (in Greek).
2015\textsuperscript{47}, was the maximum time of administrative detention (in practice, as the law still predicts 18 months as the maximum - something that might be again enforced). While the deportation of Syrians was unthinkable some months ago, now the UNHCR expresses concern that the returns to Turkey do not even abide by the rules set forth by this horrible agreement\textsuperscript{48}. A site where people “... are often captured by both regimes and pass from being subjects of humanitarianism to illegal migrants” (Tazzioli 2016: 110).

As the everyday experience in the field of power relations that is called refugee protection shows, we do not need a monolithic ahistorical conception of power, but one that is useful for encountering the present circumstances (Patton 2014: 23). A concept of power that derives from the “strategical model, rather than the model based on law”, and that because “... the force relations which for a long time had found expression in war..., gradually became invested in the order of political power” (Foucault 2005: 127). Therefore, power cannot be analyzed as a struggle between forces, but rather in terms of government, as acting “on the field of possibilities” (Patton 2014: 23-4).

An uncritical engagement of the moral universalism of human rights entails the danger to justify neoliberal globalization (Cheah 2007: 145). What we lack, according to Evans, is a critique of the human rights regime; while criticism, especially the one that focuses on the failure of the implementation of the human rights standards, is often, a critique would offer an insight on how power relations are exercised though the human rights discourse, thus exposing “...the interests served by the production and maintenance of particular truths...”, engaging in a struggle for the enhancement of the human rights as a discourse, one among others, of freedom, against its side that (inherently) promotes domination (Evans 2005: 1048-9, 1068).

What is in need for our critical attention (outside of the dominant view of human rights as inherent features of human nature and in the context of them being “historical and contingent features of particular forms of social life” - Patton 2005: 269), is the double function of human rights, both to protect the subjects that fall

\textsuperscript{47} \url{http://www.mopocp.gov.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=&perform=view&id=5374&Itemid=607}.

within their normative scope, and the parallel relation of NGOs with the main political agents that might lead to a conservative capture of the legal practice in the liberal demarcation of law. What is in need for the legal practice in the field of human rights, in this time of madness, where the application of law changes dramatically day by day, posing threats to the legal establishment of the “European family”, is not an effort to defend it for the sake of the enforcement of law, but a discourse that works as a strategic map for the critical engagement of human rights into the volatile network of resistance (Foucault 2005: 119).

Lastly, what we need for a critical theory and practice, is not only the strengthening of rights, the legal establishment and protection of legal liberties, but, at the same time a critique of the legal system itself, and its perceived neutrality, for the disclosure of its less discussed practices, and the conception of practices of freedom beyond rights, in a context where social struggle is not considered in terms of “justice”, but rather justice is emphasized as social struggle (Foucault, 1991: 51-2).

Beyond the human rights discourse, which sees the refugee as a refugee and only that, therefore in need of protection and nothing more than that, a solid, vulnerable subject, accountable only in case of gross violations of the rules of society, we should engage in efforts both to ensure the application of human rights law, and in efforts of social inclusion of the refugees in our cities, villages, neighborhoods, schools, social spaces, not in the terms of the capital, but “our way”, towards social relations based on self-organization and social solidarity (Ioakimoglou 2016).

In this site of everyday madness, the legal practice is vulnerable to an uncritical acceptance of the new normativity, therefore in need of a critical awareness of the mobile net of power relations, and in need of inspiration from the inexplicable dignity with which refugees deal with the hardships immanent in the situation of being a refugee, “working on the limits of what is possible to say and to do within a given milieu” (Patton 2005: 284), favoring the development of practices of freedom within and beyond the established human rights.

REFERENCES
Amnesty International (2016). EU-Turkey deal: Greek decision highlights fundamental flaws. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/eu-
turkey-deal-greek-decision-highlights-fundamental-flaws/ (in Greek).


European Council (2016). EU- Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. Available at:


Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (2016). Hospitality Centers must


Left (2016). The grand operation for the pre-registration of refugees in continental Greece is completed. Available at: https://left.gr/news/oloklirothike-i-megaliepiheirisi-pro-katagrafis-prosfygon-stin-ipeirotiki-ellada (in Greek).


18 Independent Appeals Committee members (2016). *Public letter on amendment to the Independent Appeals Committees*. Available at:

**Author's bios**

Commons beyond/against/underneath the nationstate
Notes on the crisis of the european border regime 2015 and the antiracist potentiality of encounter

Niki Kubaczek, transversal texts and Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, editor, student, activist

In the summer of 2015 the european border regime underwent a massive crisis. On 4 September of that year thousands of migrants started a collective march in Budapest and hundreds broke out of the reception centre in Rőszke. As often as it worked out to create the impression, that history has come to an end, that summer showed clearly: history is by no means over yet. In 2015 the question, who can live here, in europe, and under which conditions, was stolen from the judges, the executing and the professional 'representatives of the people’. Instead this question became a virulent topic discussed in shock or in anger next to the toilet at the train station, on the sidewalk in front of the refugee camp, during the common dinner or on holiday with a view on the sea. The mode of distribution of rights and possibilities – in other words: the regulation of migration – that is allowing some to have a relatively good live, where it’s deporting, incarcerating and criminalising many, many others to make them even more exploitable, was suddenly appearing to many no longer as the only possibility but as what it is: not more than just one possibility out of many. Through this de-normalisation the nationstate was facing increasing pressure, as its hegemony and implicitness was no longer guaranteed.

The strong migration movements did not only lead to a temporal opening of the borders in europe, it also provoked multiple support practices, that were then celebrated, especially in austria and germany, under the term ’welcome culture’. The term itself stands for the attempt of the nation state to rasterize, smoothen and frame the events that happened according to its own benefits: to depict the nationstate or 'its' citizens as the agent of charity and generosity where as the migrants as recipients or objects of the generous welcome actions. Thereby the strong self-determined agency
of the movements of migration in the summer of 2015 as well as the partial politization and activation of citizens that was provoked by that very movements is rendered invisible. Against those efforts of national framing, still in 2015 pictures of furious police officers were going through the media, that were fighting on the correct interpretation of the ‘border management’ at the austria-german border. It is exactly the terms of ,welcome culture’ and of ,refugee crises’ that has to be dismantled as a strategy of hiding the crisis of the border regime as well as the manifold encounters, support actions and forms of exchange that should be prevented by that border regime. What was new in 2015 was not so much the crisis ,of the refugees’ as the term ,refugee crisis’ suggests, as their travel is often accompanied with violence, pain and exploitation – what was new in 2015 was the deep crisis of the border regime: The attempt of the regulation of migration, or to put it in other words: the nationstate experienced a massive crisis as its normalisation got undermined – also when only temporally, still intensively. „To question the state like that – through the detour of immigration – is leading in the final analysis to a so to say ,denaturalisation’ of what is almost regarded as natural. This leads to a historicisation of the state or of what seems to be infested in the state by a history amnesia, which means that we are reminded of its social and historical conditions of appearance“ Sayad writes in the book The Great Prison (Sayad 2015: 39).

**Moralisation and Criminalisation**

Undermined and pushed in the corner, the nationstate did what it was left with: to lash about, to act out its repressive power, its monopoly on the use of force. As harmful as this is to many, still the state can thereby no longer hide its violence, its force behind hegemony. Sometimes ,the subjectivities push the state into defensive and force it from time to time to reconstitute itself anew solely through terror’ (Guattari/Negri 2015: 73) In that very sense, in June 2016 the viennese police started a so called „offensive against drug dealing“ on the streets of Vienna. Of course, the people who got and still get controlled were not only those who made their living by selling Marihuana on the streets – as without or with the wrong papers there is not so many options to earn money differently (see f.ex. Reichel 2016) – but it is everybody, that is identified as ’not white’ by the police. Nigerian Restaurants were terrorised by daily police presence and if you were considered ,not white’, it was almost impossible to pass that area of the city around the ’Gürtel’ without getting into just another racist
police control; or your skills of passing were very advanced. That controls continued at least until the end of 2016, when that text was written, even though police stated clearly that its not solving any problem, but only pushing the scene of drug dealing to move from one place to another in the city by keeping it ‘mobile’ how they called it. (see Wetz 2016)

It was also in the days of the beginning of the police offensive, on the 15 June 2016 that the back then new austrian chancellor Christian Kern declared in a speech in front of the Austrian National Assembly: . » If someone is getting into mischief, there is no place for him in our society. « What is meant here exactly with getting into mischief? Who is meant here? And what kind of dealing with problems is proposed and naturalised here? And last but not least: who is actually meant with ‘our society’?

It is that seemingly unimportant remark, in which the idea, the sovereignty and the reality of the nationstate as well as its practices of criminalisation, incarceration, deportation and the forms of exploitation of migrants made possible by the before get normalised by the very means of moralisation, self evidence and commons sense. What we can see in Kerns statement, is that morals, that hints at consent, is functioning less through that what is being said, but through that, what is communicated and sensed on an implicit level. A specific assemblage of knowledge, affects and judgment that appears as a universality and matter of course. Similar to morals, the idea, reality and sovereignty of the nationstate – thus the daily and fundamental assignment of rights and possibilities due to the place of birth (ius soli) or the blood relationship (ius sanguinis) – depends on such kind of ‘matters of course’. This is granting it a form of legitimacy, that is obtaining its power mainly from its invisibility. » [The] significance, that morals have in the perception of the phenomenon of immigration, can not be emphasized enough « (Sayad 2015: 36):

Migration, Encounter, Perception, Imagination

Shortly before the summer of 2015 representatives of the municipality of Alberschwende (a small village in the west of austria with a mayor from the conservativ party ÖVP) wrote a letter, in which they already hint at the potential politisication of migration: » It’s brewing in the country, it’s rumbling in the municipalities! Through our activities with asylum seeks we got insights in the insufficiency of the european asylum system (dublin agreement). We are no longer
willing to join those who simply shrug their shoulders. We people on the ground seem to be more advanced regarding asylum policy, than those chicken – and in that case – dishonest ›high‹ politics« (Gemeinde Alberschwende 2015). When this municipality is writing, that they learned themselves through the activity with migrants, this is marking a major shift on how to look on the summer of 2015. This perspective hints to the fact that primarily it was not the migrants that depended on the broad networks of support through EU citizens, but it was the opposite: exactly those networks of support wouldn’t have existed, if in 2015 there wouldn’t be so much people who struggled their way trough to europe. The reason for this is that without their presence their would just simply be no 'support structures' and those people in support structures would have never heard the many stories, that they haven’t known of before or that they would have simply continued to classified as just another horror story that they see every day in television and forget in the next moment. In Austria, the movements of migration thereby entailed a politicisation of those that have always profited from citizen rights through means of a de-normalisation of the state and the nation - whether the people affected by this politicization called themselves » helpers «, » supporters «, » activists « or » volunteers «.

The often discussed concept of the autonomy of migration respectively the border regime suggests, that migration always 'comes first' in the sense that it always also forces the state and the attempts of regulation to react to it, and not the other way around in the sense of migrants being just the victims of the nation states. Borders are never 100 percent tight because there will always be ways that people find in order to cross them; even when the ways get more and more dangerous and expensive. This means the border is never just a solid wall but much more, as a regime, a way to regulate and guide, respectively exploit migration. This does not only concern the paths of people, the walls, fences, passport controls on the streets and the many ways to illegalize and criminalize migration, it also concerns the regulation of affects, perceptions and spaces of imagination, that are connected with moving or located life. For this reason we can understand the autonomy of migration not only in crossing borders in a geographical sense, but also as the capacity to elude this constraints by continuously creating new social networks and affective connections against the ambitions of the border regime, that wants to hinder that very connections and encounters. With this and in extension to the approach of Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos – that primarily see the mobile commons as support-networks
between migrants – i would like to propose an understanding the processes of exchange and organisation that took place over the last years in the context of Refugee Struggles since 2012, but also in the long summer of migration, exactly through the mobile commons: fragmented and resistant spaces, that were dependent on the singular experiences of the migrants as well as they depended on those spaces (see Papadopoulos / Tsianos 2013).

Going back to the struggles of 2012, where in Würzburg, Germany a self organised refugee march started from lager to lager which then resulted in various protest camps in Berlin, Vienna, Amsterdam and many other cities, the protesters of course already pointed out the simultaneity of physical and discursive marginalisation that can never be separated: „Lagers are often located in the middle of nowhere. No one sees us, we cannot see anyone. No one hears us, we cannot hear anyone. No one talks to us, we cannot talk to anyone! We are invisible.“ The precondition as well as the result of the Viennese Refugee Protests that started 2012 was the many encounters and exchange between those without or with the „wrong’ papers and those with the „right’ papers. Those contacts between illegalized persons and those persons that can enjoy the right of citizens is always confronted with structural barriers: through isolation in lagers or privately run accommodations in remote places. Through representation politics and forms of othering. Through often radically different daily routines between those with more resources and rights and those illegalized people and migrants that work in the invisible, precarious and extremely underpaid jobs or in criminalized economies. Through normalisation and naturalisation of these divisions and allocations. Hence the nationstate is not only marginalising in spacial and economic terms by transferring people in remote places or prisons – hence illegalizing that workforce and by that making it even more exploitable - it is furthermore and exactly by that very means silencing the marginalized. Their living conditions are made invisible as are the state practices of devision and allocation. The voice, that could tell about the handling with the given violence and about strategies of resistance are made inaudible. Exchange, encounters and linkage with people, that have more or other resources or rights – most of the time by alleged „natural’ ways, in other cases due to 'performance' looking at the present developments in immigration law - is hindered. But parallel to this multiple solid or less solid forms of barriers, devisions and allocations, of course also the capacity to opposition exists, to move despite of all the mechanisms of control, to create networks and cross borders never the less: despite (growing) control,
fortification and regulation movement is taking place; also when its getting more dangerous.

**The ambivalences of listening**

But how can resistance be heard, without misconceiving it as acts of autonomous and heroic, only individual subjects? The work of listening Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is rephrasing as the 'making voiced of an individual' (vgl. Spivak 2008, S.53) and as the 'attentiveness for the continuous' construction of the subaltern. That work is marked by ambivalences: Spivak is referring to a form of listening to, of valuing and appreciating, of recognizing knowledge and strategies of survival and at the same time she is referring to a refusal of homogenising, romanticising, essentializing or re-identifying the marginalised voices. What is at stake here is a certain inconsistency, that thrives to escape any kind of thinking in dichotomies: Listening to the voices of the marginalised does not mean to assume them as autonomous and as independent from power relations. But at the same time that listening implies to notice the uniqueness and the force of its singularity, that transcends, that is always much much more than the universalized picture of the victim but also much more than the image of the heroic-nomadic-revolutionary figure. Learning-to-listen thereby means to listen to the polyphony, to the simultaneousness of being constraint and having the capability to withdraw yourself from that constraint. 'There is on the one side that negative image of the migrant – as an exploited subject, and on the other side there is that certain positive image – the migrant as a cultural avant-garde of the presence, as the diasporic subject, as the „cosmopolitan from bellow”. I think, that theoretical polarity has to be overcome.' (Mezzadra 2010, S. 22)

Resistance thereby is less a heroic, individual act, but rather the (singular and common) living capability to escape from control and regulation. Hence, resistance – in other words: autonomy – is never some kind of independence but can only exist in a form of in-relation-to the techniques of governance and regulation, that it tries to escape contentiously by inventing new strategies of survival. „I like to live peacefully. But here in Europe, I still have to search for this beautiful and peaceful life. For the moment, I live like an animal, like a bat. An animal that only lives at night. I always have to come up with something when I see the police so I don’t have to talk to them, to avoid being checked.“ (Kader 2013). That means that the autonomy of migration is located in its not-fully-beeing-determined by the means of control: ability and skills to find tracks and paths, that evade control, escaping it, fool it. Departing from an
awareness of differences, that wants to reach beyond both victimisation and heroization, how can we understand those radical differences as exactly the condition of the possibility of the common, of the common struggles, of common living? And which role does the work of listening play here?

**Listening-inorder-to-respond as a practice of sharing**

„Because I will share my problems with you, and you will share ours with your friends. And when the time comes when we have to struggle, we will come together, and we will be more powerful.“ (Numan 2013), Mohamed Numan, Refugeeaktivist, stated in 2012 in the Viennese Sigmund Freud Park, that was squatted from November until December by Refugees and Supporters. Mohamed Numan points here to a notion of commons, that is understood as a practice of sharing, using the possibilities we have, that are distrubted very unequally due to racism, classism, sexism, heteronormativity etc. He is thereby formulating an understanding of sharing that is part of a political, commoning praxis rather than a romantic desire that ignores violence and difference. Similar to the demand of queer feminist Black Austrian activist Linda Nkechi Louis: 'Share your privileges!' (see also Lindas Friends 2014) The differences – the predominant distribution of rights, resources and possibilities – thereby become the very preconditions of the invention of the commons without ignoring the ever present radical impossibilities and barriers of that very invention. Hence the radical differences in living conditions, lived experiences, the impossibilities of the emergence of the commons represent in this context the very condition of the possibility of any kind of common, how also butler (see butler 2006) proposed it. The fight for the good life of some as the fight for a good life for everyone. This also means to not stop at the idea of hearing, but rather aim at developing a practice of hearing-to-respond, to quote Spivak again here. Forms of audibility, that notice the breaks and possible connections: sharing problems.

'What we often overlook are the silent, small steps which organize solidarities, empower communities and tie long-lasting networks of trust. These invisible processes are often not perceived as ‘political’ work and maybe they won’t lead to immediate visible outcomes – such as a demonstration, a public debate in the autonomous centre or a zine. We want to challenge this narrow definition of the ‘political’ and stress the importance of this kind of political work.' (reflectionist
collective: Beyond Voluntourism and Holidarity? White German Activists on the 'Balkanroute' 2016,

Who for example receives attention and financial support in antiracist struggles when the work of legalisation of one person is at stake, while time and money is ever less available than it would be needed. Can political work be guided by sympathies to one or another person? Is there actually another option? How can a context be worked out, that is not collapsing after one or maximum two years due to frustration and exhaustion of the people involved?

Rex Osa, founder of THE VOICE Refugee Forum states that 'We have to learn a culture of communication: so that what affects me, also affects you; and also an understanding of the power of fighting-together.' (Osa 2014)

universalisms or friendship?

We will live together. That was one of the declarations of the squatting of the Hotel City Plaza in Athens. Against all divisions into refugees, economic migrants, victims and criminals here and there spaces popped up in the summer 2015, that despite of all the differences a common aim of living together was pursued. That places of exchange carried a certain universalism in their names: Social Center 4 All, Right to the City for Everyone, Much more 4 everyone etc. In the Left universalism often fell into disrepute, and often with very good reason. Never the less, Nora Sternfeld makes an important observation here: „... that there is good reasons for wanting more than just speaking for ones one […] And isn’t it especially the universal perspective that is often denied to marginalised positions?“ (Sternfeld 2007) Still against the notion of universality Judith Revel introduces the term of the common as confronting the idea of universality (see Revel 2011). She is locating the construction of the common in the middle of the dichotomy between the determinism of history and human inventiveness. Here one could say, that in the sense that migration can elude control and is influenced by it, as well the common is realised in a mode of despite and according to all the different differences.

With an eye on both the critique of universalism as well as on the critique of the critique of universalism, i would like to conclude with just another term, ever present in our lifes, our struggles and our ways of caring for each other: friendship. Friendship, as attentiveness, desire and vulnerability determines in whomes situation
we put ourselves in – consciously or unconsciously. It dictates which living realities and perspectives we are taking into account, when we make decisions or when we feel this or the other way. Who is becoming our comrade, who our friend, and who not? „Whose friend or enemy?“ Derrida asks in his politics of friendship. Are for example human smugglers our friends, that force people in existential emergencies to give them the last money they have, but still do their job: helping others over the border? Are volunteers our friends, who donate on sunday some old cloths to a 'poor syrian refugee family’ so that they can continue their daily routine on monday with a proud smile in their face? Are they our friends if in fact that family was very happy with the encounter and the cloths, because they lost all their cloths on the travel and in the weeks before they mostly experienced racist comments on the streets and at the alien police office? In order to become more – in a qualitative but also simply quantitative sense – who stand in for the freedom of movement of all and against racism, it is inevitable to discuss this contradictory and ambivalent contexts and not just always follow the instinct of critique, that might turn out as moralism more often than we would like it. It is exactly those conflicting contexts, that together represent the surrounding of migration, which often enables it to partially accelerate against the manifold forms of deceleration, of slowing it down, to again refer to the concept of the mobile commons.

**Conclusion**

Not only the summer 2015, but also the winter 2012 hinted at a processes that started within the framework of friendship but then transcended that boundaries, in order to reach beyond to practices of sharing and activation, that is criss-crossing our friendship circles as well as those circles of our and their friends. The long summer of migration pushed us to think more about the delicate balancing act, that Rubia Salgado - founder of *maiz*, an independent organization by and for migrant women that exists now more than 20 years in the austrian city of Linz - described at the Viennese *Aufbruch* conference as follows: „To put the common in front of the separating, without being naive“. Hence, there is this possibility of becoming more, but what is crucial here is to discuss much more the overlaps between supposedly private questions, care work and broader, more public forms of resistance and organizing, as the latter could never exist without the former. That awareness means also to search for the political more in that places where it begins: in the middle of the
debates, contradictions, discussions in the so called 'private', in the social, there where that encounter and exchange is taking place, while waiting for the Kebap, while discussing with the neighbour, while teaching each other languages, while dancing in the dark. The struggle for a good life for everyone and against the nation, criminalisation, illegalization, incarceration, moralisation, exploitation and deportation means to start here, in the middle of the false, in the middle of the presence, in the middle between us, instead of waiting for the revolution to come. 'There is no other world. There is only a different way of living.', The Invisible Committee quotes Jaques Mesrin in their book To Our Friends. To further denormalise the border regime, the nationstate and the politics of illegalization means to aim at the potentiality of encounter where it is taking place as a form of listening, that notices the violence and the forms of resistance and does not romanticise, essentialize or re-identify difference, but rather reaches across both victimisation and heroisation by here-by – meaning: in the middle of the encounter – inventing or discovering forms of commons, of a listening-inorder-to-respond: a proliferating, virulent, contagious forms of sharing problems that wants to escape the morals of both the state as well as the morals sometimes appearing in the very critique of the state; and through that inventing common worlds beyond, against and underneath the nation and its states.

**literature**


Kader, Simo (2013): I live like these animals, like the bats… only at the night http://transversal.at/transversal/0313/simo/en


Numan, Mohamed (2013): The Land is Equal. URL: http://transversal.at/transversal/0313/numan/en


for all web pages: opened last time on 25 december 2016
The Middle East Refugee Crisis and the Foundations of Solidarity

Radmila Nastić, The Faculty of Philology and Arts Kragujevac Srebia, Professor

In view of the recent influx of refugees from the Middle East and elsewhere into various European and non-European countries, and in light of their worldwide shockingly inhumane treatment, this paper looks at some lost foundations of international solidarity embodied in traditional hospitality, socialism and the non-aligned movement. The study is rooted in the observations of the recent flood of Syrian and other refugees in Serbia, the country once part of the socialist Yugoslavia, one of the founders of the non-aligned movement, where hospitality, as in Greece, has been a traditional value. As in Serbia, in Greece, too, in spite of general economic duress, we have seen instances of solidarity with refugees of the Greek people in Lesvos and elsewhere very different from the calls for their politically correct ‘processing’ by the rich EU countries, whose insistence on so called “European values,” disproved by European history, sound hollow and in practice prove to be hypocritical. The principles of non-alignment and what has remained of them have been almost smothered by the fabricated economic crisis, the austerity measures, and the unfinished project of imperialism and colonialism which have created new modes of racism in Europe. In pursuing these agendas governments go against the true interest of the people and play the game dictated by the big banks and multinational corporations.

Key words: refugees, solidarity, hospitality, socialism, non-alignment

This presentation especially seeks to salvage from oblivion testimonies of true solidarity which education for internationalism once made almost spontaneously imperative, and to suggest inclusion of some of those principles in the solution of the present crisis. As concerns the oldest of the earlier numbered concepts, traditional
foundations of solidarity, we should not, even if we are atheists, underestimate the positive aspects of religions in their unspoilt forms, in this case Orthodox Christianity which is shared by the peoples of Greece and Serbia. Many ordinary people are not educated in the new speak of human rights, internationalism, refugee crisis and the like, but understand very well what compassion is.

**Appeal to Traditional Hospitality**

We have all seen pictures of common people in Greece showing their spontaneous solidarity with Syrian and other refugees. The picture of the elderly Greek village women nursing a baby while their mother is relaxing at the back has been circulating worldwide, as well as that of the grandmother of Indomeni who hosted an entire family. In the text titled “From Lesbos to Calais: Militarized Hostility and Subversive Hospitality” an international aid worker compares an initiative on Lesbos and the inhuman “Jungle” of Calais: “In the town of Kalloni a diverse group of atheist Marxists and a solitary Orthodox monk gave life to an old monastery by feeding and caring for refugees passing through. In spite of crushing austerity laws, unemployment and arising far-right, communities have chosen to welcome the strangers and stand in solidarity with them” (Anonymous 2016).

The officials of the Orthodox Church, too, have openly identified with the exiled and the oppressed. This is an excerpt from a presentation at a conference devoted to this problem:

> The Orthodox Churches advocate a culture of compassion in which people share their material resources with those in need. Charity and compassion are not virtues to be practiced just by those who have the material resources and means. They are virtues that promote the communal love that Christians should have for all human beings. Every human being, regardless of whether he or she is rich or poor must be charitable and compassionate to those lacking the basic material resources for sustenance (Clapsis 2011).

In the past year about one million refugees have passed through Serbia almost without any major problem or conflict. Exactly this time last year (2015) on and around the park near the main railway and the bus stations in Belgrade thousands of refugees spent their time waiting for further means of transfer to European Union. While governments sealed borders and erected walls, ordinary people were offering support and shelter. A refugee relief centre was established nearby. Last August they were helping 1,000 people a day, offering food, clothing and a solar-charging station for
mobiles in the heart of the city. This was one of the groups filling the gaps left by a government restricted by the terms of an IMF loan, which leave it unable to employ civil servants to respond to the needs of refugees transiting through its territory. Imagine this!

The bulk of donations have come from the local people: “We are a nation of refugees – people understand,” explained a representative of the charitable wing of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which provided food and shelter. “Over the summer there were 3,000 refugees in Belgrade parks. People brought food and clothing; companies handed out water. There was not a single incident or conflict (Vranesevic cited in Healy 2016).

I am sure every people has some foundation of solidarity, every religion and confession has in its original form a built-in idea of compassion and hospitality which must be invoked time and again against the callousness and greed of the so called free market economy and what goes with it.

Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement

Another thing to be remembered is the Yugoslav socialist heritage which is still not quite dead among ordinary people. It meant, among other things, that for each new born baby free social care and enough food had to be provided. Part of this policy was free education from elementary school to the university, and education for internationalism. Elements of socialism were shared by many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, once united in the non-aligned movement which brought their peoples closer together. Yugoslav people was taught to develop solidarity with all the peoples of the world, especially from these so-called third world countries. We knew a lot about these countries. Many young people from these countries studied at Yugoslav universities, and some of their children still do. There were many other forms of economic and cultural cooperation between our countries. This is why we took so hard the destruction of Iraq, Libya, and now the war that is being waged against Syria. All of these countries were once part of the non-aligned movement, and still are, though the movement is not what it used to be, and practiced some kind of socialism. They were also important for the integration of the countries of the region.

I will paraphrase and quote some theses by Vijay Prashad expressed in his 2007 book *The Darker Nations, A People’s History of the Third World* with reference to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as a factual framework, and some, though not all, of his interpretations of the facts. Its beginning was in the dream of the peoples of
Africa, Asia and Latin America during their seemingly endless battles against colonialism, which was first defined as Third Worldism by such leaders as India’s Nehru, Egypt’s Nasser, Ghana’s Nkrumah, and Cuba’s Castro who met at a series of gatherings from Bandung in 1955 to Havana in 1966. Two thirds of the world who had just won their independence wanted to stay away for the bi-polarity of the Cold War. The new nations took the advantage of the United Nations incepted in 1948 to put forward their demands through the General Assembly. In Bandung, one of the leaders of the Third World, Ahmed Sukarno, pleaded with his fellow statesmen and their peoples not to be bitter about the past, but to look firmly on the future of life and liberty. He said:

Let us remember that the highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of poverty, the liberation of man from the physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for long stunted the development of humanity’s majority. And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united (Sukarno cited in Prashad 2007, p.xvii).

The idea of the Third World, writes Prashad, moved millions and created heroes. Apart from the mentioned leaders there were also Vietnam’s Nguyen Thi Binh and Ho Chi Minh, Algeria’s Ben Bella, and South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. However, as this author points out, the project came with a built-in flaw: the fight against colonial and imperial forces enforced a unity among various political parties and across social classes. The people believed that the new states would promote a socialist programme. Instead they got compromises. Still it was much better than what was to come, certainly than what we have today.

A central character in this story in the beginning was Nehru, the prime minister of India from 1947 to 1964. He insisted that the Third World countries should create moral pressures, though not a force. He defined the main points of the Third World platform as: “political independence, nonviolent international relations, and the cultivation of the United Nations as the principle institution for planetary justice” (Ibid, P.11). In time leaders of the main social tendencies against colonialism began to use the term Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). They came together in a political movement against imperialism’s legacy (Prashad, p.13). Interestingly, at some points, both so called communist powers, China and The Soviet Union came close to or took part in the movement.
The founding conference of NAM held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961 was the result of the preparatory meetings of Nasser, Nehru and Marshal Tito. During this conference the term “peaceful co-existence” was coined. The term was denigrated by the USA, accepted by the Soviet Union. The US led a hostile policy towards the movement undertaking to undermine it in every possible way. Though among some of the member states the concept of international relations based on morals rather than in terms of power politics was adopted, some other states, like Egypt, had to arm themselves. Tito became the most dominant figure of the movement. Yugoslavia sent its arms to Egypt and Burma, in the UN voted for Congo and Angola, actively supported the Algeria’s war of independence. The victory of the Algerians in 1962 was hailed by the NAM countries. NAM also supported the main liberation movements in Portuguese Africa (Mozambique, Angola, and Cabo Verde). Victory of the people of Vietnam a decade and more later was a triumph.

Between the 1950s and 1970s the Third World formed a unique political force, but from the 1970s it began to falter, attacked from without and from within. Both attacks were born in one country – Saudi Arabia – according to Prashad. As early as 1962 the Saudi crown prince initiated the formation of World Muslim League (WML) which proclaimed that: “Those who disavow Islam and distort its call under the guise of nationalism are actually the most bitter enemies of the Arabs, whose glories are entwined with the glories of Islam” (Prashad 260). Thus the League organized to disrupt the Third World nationalism and its secularism, its socialism, and its type of modernity. It set up its offices across the Muslim world. At the same time in Latin America, the alleged danger of communism and liberation was countered by the regional elites and the leading Christian churches. This kind of Catholicism was “the mirror image” of what came out of the WML. It encouraged the close relationship between the church and the juntas (Prashad, p.262).

Behind the backlashes stood the United States and its corporatism. Together with its allies it was seeking to expand its economic power. They put all their force into the assault on socialist governments and Communist movements – the first targets being Sudan and Afghanistan. The IMF-led globalization of the 1970s ravaged the main pillars of state sovereignty. On the one hand it covertly supported the return of disruptive religiosity, while at the same time had someone to blame for the consequences of its devastation of national economies.
The epilogue is that in 1970 while the Third World project was still hanging on, the sixty states classified as low-income by the World Bank owed commercial lenders and international agencies 25 billion $. Three decades later, the debt of these states was 523 billion $. Over the course of these three decades the sixty states paid 550 billion $, yet they still owe 523 billion (Prashad, p.276).

In 1989 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union came the first in a series of invasions of third world countries by the United States as a dress rehearsal for the new epoch – that of Panama (Prashad, p.278). The dissolution of Yugoslavia came soon after. In November 1991, the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, led by a certain Robert Badinter, concluded at the request of a certain Lord Carrington that the SFR Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, that the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia did not have a right to self-determination in the form of new states, and that the borders between the republics were to be recognized as international borders. On 15 January 1992, the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was recognized worldwide. Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia would later be admitted as member states of the United Nations in 1992. Ultimately the devastating and painful civil war broke fired by old animosities and basest instincts as war usually are.

I will not dwell here on the details of the real reasons for the destruction of Yugoslavia – volumes have been written. The real reason, in short, was that Yugoslavia could have been a better example for a united Europe as a socialist, multinational, multi confessional country, instead of a Europe based on exclusions and discriminations dictated by corporate interests and greed. I will quote a Yugoslav intellectual, Professor Bogoeva-Sedlar and an international one, Michael Parenti. Speaking at the last year’s (2015) meeting of ALBA countries (Alliance for the Peoples of Our America), a side meeting to the CELAC, on June 2015 in Brussels she reminded the audience of Eduardo Galeano's advice to the people of Latin America "Do not Be Like Them" – like your colonizers that is, to further remind the audience who the "THEM" are among other things:

Many of those who, in the name of the people, today claim to be concerned about the preservation of the environment, have made sure, throughout history, that their own lawns were always green, while devastating the environments of the people they exploited at home and abroad, in the ghettos, favelas and barrios they created. They who give friendly advice that wars are very good for the economy, cannot be expected to properly and openly
identify war as one of the greatest ecological disasters…Yugoslavia, to which we not such a long time ago belonged, was the founding member of the Nonaligned Movement. It was destroyed for daring NOT to be like the colonial powers of Europe who continued to see other continents as their slaves and property.49

In a less emotional tone Michael Parenti described what he called the “rational destruction of Yugoslavia” as a joint enterprise of economic measures led by the IMF, psychological warfare, MSM campaigns of fear and lies, and finally physical damage in the form of bombing, long term uranium poisoning etc, until it gets a government sufficiently pleasing to the free market globalists in the west. This view was also expressed by Diana Johnstone, investigative journalist, frequently quoted by Parenti (Parenti 2002-2008).50

In the International Conference on Peace, Security and Co-Operation held in Belgrade, Serbia in December 2015, three significant anniversaries were commemorated. First, it was held in the same venue where in 1961 the Non-Aligned Movement was founded. It was also the 70th anniversary of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences and the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Accord. Neil Clark, one of the participants at the Conference, summed up the horrendous loss Europe has suffered after its oligarchies abandoned the principles of sovereignty, peace and cooperation for American corporatism. One of the most notable participant, Belgian author and activist Michel Collon stated that we should not fall for the “clash of civilization” narrative being pushed by Western neocons. What we have been witnessing in the last twenty-five years, Collon said, has nothing to do with religion but is the “re-colonization of the world” by Western elites following the fall of the Soviet Union. These “gangsters” have been following the maxim what you can not control, destroy. But before the destruction come the lies (Collon cited in Clark 2015). Clark concludes: “In order to stop the endless warmongwering we’ve seen since the fall of

49 Ljiljana Bogoeva-Sedlar in a personal note to the author, June 25, 2016.

50 Parenti quotes Diana Johnstone’s mail sent to him: “With their electric power stations ruined and factories destroyed by NATO bombing, isolated, sanctioned and treated as pariahs by the West, Serbs have the choice between freezing honorably in a homeland plunged into destitution, or following the ‘friendly advice’ of the same people who have methodically destroyed their country. As the choice is unlikely to be unanimous one way or the other, civil war and further destruction of the country are probable.”
the Soviet Union we need to recapture our state so that onceagain they act in the interests of the majority as they did in the post-WWII period” (Ibid).

The last NAM summit was held in Tehran in 2012. The next one was to be held in Caracas in 2014 but it was postponed as Venezuela, and thus the NAM itself, became the prime targets of the US imperialism, struggling to survive and was taking place as I was writing this paper, September 2016 in Venezuela. The positive legacy of both socialism and non-alignment is so deep rooted that it cannot be easily forgotten. It is of this legacy, together with the appeal to traditional people's solidarity, that we have to raise awareness in the people of the war affected countries of the third world and elsewhere. Western institutions and NGOs cannot solve anything before being able to implement true democracy in their own countries and thus prevent the wars of aggression.

The most important articles in the documents concerning human rights and war crimes are generally overlooked by western democracies when it suits them. For instance, as far as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, what is generally being overlooked is that among other basic human rights there is the stipulation that “everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment”…

“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit” (UN General Assembly 1948).

*There is a similar situation with the definition of war crimes. During the trial in Nuremberg in 1950, the chief American prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, stated: “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole” (Jackson 1946). As a consequence, there are no longer declarations of war. Imperialist countries usually attack small countries without any basis in international law and are never brought to justice. Instead, they establish criminal courts to judge leaders of the attacked countries proclaimed to be tyrants, monsters, war criminals, while at the same time instigate civil unrests through various agencies and NGOs.*

**Conclusion:**
To summarize: while the urgent requirement is to take care of the refugees from war torn countries and raise awareness of all people to this problem, we must not forget the people who have remained in these countries and the possibilities of permanent solutions and reconstructions in them, as well as building the bridges between the neighbouring, embattled countries without malevolent foreign meddling. And to this end I wanted to refresh our memory of some unjustly forgotten possibilities which, contrary to some beliefs and wishful thinking, have been preserved in the memory of many people.

To illustrate further my thesis, I recall two events of which I have been a witness. One is an old memory of the first NAM summit in Belgrade in 1961. I was a child then living in a Belgrade suburb which is now part of the outer city. I remember group photographs of the heads of states who attended the summit as a varicoloured, dignified bunch who were publicly represented with respect. The route they passed on the way to a meeting or an outing outside Belgrade ran through my community. Every courtyard had to be cleared and trimmed and all the fences painted fresh in their honour. Our local bridge was named after the recently killed Patrice Lumumba.

The other is a contemporary event in Belgrade attended by the ambassador of Algeria in the cultural centre of my community. It was organized in honour of an old, famous photographer, Stevan Labudovic, who used to photograph important social and political events, including the activities of President Tito. He also photographed and recorded the Algerian war of independence. The memory of this never died in the people of Algeria nor their leaders. A witness told us that the year before when he visited a museum in Algiers where some of his work was exhibited, there suddenly arrived a group of school children who recognized him as they had learned about him in school, and greeted him cordially.

So I think that what once was can again be

Reference List


**Author’s Bio**

*Dr Radmila Nastić is a Belgrade based Professor of English Literature and Culture employed at the Faculty of Philology and Arts of the University of Kragujevac, Serbia. She specialises in modern drama. Her other interests are cultural studies, social criticism and activism. Her publications include three book volumes and a number of papers published in peer reviewed journals.*
Το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης στην Ελλάδα κατά τη διάρκεια της προσφυγικής κρίσης.

Αλεξάνδρα Πολιτάκη

Στη διάρκεια της προσφυγικής κρίσης χαρακτηρίσμος που ανήκει στην περίοδο της κορύφωσης των προσφυγικών ροών προς την Ευρώπη οι απότοκοι τού πολέμου στη Συρία και καλύπτει το διάστημα καλοκαίρι 2015 – καλοκαίρι 2016, αναπτύχθηκε ένα μεγάλης εμβέλειας και δυναμικής κίνημα αλληλεγγύης. Η μαζική παρουσία και η δυναμική δράση μέσα στο πεδίο ελλήνων και αλληλέγγυων που ήρθαν από όλον τον κόσμο, στήριξε και αντιμετώπισε την πρώτη και πιο δύσκολη φάση της προσφυγικής κρίσης. Η δράση του κινήματος επεκτάθηκε και κάλυψε όλα τα πεδία ανθρωπιστικής δράσης φτάνοντας μέχρι τη δημιουργία και λειτουργία αυτό-οργανωμένων δομών φιλοξενίας για τους πρόσφυγες, επιδεικνύοντας με τον τρόπο αυτόν ένα άλλο μοντέλο διαχείρισης της ανθρωπιστικής κρίσης, την ώρα που το κράτος απροετοιμαστο, υποστελεχωμένο και αμήχανο παρακολουθούσε τις εξελίξεις στο εξωτερικό σε επίπεδο αποφάσεων κυριής, αλλά αδυνατούσε να υπάρξει και να δράσει μέσα στο πεδίο. Στη συνέχεια, η έλευση και η εγκατάσταση των μεγάλων διεθνών οργανισμών ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας στην Ελλάδα άλλαξε το τοπίο και το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης βρέθηκε εκτός πεδίων και δράσης και πολλοί έκαναν λόγο για ήττα και διάλυση. Τη συνέχεια, με το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης την περίοδο της προσφυγικής κρίσης στην Ελλάδα, πως καταγραφείται η πορεία και η δράση του την κρίση και περίοδο, ποιοι παράγοντες κατεύθυναν και με ποιον τρόπο τις εξελίξεις και τι συμβαίνει σήμερα με το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης είναι τα σημεία στα οποία η ανάλυση αυτή επιχειρεί να απαντήσει.

Η εξέλιξη του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης έτσι όπως εμφανίζεται μέσα από την εξέλιξη της προσφυγικής κρίσης θα μπορούσε να αναλυθεί σε τρεις εξελικτικές φάσεις.

Α φάση: Μαζικές προσφυγής ροές στη Μεσόγειο και ανάδυση του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης
Η πρώτη φάση θα μπορούσε να εντοπισθεί την περίοδο της αύξησης των προσφυγικών ροών που ξεκινάει από την άνοιξη του 2015 έως τον Οκτώβριο 201551 όταν οι ροές φτάνουν στο υψηλότερο σημείο τους. Η φάση αυτή χαρακτηρίζεται από τη συνεχή αναφορά στις ασφαλείς των συνόρων, η οποία γίνεται πλέον κοινή στα ευρωπαϊκά και στα ελληνικά κείμενα, νομιμοποιώντας πρακτικές παράνομης αποτροπής της προσφυγικής μετακίνησης.52 Έτσι, προκειμένου να κατευθυνθούν οι προσφυγικές ροές προς τον πλέον κερδοφόρο για τους διακινητές θαλάσσιο δρόμο διατηρείται ο φράχτης του Έβρου και ενισχύεται ο ρόλος της FRONTEX σε όλο το ευρύ τον χερσαίον ελληνικόν συνόρων και ιδιαίτερα στα σύνορα Ελλάδας – FYROM. Ως αποτέλεσμα υπήρξε η κλιμακώμενη αύξηση των ροών από τις θαλάσσιες οδούς, η οποία έδωσε απρόβλεπτες κορυφώσεις μέσα στο καλοκαίρι με αναπάντεχους αριθμούς νεκρών και αγνοουμένων στη Μεσόγειο που σοκάρισαν τους ευρωπαϊκούς λαούς, αλλά όχι τις ηγεσίες τους.53 Στη φάση αυτή, παρατηρείται η ανάπτυξη ενός δυναμικού, με διεθνή σύνθεση κινήματος αλληλεγγύης στην Ελλάδα και ανάληψη δράσης σε εθνικό και διεθνές επίπεδο. Το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης που εμφανίζεται σε αυτή την περίοδο συγκροτείται με τρεις οργανωμένες μορφές.

Η πρώτη της μορφή συναντάται στις συλλογικότητες που δρούν στη νησιωτική χώρα και συγκεκριμένα στο ανατολικό νησιωτικό μέτωπο (Λέσβος, Χίος, Σάμος, Λέρος), το οποίο είναι και ο πρώτος υποδοχέας των προσφυγικών πληθυσμών που έρχονται στην Ελλάδα. Οι συλλογικότητες αυτές χαρακτηρίζονται από πολύχρονη παρουσία και δράση σε τοπικό επίπεδο, στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις πάνω από δέκα χρόνια. Έχουν συστοιχίσει υπερήφανα αλλά σε μικρή κλίμακα και χωρικές εξειδικεύσεις, αλλά μεγάλη εξοικείωση με το προσφυγικό στοιχείο, καθώς προϋπήρχαν της περιόδου των κορυφώσεων των προσφυγικών ροών και σε πολλές περιπτώσεις η φροντίδα των βασικών ζητημάτων της σίτισης, περίθαλψης, διαμονής, των χωρίς νομιμοποιητική έγγραφα μετακινούμενων που έφταναν στα νησιά αλλά τα προηγούμενα χρόνια ήταν

και ο λόγος της συγκρότησής τους. Ο πυρήνας τους είναι αριστερής ιδεολογίας και είναι άνθρωποι γνωστοί για την κοινωνική/πολιτική δράση τους στην τοπική κοινωνία, η δράση τους περιβάλλεται από αποδοχή και αξιοπιστία αν και όχι από μαζική συμμετοχή. Η συμμετοχή θα αυξηθεί κατά την κρίση και θα έχει μεγάλη διάρκεια. Οι συλλογικότητες αυτές έχουν περιορισμένους οικονομικούς πόρους που προέρχονται κυρίως από μικρά συλλογικά ταμεία, ή προσωπικούς πόρους.

Μία δεύτερη μορφή είναι οι συλλογικότητες που δημιουργήθηκαν κατά τη διάρκεια της ανθρωπιστικής κρίσης στην Ελλάδα (2011 και μετά) και ενδυναμώθηκαν καθώς η κρίση κορυφωνόταν με τη ραγδαία φτωχοποίηση μεγάλων τμημάτων του πληθυσμού. Όταν προέκυψε το προσφυγικό ζήτημα έστρεψαν τη δράση τους στους πρόσφυγες. Έχουν μέση διάρκεια παρουσίας και δράσης (5-6 χρόνια) και εντοπίζονται αρχικά κυρίως στην ενδοχώρα και πιο συγκεκριμένα στα αστικά κέντρα Αθήνας και Θεσσαλονίκης. Δεν έχουν ιδιαίτερη εξοικείωση με το προσφυγικό στοιχείο, αλλά αντιμετωπίζουν καλύτερα τη διαχείριση κρίσης (συσσίτια, συγκέντρωση ειδών, διανομή, κτλ.) σε μέση και μεγάλη κλίμακα, με βάση την εμπειρία που αποκτήθηκε από τη φροντίδα μεγάλου αριθμού ανθρώπων κατά τη διάρκεια της ανθρωπιστικής κρίσης. Έχουν αριστερό πυρήνα, αλλά είναι ανοικτές και στην περιφέρειά τους διακρίνονται συγκέντρώσεις διαφορετικής ιδεολογικής ή πολιτικής τοποθέτησης, που συνενώνονται στη βάση της ανθρωπιστικής δράσης.

54 Οι πυρήνας τους είναι αριστερής ιδεολογίας και είναι άνθρωποι γνωστοί για την κοινωνική/πολιτική δράση τους στην τοπική κοινωνία, η δράση τους περιβάλλεται από αποδοχή και αξιοπιστία αν και όχι από μαζική συμμετοχή. Η συμμετοχή θα αυξηθεί κατά την κρίση και θα έχει μεγάλη διάρκεια. Οι συλλογικότητες αυτές έχουν περιορισμένους οικονομικούς πόρους που προέρχονται κυρίως από μικρά συλλογικά ταμεία, ή προσωπικούς πόρους.

Η τρίτη μορφή περιλαμβάνει τις συλλογικότητες που δημιουργήθηκαν κατά τη διάρκεια της προσφυγικής κρίσης με σκοπό να ανταποκριθούν στον επείγοντα χαρακτήρα της συμβάλλοντας στη διαχείρισή της. Δραστηριοποιούνται κυρίως στα νησιά του ανατολικού Αιγαίου, έχουν χαρακτήρα διεθνιστικό, καθώς στην πλειοψηφία τους αποτελούνται από ξένους ακτιβιστές και αλληλέγγυους που φτάνουν στην Ελλάδα μεμονωμένα ή σε μικρές ομάδες, ενώ σε κάποιες περιπτώσεις πρόκειται για ολόκληρες οργανώσεις και σωματεία εργαζομένων. Δεν έχουν πολιτικό ή ιδεολογικό πυρήνα και το συνεκτικό τους στοιχείο είναι η αλληλέγγυα ανθρωπιστική δράση. Ως παρουσία και δράση παρουσιάζουν μία εξαιρετική πολυμορφία που περιλαμβάνει από άτομα χωρίς καμία εξειδίκευση έως υψηλής εξειδίκευσης σε συγκεκριμένους τομείς. Έτσι, η δράση τους καλύπτει ένα πολύ ευρύ φάσμα που ξεκινά από τη δημιουργία συσσίτιων (συγκέντρωση πρώτων υλών, παρασκευή γεωμάτων, οργάνωση διανομής, κτλ) και επεκτείνεται έως την έρευνα και διάσωση.56

Σε αντίθεση με τις δύο προηγούμενες μορφές που δρουν στην πλειοψηφία τους με δικούς τους οικονομικούς πόρους και είναι εξαιρετικά περιορισμένοι στην περίπτωση αυτή οι οικονομικοί πόροι προέρχονται από το εξωτερικό και συγκεντρώνονται με τη μορφή δωρεών και ενεργών, πρακτικές διαδικομένες και με απόχρηση και αποτελεσματικότητα στην υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη, αλλά όχι στην Ελλάδα.

Παρά τις διακρίτες μορφές στη συγκρότησή του -που στις επόμενες φάσεις θα αμβλυνθούν και θα μπορούμε να κάνουμε λόγο για πιο ενιαία έκφραση- το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης ακόμη και σε αυτήν την πρώτη φάση του παρουσιάζει κοινά χαρακτηριστικά. Έχει ρίζοσπαστικό πυρήνα, δεν έχει κεντρική καθοδήγηση, έχει διακριτή δράση από το κράτος και δεν συμπεριέλεται μαζί του, στηρίζεται σε δικούς του οικονομικούς πόρους, αναπτύσσει τη δράση του γύρω από τη θεμελιώδη έννοια του ανθρωπισμού και γίνεται έτσι η μόνη πλευρά που μπλέει για το προσφυγικό ζήτημα με αυτούς τους όρους και τέλος -και ίσως το πιο σημαντικό - δρα με αποτελεσματικότητα. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι ακόμη και στις περιπτώσεις που η κάλυψη των αναγκών δεν μπορεί να είναι καθολική, η δράση συνεχίζει να επεκτείνεται και διατηρεί ως στόχο της την απόλυτη κάλυψη.57 Το στοιχείο της αποτελεσματικότητας

---


57 Για να γίνει αντιληπτό το μέγεθος των βασικών αναγκών, αρκεί να θωρηθεί και να αναμενόμενοι ότι η αύξηση των προσφυγικών στην Ελλάδα για το 2015 -με πρώτους υποδοχές τα ελληνικά νησιάδες της κατά 750% αυξήθηκε σε σχέση με την προηγούμενη χρονιά, GREECE UNHCR OPERATIONAL UPDATE http://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/46320
θα αναδειχθεί πολύ σύντομα ως και το πλέον κρίσιμο, όχι γιατί με αυτό θα κρίθει η ικανότητα διαχείρισης της κρίσης, αλλά γιατί θα καταδεικνύει συνεχώς την απουσία και την ανικανότητα του κράτους και ταυτόχρονα θα αναδεικνύει απέναντι σε αυτά ένα άλλο αποτελεσματικότερο μοντέλο οργάνωσης και δράσης που θα χαρακτηρίζεται από την αυτό-οργάνωση και μάλιστα από τα κάτω.

Το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της πρώτης φάσης που εκφράζει και τη μεγάλη κρισιακή κορύφωση περνάει με τη στήριξη του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης. Προς το τέλος της θα αρχίσουν να ενεργοποιούνται και ελληνικές και διεθνείς Μη Κυβερνητικές Οργανώσεις και διεθνείς διακυβερνητικοί οργανισμοί. Όμως και αυτές στην παρούσα φάση στηρίζονται στη δράση του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης, επιζητούν τη συνεργασία του και λειτουργούν συμπληρωματικά ως προς τις δικές τους δράσεις. Το κίνημα ενδυναμώνεται συνεχώς. Οι έξονι κυρίως αλληλέγγυοι μέσα από τα κοινωνικά δίκτυα μεταφέρουν την εικόνα και η εμβέλεια του κινήματος παίρνει μεγάλες διαστάσεις διεθνώς. Ο έξονος συστημικός Τύπος ακολουθεί και αυτός με υμνητικά σχόλια, ανταποκρίσεις, ρητορική, αν και παρουσιάζει περισσότερο πρόσωπα και περιπτώσεις αποφεύγοντας να παρουσιάσει το κίνημα και τη δράση του ως σύνολο. Παρόλα αυτά η απόχρηση του κινήματος είναι μεγάλη και η προβολή του παίρνει μεγαλύτερες διαστάσεις από αυτήν της περιόδου της ανθρωπιστικής κρίσης. Εχει χώρο δράσης, εχει χώρο προβολής, εχει αποδοχή, παράγει τρόπους κοινωνικής συγκρότησης και δράσης. Ο νεοεκλεγμένος αριστερός ΣΥΡΙΖΑ που είναι κυβέρνηση με τους ΑΝΕΛ επιχειρεί να μπει στη μεγάλη εικόνα στη βάση της ανθρωπικής ιδεολογικής συνάφειας, να πάρει μέρος της προβολής και να καρπωθεί το αποτέλεσμα. Προσπαθεί να θέσει αλληλέγγυες συλλογικότητες και οργανώσεις σε ένα δίκτυο και να κρατήσει στον συντονισμό των δράσεών τους. Το κίνημα όμως εμμένει στον ανεξάρτητο χαρακτήρα του και την εγχείρηση αποτυχάνει. Οι ρόλοι είναι ξεκάθαροι: το κίνημα δεν συμπεριφέρεται με την εξουσία, η κεντρική εξουσία δεν μπορεί να πάρει τον έλεγχο του με προσεταιρίσμους και το κίνημα αναδεικνύεται σε μια δύναμη με τεράστιες δυνατότητες. Η πλάστιγγα γέρνει με ξεκάθαρους όρους από την άλλη πλευρά της κεντρικής εξουσίας παρά το ότι αυτή εκφέρεται από μία αριστερή κυβέρνηση. Η αποτυχία της κυβέρνησης να προσεταιρίστει το κίνημα και να το ελέγξει θα αποτελέσει και το κρίσιμο σημείο της σχέσης του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης με την εξουσία και θα παίξει καθοριστικό ρόλο στις εξελίξεις του κινήματος. Την ίδια στιγμή η ευρωπαϊκή ηγεσία προτάσει την ασφάλεια των συνόρων έναντι της ασφάλειας των ανθρώπων με επακόλουθο την παγίωση του κλεισίματος των συνόρων.
και της απαγόρευσης της ελεύθερης διέλευσης ως κεντρική ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική 58 και επιτελώντας με τον τρόπο αυτόν μια θεμελιώδη στροφή στο προσφυγικό δίκαιο και μία νέα αρχιτεκτονική συνοριακής επιτήρησης η οποία εκφέργει από τις διαδικασίες λογοδοσίας και διαφάνειας.

**Β Φάση: Αλλαγές στο τοπίο και στοχοποίηση του κινήματος**

Η δεύτερη φάση ξεκινάει μετά την τελευταία κορύφωση των προσφυγικών ροών (Οκτώβριος 2016) και εκτείνεται έως τη Συμφωνία ΕΕ-Τουρκίας (Συμφωνία της 20ης Μαρτίου 2016) για τον έλεγχο των προσφυγικών ροών από την Τουρκία. 59 Είναι η φάση με τα περισσότερα πολιτικά γεγονότα και σφραγίζεται από μία θεμελιώδη μετατόπιση και μία συμφωνία, που αλλάζουν όλο το μέχρι τώρα status quo του προσφυγικού. Η μετατόπιση συνίσταται στη «στρατιωτικοποίηση» του προσφυγικού ζητήματος, καθώς η κυβέρνηση παραδίδει τον ρόλο του κεντρικού συντονιστή των δράσεων στο προσφυγικό πεδίο στον στρατό, «στρατιωτικοποιώντας» με τον τρόπο αυτό -μαζί με μία σειρά από άλλες αποφάσεις όπως η κάθοδος και η εμπλοκή του NATO στο Αιγαίο- ένα ζήτημα κατεξοχήν πολιτικής διαχείρισης. 60 Οι σημαντικότερες αρμοδιότητες για την αντιμετώπιση της προσφυγικής κρίσης μεταφέρονται πλέον στο Στρατό, στο NATO, στην Frontex, στην Ελληνική

58 Δημιουργούνται νέοι φράκτες στα ευρωπαϊκά συνοριακά περάσματα, με αλλεπάλληλες ευρωπαϊκές αποφάσεις και ευρωπαϊκά κονδύλια η επιτήρηση των συνόρων αποκτά στρατιωτικό χαρακτήρα (οι συνοριοφυλακές σε αρκετές περιπτώσεις ενισχύεται από στρατό), ενισχύονται οι προϋπάρχουσες δυνάμεις συνοριακού ελέγχου (με νέο κοινολογικό η Frontex «ανεξαρτησίατοποίεται» και δρα πλέον χωρίς ελέγχου και λογοδοσία από και προς τα ευρωπαϊκά κράτη), δημιουργούνται νέες ομάδες επιτήρησης (European Border Guard Teams http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/european-border-guard-teams), πολλαπλασιάζονται οι συνοριακές επιχειρήσεις (Poseidon) και δημιουργούνται κάθε είδους αναγώματα για την αποτροπή της διέλευσης, είτε στρατιωτικό χαρακτήρα, είτε πολιτικού μέσω των πιέσεων στην Ελλάδα να βγει από τη Σέγκεν και της επαναφοράς των ευρωπαϊκών συνοριακών ελέγχων μονομερώς από ορισμένα κράτη (βλ. Δανία και Σουηδία, Ιαν. 2016).


153
Αστυνομία, στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, ενώ στην Ευρώπη οι νέο-εισερχόμενοι πρόσφυγες αντιμετωπίζονται με δυνάμεις καταστολής και με όρους πολύ μακριά από την ιδέα του σεβασμού στην ανθρώπινη ύπαρξη. Η απόφαση του NATO (11.02.2016) ύστερα από πρόταση Ελλάδας, Τουρκίας και Γερμανίας, να «συνδέομε» με ναυτικές δυνάμεις επέφερε μία ριζική μεταστροφή στην αντιμετώπιση του προσφυγικού ζητήματος: υψώθηκε ένας θαλάσσιος φράχτης στρατιωτικού χαρακτήρα στη Μεσόγειο ακυρώνοντας το δικαίωμα για κάθε είδους διέλευση σε κάθε άνθρωπο, ανεξαρτήτως νομικής κατάστασης και ανάγκης. Η απόφαση αυτή εγκαίνιασε τη μεγαλύτερη επιχείρηση συλλογικής επαναπροώθησης προσφύγων σε μια υποτιθέμενα ασφαλή τρίτη χώρα (την Τουρκία), παραβιάζοντας με τον πλέον ομο τρόπο την «αρχή της μη επαναπροώθησης», όπως αυτή κατοχυρώνεται ρητά στη Σύμβαση της Γενεύης του 1951 και επιπλέον χωρίς κανέναν έλεγχο από όργανα επιτήρησης των δικαιωμάτων του ανθρώπου. Η συμφωνία που οριοθετεί και το τέλος της δεύτερης φάσης είναι αυτή της 20ης Μαρτίου μεταξύ Τουρκίας-ΕΕ, η οποία κατατάσσεται με έναν ομο τρόπο το υπάρχον νομικό, δικαίωμα, ενσωματοποιημένο και ανθρωπιστικό status, κλονίζοντας τους κεντρικούς πυλώνες των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων.61 Σε αυτή τη φάση, οι συναντήσεις και συζητήσεις κοινωνικά στην Ευρώπη πολλαπλασιάζονται και κάθε φορά ολοκληρώνονται με αποφάσεις που ενισχύονται και πολλαπλασιάζουν τον περιορισμό των ελευθεριών και των δικαιωμάτων των μετακινούμενων πληθυσμόν και μετατρέπουν την Ευρώπη σε ένα κλειστό φρούριο, όπου η διέλευση σε αυτό αποτελεί κυριολεκτικά ζήτημα ζωής ή θανάτου. Ως βασικοί στόχοι της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής τίθενται ξεκάθαρα πλέον η προστασία των εξωτερικών συνόρων, η ανακοπή των μεταναστευτικών ροών, η μείωση της παράνομης μετανάστευσης και η ακριβώς της ζώνης Σέγκεν. Χαιρετίζεται η νατοική παρέμβαση και καλούνται τα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ να συνεργαστούν με στόχο την «επιτήρηση» -που τελικά σημαίνει την αποτροπή- των «παράνομων διασχίσεων».

Σε αυτό το τοπίο πολιτικής σκληρύνσεως η αλληλέγγυα κινηματική δράση αναπτύσσεται και ενδυναμώνεται στη βάση της αυτό-οργάνωσης. Η δυναμική της κυρίως σε ανθρώπινους πόρους είναι τέτοια ώστε επεκτείνεται στη δημιουργία, ενίσχυση, συντήρηση και διαχείριση ολόκληρων δομών αλληλεγγύης, αναδεικνύοντας με τον τρόπο αυτών ένα εντελώς διαφορετικό μοντέλο διαχείρισης

του προσφυγικού ζητήματος από αυτό που Ευρώπη και ελληνική κυβέρνηση συμφωνούν και επιβάλλουν. Παράλληλα όμως, στο θεσμικό επίπεδο γίνεται αποδέσμευση και διανομή ευρωπαϊκών κονδυλίων μόνο στους θεσμικούς εταίρους, για δράση στο πεδίο που στη φάση αυτή εντοπίζεται στη νησία του ανατολικού Αιγαίου και στο συνοριακό πέρασμα της Ειδομένης. Αυτό σημαίνει πλήθος διακυβερνητικών ευρωπαϊκών εταίρων που καταφθάνουν πλέον μαζικά στην Ελλάδα, μοιράζονται τους πόρους που απελευθερώνονται από τα ευρωπαϊκά ταμεία και ενεργοποιούνται. Η είσοδος των ξένων επιχειρησιακών εταίρων δεν γίνεται με τρόπους ομαλότητας στις τοπικές κοινωνίες και οι σχέσεις των δύο πλευρών δεν θα γίνουν ποτές ιδιανικές. Καθώς το κίνημα παραμένει ισχυρό αλλά οι νέοι επιχειρησιακοί πάκτες σπεύδουν μαζικά στην Ελλάδα, το τοπίο αρχίζει να αλλάζει κι υπάρχει ένα διάστημα περιορισμούς διάρκειας που χαρακτηρίζεται από τη συνύπαρξη της θεσμικής (με τη μορφή ΜΚΟ, διακυβερνητικών εταίρων, διεθνών οργανισμών) και της κινηματικής δράσης. Σε αυτό το σημείο δεν υπάρχει ακόμη σαφής και πλήρης διαχωρισμός δράσεων, αλλά συνεχίζεται με τη συμπληρωματική παράλληλη παρουσία των θεσμικών εταίρων στις αλληλεγγύες δράσεις που ήδη έχουν αναπτυχθεί σε πολύ μεγάλο εύρος. Είναι όμως εμφανές ότι στη φάση αυτή έχει ακινητοποιηθεί ως μέσος έλεγχος και περιορισμός της δράσης του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης από την ελληνική κυβέρνηση.

Η μεταφορά των αρμοδιοτήτων των νεοσύστατων «δομών φιλοξενίας» στο στρατό είναι το πρώτο βήμα που θα οδηγήσει τάχιστα στην απαγόρευση της εισόδου των αλληλέγγυων στις δομές, ακόμη και με κόστος την απώλεια γεωμάτων για όσους πρόσφυγες βρίσκονται στις δομές αυτές. Η σύγκριση των δομών φιλοξενίας των αλληλέγγυων και των δομών φιλοξενίας που το κράτος δημιουργεί είναι συντριπτική υπέρ τον δομό αλληλεγγύης σε όλους τους βασικούς και επιμέρους όρους. Από τη σημαντικότητα της παρεχόμενης βοήθειας -αρκεί να θυμηθεί κανείς τις κουζίνες αλληλεγγύης- όσο κυρίως στο επίπεδο της ελευθερίας και στους όρους της ισότητας και του σεβασμού με τους οποίους οι πρόσφυγες αντιμετώπιζαν μέσα στις αλληλέγγυες δομές. Στο αμέσως επόμενο διάστημα τις κλιμακούμενες απαγορεύσεις-αποκλεισμούς εισόδου θα ενισχυθούν οι περιορισμοί και αποκλεισμοί δράσης. Η δράση των αλληλέγγυων θα επικεντρωθεί πλέον εκτός δομών (δημόσιοι χώροι) ή μόνο στις αλληλέγγυες δομές. Μαζί με αυτήν την άμεση επίθεση στο κίνημα με στόχο τον περιορισμό του, έχει και η ποινικοποίηση της αλληλέγγυας δράσης και
θα ακολουθήσει κλιμακούμενα η σκληρυνση του ποινικού χαρακτηρισμού των αδικημάτων.62

Τα ελληνικά ΜΜΕ την περίοδο αυτή παίζουν έναν καθοριστικό ρόλο στη στοχοποίηση του κινήματος. Ακολουθώντας το παράδειγμα των ξένων συστημικών ΜΜΕ, διαπιστώνουν τις γεμάτες θαυμασμού εκτενείς αναφορές τους όταν πρόκειται για μεμονωμένα «άκακα» περιστατικά-παραδείγματα σε βαθμό που μετατρέπεται σε ντελίριο. Αντίθετα, δεν παρουσιάζουν σχεδόν με κανέναν τρόπο αλληλέγγυες δομές, ολοκληρωμένες δράσεις, δεν υπάρχουν συνολικές αναφορές ή συμπαγείς εικόνες της αλληλεγγύης ως κίνημα, παρά την αδιαμφισβήτητη επιτυχία της αυτό-οργάνωσής του. Με τον τρόπο αυτόν, στην κεντρική μαζική του πρόσληψη το κίνημα είτε παραμένει αφανές, είτε προβάλλεται με μία εικόνα πολυδιασπασμένη σε μικρά περιστατικά, με αποτέλεσμα να μην αποδίδεται και να μη γίνεται αντιληπτή στο σύνολο της το εύρος, η εμβέλεια και η δυναμική του. Στη συνέχεια τα ΜΜΕ θα προβάλουν με ζήλο αλλά όχι βάθος τις περιπτώσεις ποινικοποίησης της αλληλέγγυας δράσης σαφώς από την πλευρά της κυβερνητικής λογικής και δεν θα επανέλθουν με δημοσιεύματα επανόρθωσης όταν αυτά είναι απαραίτητα.

Ο συνδυασμός της στοχοποίησης του κινήματος και της ποινικοποίησης της αλληλέγγυας δράσης είχαν ως απώτερο στόχο τον κλονισμό της ηθικής διάστασης του κινήματος. Έτσι στη συνέχεια, οι δομές αλληλεγγύης στοχοποιούνται και διασύρονται καθώς παρουσιάζονται ως άνδρα αναρχίας και εγκληματικές εστίες, οι αλληλέγγυοι ως πρόσωπα αμφίβολης ηθικής ποιότητας, προέλευσης και δράσης, η αλληλεγγύη ως αμφιληγόμενη δράση. Τα δημοσιεύματα είναι σφοδρά και καταγγελτικά και η προσπάθεια μεταστροφής της κοινής γνώμης είναι πλέον πέρα από συστηματική και εμφανής. Σπερί πεπεριού, ασύρματοι, φωτογραφίες, μικροποσότητες ινδικής κάνναβης, υποψίες σωματεμπορίας και λαθρεμπόριο ναρκωτικών, υποκίνηση βίαιων ενεργειών, όλα σε περιφανείς τίτλους προβάλλουν την επιταγή για έλεγχο και επιβολή του κινήματος αλληλεγγύης ως απαίτηση των τοπικών κοινοτήτων που βρίσκονται σε «κίνδυνο» από τους αλληλέγγυους, με σκοπό να καθαρίσει το τοπίο

από «εγκληματικά στοιχεία» και να προληφθούν περαιτέρω «κίνδυνοι» για την κοινωνία.63

Η ολοκλήρωση της δεύτερης φάσης βρίσκει το κίνημα με περιορισμένο χώρο δράσης, καθώς έχει απαγορευτεί πλέον η είσοδος των αλληλέγγυων σε παλιές και νέες δομές, τον δημόσιο χώρο (λιμάνια και άλλα σημεία) έχουν καταλάβει οι ΜΚΟ, ενώ ένας ανήλες πόλεμος για να κλείσουν οι δομές αλληλεγγύης με τη συνδρομή των τοπικών αυτοτόμως αρχόντων έχει ξεκινήσει και βρίσκεται σε εξέλιξη. Το βρίσκει επίσης και με περιορισμένους πόρους καθώς ένας τεράστιος αριθμός αλληλέγγυων αποχωρούν ύστερα από τη στοχοποίηση που συνεχίζεται και δεν επιστρέφουν, ενώ ομάδες και συλλογικότητες αλληλέγγυων διαλύονται. Αυτό σημαίνει παράλληλα και μία τεράστια μείωση ανθρώπινων και οικονομικών πόρων. Και ίσως οι δύο αυτοί παράγοντες να μπορούσαν να αντιμετωπίσουν από το κίνημα σε αυτή τη φάση. Αυτό όμως που δεν ήταν δυνατό να αντιμετωπίσει ήταν το χτύπημα που δέχτηκε στο επίπεδο της νομιμότητας. Η ποινικοποίηση της αλληλέγγυας δράσης και η προσπάθεια να μετατραπεί το κίνημα στη συνείδηση του κόσμου ως χώρος εγκληματικής δράσης ήταν κάτι εξαιρετικά δύσκολο να αντιμετωπισθεί. Σε αυτή την αδυναμία ακούμπησης και η δικαιολογημένη κόπωση ενός κομματιού της τοπικής κοινωνίας μαζί με την οικονομική της εξάντληση που προηγήθηκε. Το κίνημα μπορεί να περνάει από τον θρίαμβο στην ήττα με τρόπο που χωρίς να του είναι καινούργιος φαίνεται να μην είχε προβλέψει. Σανόχρονα, δύο ακόμη παράγοντες παίζουν καθοριστικό ρόλο. Ο ένας έχει να κάνει με την έλευση των μεγάλων διεθνών οργανισμών και οργανώσεων. Σε αυτές παραχωρείται μέσω μνημονίων συνεργασίας και συμφωνιών με την ελληνική κυβέρνηση ένας απεριόριστος χώρος δράσης και αρμοδιότητες, ενώ ο στρατός διατηρεί τη θέση και το ρόλο του. Οι οργανώσεις αυτές έχουν τη δυνατότητα να κινήσουν εκτός από πολύ μεγάλα κονδύλια κι έναν τεράστιο αριθμό επαγγελματιών. Οι αρμοδιότητες στο πεδίο και όχι μόνο, μοιράζονται μεταξύ αυτών και οι όροι κλείνουν ερημικά για τους εκτός συμφωνιών. Το επισφράγισμα του αποκλεισμού αυτού έρχεται από την ελληνική κυβέρνηση με την απόφαση του Υπουργείου Μετανάστευσης: Πολιτική να καταγράψει να εγκρίνει και να διαπιστώσει τις οργανώσεις που θα δραστηριοποιούνται πλέον σε θέματα διεθνούς

63 Μερικά χαρακτηριστικά παραδείγματα για τις συλλήψεις σε Χίο, Λέσβο, Ειδομένη: Οι συλλήψεις διώχνηκαν τους «αλληλέγγυους» από Ειδομένη και Λέσβο, Έβρος, Ύδρα, Ελληνική κυβέρνηση, Αρχή συλλήψεων από τη Frontex, Ιν.γρ 14.01.2016 http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500051568
προστασίας, μετανάστευσης και κοινωνικής ένταξης, μέσω της δημιουργίας του Εθνικού Μητρώου ΜΚΟ. 

Είχε προηγηθεί η απαίτηση της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης να εγκαταλείψουν οι αλληλέγγυες οργανώσεις από το πεδίο, κάτι που βέβαια δεν έγινε. Έτσι, με τον τρόπο αυτόν, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση διαλέγει τους εταίρους της οι οποίοι έχουν μόνο θεσμικό ονοματεπώνυμο και αποκλείει πλέον από το πεδίο κάνοντας χρήση της κυβερνητικής και θεσμικής της εξουσίας την αλληλέγγυα δράση.

Γ Φάση: το τέλος της κρίσης και η αποκατάσταση της τάξης

Η τρίτη φάση ξεκινάει από τη Συμφωνία της 20ης Μαρτίου 2016 και εκτείνεται έως τον Οκτώβριο του 2016 όπου η συμφωνία ΕΕ-Τουρκίας μπαίνει σε μία ανεπίσημη και σιωπηλή αναστολή. Και θα μπορούσε ίσως να ονομαστεί «το τέλος της κρίσης και η αποκατάσταση της τάξης». Χαρακτηρίζεται στη μεγάλη κλίμακα από την ολοκληρωτική επιβολή της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής στην Ελλάδα για το προσφυγικό και στις εξελίξεις στο πεδίο από τον πλήρη έλεγχο του από τις μεγάλες διεθνείς οργανώσεις και τη μεγάλη έμφαση που παίρνουν πλέον οι νομικές διαδικασίες (συστηματική καταγραφή, προ-καταγραφή, αιτήματα ασύλου, κτλ.). Το κέντρο του βάρους της δράσης μετατοπίζεται από το νησιωτικό μέτοπο του ανατολικού Αιγαίου στους προσφυγικούς καταυλισμούς της ενδοχώρας και ειδικότερα στη βόρεια Ελλάδα, καθώς εκεί δημιουργούνται οι περισσότερες δομές και μεταφέρεται ο μεγαλύτερος όγκος του προσφυγικού πληθυσμού. Η φάση αυτή χαρακτηρίζεται επίσης από τη μεγάλη μείωση των ροών από τις θαλάσσιες οδούς, αύξηση της σκληρύνσης της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής και παράλληλη αύξηση των προς διανομή ευρωπαϊκών κονδυλίων, συνεχείς αλλαγές στην ελληνική νομοθεσία και ισοτίμηση πρακτικών στην κατεύθυνση της εξυπηρέτησης της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής, που σημαίνει επιπλέον περιορισμό της ελευθερίας (γεωγραφικός περιορισμός στα νησιά για αποτροπή της εισόδου προσφύγων στην ελληνική ενδοχώρα, γεωγραφικός περιορισμός και στην ενδοχώρα για μετακίνηση σε άλλα σημεία της χώρας). Τα ευρωπαϊκά σύνορα παραμένουν κλειστά για τους πρόσφυγες, ενώ στην Ελλάδα αρχίζει με την παρέμβαση των μεγάλων διεθνών οργανισμών που αναλαμβάνουν

64 Το Εθνικό Μητρώο, όπως αναφέρεται στην απόφαση, περιέχει πληροφορίες σχετικές με στοιχεία του φορέα, στοιχεία αύξασης του, φορολογικά στοιχεία, οικονομικά στοιχεία, στοιχεία νόμιμου εκπροσώπου στην Ελλάδα, παρεχόμενες υπηρεσίες, υλοκτηνοχωρική υποδομή και απασχολούμενο προσωπικό (αμεβόμενο ή εθελοντές). ΦΕΚ Β 2930/2015

65 Σύμφωνα με την ελληνική κυβέρνηση δεν γίνονται επιστροφές Σύρων στην Τουρκία μετά την απόπειρα πραξικοπήματος της 15ης Ιουλίου 2016. Στον αντίλογο των οργανισμών που καταγγέλλουν τέτοιες επιστροφές η κυβέρνηση απαντά ότι πρόκειται για εθελοντικές επιστροφές, ενώ το ίδιο απαντά και για τις επιστροφές μη Σύρων προσφύγων στην Τουρκία που συνεχίζονται.

158
ολοκληρωτικά την κατάσταση ένας συστηματικός πολλαπλασιασμός προσφυγικών καταυλισμών χωρίς όμως ευρύτερο σχεδιασμό, χωρίς υποδομές, χωρίς σεβασμό στα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, που επιβεβαιώνουν την ανυπαρξία διαδικασιών κοινωνικής ένταξης για τους προσφυγικούς πληθυσμούς και αποκαλύπτουν και την έλλειψη τέτοιων προθέσεων. Με αυτές τις αλλαγές του τοπίου εκτιμάται από πολλούς ότι τελειώνει και η φάση της κρίσης και αίρεται πλέον ο επείγον χαρακτήρας του προσφυγικού ζητήματος, το οποίο περνάει σε φάση κανονικότητας και ομαλής διαχείρισης για τους προσφυγικούς πληθυσμούς που εγκλωβίζονται στην Ελλάδα, είτε εξαιτίας της εφαρμογής του μέτρου του γεωγραφικού περιορισμού, είτε λόγω των διαδικασιών ασύλου και μεταγκατάστασης οι οποίες παραμένουν εξαιρετικά αργές από την υποτελεσματική κρατική διοίκηση.66

Συνολικά το κίνημα στη φάση αυτή σημειώνει υποχώρηση. Στο νέο τοπίο οι κρατικές προσφυγικές δομές είναι κλειστού τύπου και σε συγκεκριμένη δικαιοδοσία. Οι διεθνείς οργανισμοί και ΜΚΟ αναγνωρίζονται ως θεσμικοί εθνικοί κυβερνητικοί εταίροι και συνάπτουν συμφωνίες με εγχώριες ΜΚΟ που μπαίνουν κι αυτές για τα καλά στο παιχνίδι στο κυβερνητικό πλευρό και χάρη στα μεγάλα κονδύλια της ευρωπαϊκής χρηματοδότησης στελεχώνουν επαγγελματικά κάθε δράση, υποκαθιστώντας το κράτος αλλά σε συνεννόηση πάντα μαζί του. Η νομική ενημέρωση και υποστήριξη των προσφύγων –που περνάει στην πρώτη γραμμή σε αυτή τη φάση– παραμένει ανάπαρτη εκ μέρους του κράτους και ξεκινά αρχικά σε μικρό και περιορισμένο βαθμό από συλλογικότητες του νομικού κόσμου. Οι δομές αλληλεγγύης κάτω από την πίεση που δέχονται κλείνουν, διαλύονται, ή περνούν σε κρατικό έλεγχο. Παραμένουν μόνο λίγες και από αυτές οι περισσότερες με τη μορφή καταλήψεων που «κρατούνται» με την υποστήριξη των περιόδων, πολλές φορές και απέναντι στις αστυνομικές εφόδους που έχουν ως στόχο τη διάλυση τους, αλλά και με υλική βοήθεια (τρόφιμα, είδη ρουχισμού, κτλ.), παρά τα γνωστά φοβικά αντανακλαστικά απέναντι σε τέτοιες δράσεις. Στις κρατικές δομές κλειστού τύπου – κάτι που οι δομές αλληλεγγύης δεν υπήρξαν ποτέ– η στέρηση της ελευθερίας πλέον και όχι μόνο της διέλευσης (προσωπική κράτηση πέραν του γεωγραφικού περιορισμού), μετατρέπεται από έσχατο ατομικού διοικητικού μέτρο εκτιμώμενο κατά

περίπτωση, σε κοινό σύνθες μέσο αποτρπετικής μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής που εφαρμόζεται μαζίκα προς εκφοβισμό των πολλών και γίνεται ο κυρίαρχος κανόνας για τον προσφυγικό πληθυσμό. Έτσι, εμφανίζεται μία συνεχώς αυξανόμενη και εκτεταμένη βία εντός των προσφυγικών καταυλισμών (διαμαρτυρίες προσφύγων, μεταξύ τους βιαιοπραγίες, επιθέσεις, βανδάλισμοι), που καταστέλλεται με βίαιο τρόπο από την αστυνομία, επεκτείνοντας ακόμα περισσότερο και συχνά με ακραίο τρόπο τη χρήση βίας. Μαζί με τις δομές αλληλεγγύης στις οποίες ποτέ δεν σημειώθηκαν επεισόδια εκτεταμένης βίας, οι ρομαντικές εικόνες της πρώτης φάσης εκλείπουν και μαζί οι «ανώνυμοι ήρωες». Το προσφυγικό ζήτημα είναι πλέον υπόθεση της κυβέρνησης και των διεθνών και εγχώριων εταίρων της και το χειρίζεται με τον μονοπωλιακό τρόπο που η εξουσία έχει.

Το κίνημα

Η επόμενη μέρα βρίσκει το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης μακριά από το πεδίο δράσης στο οποίο τον προηγούμενο καιρό αναπτύχθηκε, χωρίς ωστόσο να έχουν ατονήσει οι εντυπώσεις που δημιούργησε. Δέχτηκε ένα καιρό, αλλά δεν υπήρξε διάλυσή του. Είναι εμφανές ότι σκόπιμα και τερηδόντως του αφαιρέθηκε ο χώρος και οι δυνατότητες δράσης. Στοχοποιήθηκε και ενοχοποιήθηκε στο πιο υψηλό σημείο της δράσης του. Χωρίς αμφιβολία θα μπορούσε η πορεία του και η εξέλιξη του μέσα στην προσφυγική κρίση να ήταν διαφορετική και με μια αριστερή κυβέρνηση θα περίμενε κανείς να υπάρξουν και συμπλήρωσης, αλλά εμφανοί δεν ήταν αυτό που επιλέχτηκε. Μέσα στη διαδρομή του από την ενδυνάμωση στην αποδυνάμωση είναι εξαιρετικά δύσκολο και αρκετά νωρίς, να εκτιμηθεί τί το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης κεφαλαιοποίησε και πως αυτό το ανθρώπινο και κοινωνικό κεφάλαιο θα χρησιμοποιηθεί στη συνέχεια. Αν και η αποδυνάμωση του σήμαινε όχι μία μεγάλη απώλεια για το προσφυγικό ζήτημα: την απόσυρση της ανθρωπιστικής διάστασης από το τραπέζι των συζητήσεων και το πεδίο δράσης - αρκεί κανείς να ανατρέξει στις αποφάσεις της ευρωπαϊκής ηγεσίας, της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης, ή να δει τις συνθήκες μέσα στις οποίες ζει η πλειοψηφία των προσφυγικών πληθυσμών- το κίνημα συνεχίζει να είναι παρόν. Στην ευθραυστότητα της Συμφωνίας ΕΕ-Τουρκίας το βλέμμα όλων συνεχίζει να είναι στραμμένο στη στάση των τοπικών κοινωνιών και όχι των διεθνών οργανώσεων στην περίπτωση μιας νέας μαζικής ανεξέλεγκτης
αύξησης των προσφυγικών ροών. Στο κρίσιμο ζήτημα της μετακίνησης και εγκατάστασης προσφυγικών πληθυσμών στην ενδοχώρα ο ρόλος των τοπικών κοινοτήτων στην υποδοχή τους συνεχίζει να είναι καίριος και αναντικατάστατος από τις διεθνείς οργανώσεις. Η διαφορετική ατζέντα, ο ρόλος, ο χαρακτήρας, ο σκοπός και ο τρόπος δράσης των διαφορετικών διεθνών οργανισμών που δρουν, τους κρατάει σε διακριτές διαφοροποιήσεις με την τοπική κοινωνία και δημιουργεί σημεία τριβής με το προσφυγικό στοιχείο, κάτι που αποτελεί στοιχείο μεγάλης αδύναμίας σε σχέση με το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης που προέρχεται μέσα από την κοινωνία και δρα με άλλους όρους. Είναι κάτι παραπάνω από σίγουρο ότι η Ευρώπη θα παραμένει με τα σύνορα κλειστά, ενώ η ηγεσία της καλείται να αποφασίσει εκ νέου σε ποια κατεύθυνση θα κινηθεί. Η στρατηγική της ανάθεσης της λύσης σε άλλους (βλ. Τουρκία) εμπνέει την ανεύρεση λύσεων στο προσφυγικό και η ευρωπαϊκή επιλογή να διατεθούν κονδύλια στην Τουρκία ως ουσιαστικές απαιτήσεις ή συζητήσεις για εγγυήσεις σε σχέση με τη διαχείριση του μεταναστευτικού/προσφυγικού, αντί να επιλέξει να διαχειριστεί το ζήτημα στο έδαφος της, υπονόμευσε εξαρχής την επόμενη ημέρα του προσφυγικού ζητήματος και ακυρώθηκε στην πράξη μετά τις πρόσφατες εξελίξεις στην Τουρκία. Μπροστά σε αυτές τις διαπραγματεύσεις, η διαπίστωση ότι το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης που δημιουργήθηκε κατά τη διάρκεια της προσφυγικής κρίσης υπέ ηττήθηκε, ούτε διαλύθηκε, είναι από τις πλέον αισιόδοξες, αναδύοντας μία άλλη σταθερά. Το κίνημα μπορεί να βρει τον τρόπο δράσης του μέσα στο νέο τοπίο και το πολύτιμο κεκτημένο εφαρμοσμένων δομών και πρακτικών αλληλεγγύης που ανταποκρίθηκαν στις απαιτήσεις των κρίσιμων και τεράστιων αναγκών όλο τον προηγούμενο καιρό της προσφυγικής κρίσης, μπορεί και πρέπει να αξιοποιηθεί στις νέες δυσκολότερες και πιο απαιτητικές συκυρίες που βρίσκονται μπροστά. Έτσι,

- το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης του προηγούμενου καιρού έχει λόγο και θέση και αγώνα και τρόπους δράσης απέναντι στη μονιμοποίηση της κατάστασης έκτακτης ανάγκης που συντελείται και δικαιολογεί την περιστολή ελευθεριών και την καταπάτηση ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων. Απέναντι στην περιχαράκωση της Ευρώπης, τον διαμελισμό της από φράχτες, όπου η διέλευσή της από μετακινούμενους πληθυσμούς αποτελεί πλέον ζήτημα ζωής και θανάτου.

- Έχει λόγο και θέσεις και δράση απέναντι στον απάνθρωπο τρόπο με τον οποίο αντιμετωπίζονται δόμοι οι σε κίνηση προσφυγικοί πληθυσμοί, σε αυτήν την έκρηξη της ομίχλης βίας, την προσφυγή στην άμεση περιστολή των δικαιωμάτων, τη στέρηση
της ελευθερίας, τη διαβίωσή τους σε άθλιες και τραυματικές για την ανθρώπινη ύπαρξη συνθήκες.

- Έχει λόγο και θέσεις στον αγώνα για αξιοπρεπείς συνθήκες διαβίωσης των προσφυγικών πληθυσμών, είτε αφορά αυτούς που για κάποιον καιρό -ακόμα και χωρίς τη θέλησή τους- βρίσκονται και θα παραμείνουν στην Ελλάδα με σκοπό να συνεχίσουν τη ζωή τους σε κάποια άλλη χώρα της Ευρώπης, είτε αυτούς που θα επιλέξουν να εγκατασταθούν μόνιμα στην Ελλάδα και να συνεχίσουν τη ζωή τους σε αυτή τη χώρα.

Το κίνημα αλληλεγγύης έχει επίσης πολλά να προσφέρει απέναντι στις συνεχείς νίκες των ξενοφοβικών αντανακλαστικών με κίνδυνο να εδραιωθούν και να εξαπλωθούν εκτός ελέγχου, είτε στη μικρή τοπική κλίμακα, είτε στη μεγάλη ευρωπαϊκή κλίμακα.

Waiting and Mobilisation in the ‘Jungle’ camp of Calais

Suber, D.L., (Tuebingen University & American University of Cairo)

Author Details:
Name: David Leone Suber
Address: Via Sassoferrato 2 – 00197 – Rome, Italy
Email: leone.suber@gmail.com

Abstract:

The infamously known ‘Jungle’ refugee camp in Calais has proven to be an exemplary stage of refugee political contestation and resilience against the border regime of Fortress Europe. Since the very first days of its existence, the camp’s inhabitants have self-organised themselves mostly along national, ethnic and linguistic lines. Such networks have been crucial to coordinate the space available for housing, communal areas, and other basic activities such as food and clothing distribution. Those groups who had been more successful in community building, successfully organising spaces according to semi-permanent arrangements, had been
those who had benefitted from a factor over all: time. Waiting in the infamously known ‘Jungle’ had become for many a better option than daily risking their lives in attempts to cross the border to the UK. When on February 29th 2016 the French riot-police forces entered the camp with an eviction notice the camp’s communities staged different forms of political contestation. Against common assumptions, those better-established communities who had longer been in the ‘Jungle’ decided to re-settle in other areas of the camp, avoiding direct violent confrontation with the evicting authorities. Conversely, those who were not living as members of wider-organised communities were the ones who engaged in more active mobilisation, staging protests, sit-ins, hunger-strikes and in some cases also directly confronting police forces. Stemming from basic ethnographic observations collected during the eviction period in the Calais refugee camp, this paper analyses the link between the temporality of ‘waiting’ and the different forms of political mobilisation organised by refugees to resist the encroaching border regime in France.

**Keywords:** migrants; direct mobilisation; passive mobilisation; waiting; communities.

**Waiting and Mobilisation in the ‘Jungle’ camp of Calais**

“With the coming of the second world war many eyes of imprisoned Europe turned hopefully or desperately towards the freedom of the Americas. Lisbon became the great embarkation point; but not everybody could get to Lisbon directly, and so a tortuous roundabout refugee-trail sprang up: Paris to Marseilles, across the Mediterranean to Oran, then by train, or auto of foot across the rim of Africa, to Casablanca in French Morocco. Here the fortunate ones through money, or influence, or luck might obtain exit visas and scurry to Lisbon. And from Lisbon to the new world. But the others wait in Casablanca. And wait and wait, and wait…”

(Casablanca; 1942)

The notion of temporality and ‘waiting’ is often implied in discourses on migration and refugee camps, but only seldom actually accounted for in its own merit. ‘Waiting’ is a condition which is not equally shared by all refugees and migrants, but rather perceived and performed in very different ways according to material and social conditions linked to identity, gender, race and age, as well as to the different legal
statuses that different nationalities enjoy according to which country’s legal systems they are under.

This paper will analyse the particular link between the temporality of ‘waiting’ and the different forms of political mobilisation organised by migrants and refugees to resist and counter the border regime of fortress Europe…or fortress England, in the more specific case of migrants and refugees seeking to cross the British Channel. In other words, according to my ethnographic experience in Calais, different forms of political mobilisation are adopted by groups or individuals according to whether they can wait to cross the border, or not.

In these terms, I will be arguing that there are two overall categories of people struggling to get to the UK from Calais:

1. Those who do so everyday, incessantly trying to manage their way on a lorry or train across the border,
2. and those who instead have resolved to wait in Calais’ refugee camp hoping for a less dangerous way to cross the border.

Simply put, the difference I am theorising stands between those who have decided to wait, and those who cannot allow themselves to do so.

This paper won’t indulge in the factors that motivate people to opt for one strategy rather than the other. There are many possible reasons that might be given over why people allow themselves to wait or not, one over many the different legal statuses that refugees and migrants coming from different areas have, once they get in Europe and request asylum (i.e Syrian refugee’s ‘special’ status). Instead, I want to argue how these different conditions and perceptions of temporality, the choice of whether to wait or not, is directly connected to strategies of political mobilisation that individuals and communities choose to adopt in resisting the encroachment of border authorities, especially now that the eviction of the Calais refugee camp known as the ‘Jungle’ is already half way through.

I will do this by taking my sources from the direct experience that I was able to make in Calais in the last three weeks before coming here to Catania, the last of a longer period of travels and visits to Calais in the last two years. I first went to Calais in November 2013 to join demonstrations organised by No Border groups. I later started to work as a volunteer for a small French charity called: L’Auberge de Migrants, a
grassroots organisation which coordinates off-site kitchens, clothes distribution and the building of shelters. Most -if not all - of the material and information I am basing this presentation on has been collected through my time there volunteering as a builder, constructing shelters first and moving them away from the front line since CRS riot-police forces started evicting the inhabitants of the camp and destroying their shelters on the 29th of February 2016.

My key argument is that migrants and refugees who wait in Calais, those who do not attempt to daily cross the border, are those who have had the time to build strong communities and networks of solidarity within the camp, organising the construction of shelters and areas for communal use. Since the eviction has started however, these people made the conscious decision not to engage in direct political mobilisation and antagonistic confrontation with the French police forces, leaving their shelters with no major incident or sign of active resistance, but rather deciding to re-settle somewhere else.

On the other hand, those who do daily try to cross the border by climbing on trucks and trains, risking their lives or risking being caught, arrested and detained, are the ones who build less strong community-ties in the camp, remaining fragmented in smaller groups, linked by parental relations or just by affinity emerging from being from the same city, or having travelled together up to France. These people, mostly young men, are the ones who have engaged in more direct and radical actions since the beginning of the eviction, staging demonstrations and sit ins, occupations of the highway and of the port, hunger strikes and also rock-throwing and violent clashes with the police.

The puzzle I am aiming to present then, regards the links existing between perceptions of temporalities and organised mobilisation, both direct and ‘radical’ or more passive and ‘conservative’ as that might be.

When CRS riot police entered the camp on the 29th of February, the ‘Jungle’ counted 3 mosques, 2 churches, more than 70 between shops and restaurants, 2 hamam, 3 barbershop, and even a few night clubs blasting Sudanese music until six in the morning. Not to speak of 12 clothes distribution points, 3 permanent kitchens serving warm food twice a day, 2 schools and libraries, 1 school and playground for children only, 2 permanent first aid caravans, a legal centre, a women & children’s centre and an open artistic space that was also used as gym. All of these were either directly run
by migrants and refugees, or in collaboration with volunteers. These facilities were to be found all over the camp, but were mostly run or participated by the Afghan, Eritrean, Somali and Pakistani communities in the ‘Jungle’, those communities which have been most consistently present in Calais throughout the years, and who had clear demarcated areas of influence in the camp.

These groups, so active and successful in community building, did not organise major active mobilisation against police demolishing homes and shelters. Rather, they decided to relocate to the north side of the camp -currently not being demolished- or to move away to re-establish other camps in other areas next to Dunkerque or even in Belgium. When the evictions started, these communities did not join the protests en masse; did not climb on the roofs while their shelters, mosques and churches were being demolished; and did not through stones to police nor start hunger strikes. Rather, they disassembled restaurants and shelters before they could get burned or demolished, and have been relocating elsewhere, away from the front line, in other parts of the camp or other camps altogether. This has been their political, more ‘conservative’, but surely pragmatic strategy to face the eviction.

On the other hand, those who decided to actively resist the eviction did so in various ways. On the 23rd of January a highly participated demonstration was organised to protest against the first eviction order of the ‘100-meter line’ running the perimeter of the camp closer to the highway. The march was organised from the ‘Jungle’ camp to the port, and it resulted with refugees and migrants actually occupying the port and with many managing to climb on one of the ferries.

When the police entered the camp with a renewed and final eviction order a month later, clashes with police were staged every night. To police tear-gas migrant protesters responded with slings and stones, and setting fire to abandoned shelters. The days following saw protesters resisting bulldozers by sitting on roofs until police officers forcibly dragged them down. By the end of the first week of eviction a group of Iranian refugees began a hunger strike that is still lasting today, requesting the demolition of the ‘Jungle’ to be immediately ceased. They have met with both the Prefecture and UN representatives and latest news from Calais says that authorities have halted the eviction of the north area of the camp for the next three weeks in an attempt to break their hunger strike action.
These more radical and confrontational strategies of mobilisation have been staged by those who cannot wait, those who did not build solid communities over their time in the camp, but are hugely dependant on the ‘Jungle’ as a place to rest and find shelter as their energies and money are spent on trying to cross the border by any means. The majority of these people are either from Syria or are Kurdish refugees from Iraq (many of which with Syrian IDs).

In such a scenario, the original fragmentation of these groups was at times overcome, bringing high numbers of Arab and Kurdish men to coordinate over direct action and active resistance to police forces dismantling the camp. However, their rushed mobilisation has been lacking the benefits of coordination and cohesion which were instead strong in those communities that chose to not actively mobilise against the eviction of the ‘Jungle’.

This argument is incomplete if we don’t ask the ‘why question’: “Why are the more organised communities pursuing more passive and conservative strategies when mobilising against forced eviction?” This question would deserve a whole new different paper, but I would only hint that most probably migrants and refugees which are not from the Middle East (Syria and Iraq especially) are aware of the legal repercussions they might face if they get arrested by police, whereby detention may mean force-fingerprinting and even deportation to the first country of arrival or further back to the country of origin. More nuanced answers might instead be found when considering also other dynamics such as: decision-making processes within these migrant communities; the possibility of people to use their ‘waiting’ time in the Jungle to set up put businesses and set aside savings, or simply the fact that many members of these communities are in Calais with their families, elderly and children, thus considerably raising the difficulty (both in risks and costs) of crossing the border.

These are only some of the factors that could be suggested play a role in motivating people to either wait or not, and thus to mobilise in one way or the other. Whatever the answer to causes of why they chose so, whatever those reasons are, my experience in Calais suggests me that a direct link can be clearly seen between ‘waiting’ and ‘protesting’, by which well established communities of the camp decide not to engage in antagonistic mobilisation against police eviction, whilst those who were not organised in tight communities are the ones to most vehemently react to the Jungle’s eviction. This pattern connecting temporalities with strategies of political mobilisation
in the refugee camp of Calais is, in my opinion, worth of notice and potential further enquiry.

Authors’ Biography:

David L. Suber is a Masters student in the Comparative Middle East Politics and Society joint Masters at Tuebingen University (Germany) and the American University in Cairo (Egypt). He gained his BA in History and Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London), where he has also been the co-President of the SOAS Students’ Union for the year 2014-2015.

Turkey’s Europeanisation: A Case of Self-Induced Divergence

Dr Petros Violakis

The end of the Cold War, the changes in the global security balance and the reconsideration of NATO’s role and dynamics induced the EU to develop a global political and security role. This was reflected in the European Security Strategy (2003, 2008) and in the Internal Security report (2010). The aim of the abovementioned initiatives was to enhance EU Member States “joint threat assessment and set clear objectives for advancing EU security interests” (European Council, 2008). This report included a number of potential security issues, such as illegal immigration and state failure. However, given the joint (pooling and sharing) character of these initiatives, one could identify the existence of fundamental differences amongst Member States, concerning not just CSDP but also the global geopolitical landscape. These differences became evident when migratory flows deriving –mainly- from Syria's civil war began affecting EU member states. As a result, Greece, located at the EU extremity, apart from struggling with its economic recession, was called upon to deal large-scale emigration flows from Turkey. In view of these events, Turkey’s role
as a distinct factor undermining both CFSP and CSDP Europeanisation may be examined.

**Introduction**

The end of the Cold War triggered changes in global security balance and prompted NATO to re-examine its role and mission. These new conditions induced the EU to consider developing a global political and security role. This development was reflected in the European Security Strategy (2003, 2008) and in the Internal Security report (2010). The aim of the above initiatives was to enhance EU Member States “joint threat assessment and set clear objectives for advancing EU security interests” (European Council, 2008). In this report, illegal immigration and state failure were highlighted as potential security threats to the Union. However, the joint character of these initiatives reveals the existence of fundamental differences amongst Member States, regarding the policy-makers’ visions of CSDP and the global geopolitical landscape. These differences came to the fore as migratory flows from Turkey reached EU territory. As a result, Greece, at the outskirts of EU, apart from struggling with its economic recession, was called upon to deal single-handedly with the indicated flows. In view of these events, Turkey’s role as a factor undermining CFSP and CSDP Europeanisation is examined.

The impact of migration is hardly uniform across European countries. Hence, the issue of migration is intertwined with political considerations notwithstanding its humanitarian dimension. In any case, the mainstream approach is focused on the humanitarian crisis. As noted above other aspects are present: the use of the immigration issue as a means for political identity-building by fringe political elements and as an instrument for undermining governing coalitions; furthermore, its use as means of pressure on Greece with a view to the Cyprus issue as well as for extracting benefits (maritime, rent subsidy etc.) by domestic business. At the European level migration is used by extremist political elements as a means for building a political identity but also as a "test" for the EU Common Defence Security, as a level for pushing Greece toward structural reform and as a means for extracting benefits at the expense of common European enterprise.

**Methodology**
The methodology used in this research is the following:


2. Overview of the security risks associated with illegal immigration as presented in the Security and Defence Strategy and in the EU Internal Security.

3. Analysis of related security theories (Turkey’s candidate status for EU membership as a means of Europeanisation) and of the deconstruction of European cohesion following the reports claiming uncontrolled migration flows from Turkey.

**Europeanisation of Common Foreign and Security Policy – Security**

The theoretical framework of this study is based on Radaelli’s approach to Europeanisation. The reason for the selection of the theoretical framework of Radaelli is that although it contains elements of European Integration, it differs from standard European Integration theories. Radaelli’s definition captures a dynamic pattern and incorporates elements of those who have worked on the topic of Europeanisation. Specifically, the framework of Radaelli contains elements from the work of other researchers in the field, such as Ladrech’s, on integration policies and EU policies on economic data and national policies (Ladrech, 1994: 17), Börzel’s regarding local political linkage with EU policies (Börzel, 1999: 574), Risse et al regarding distinct governance structures at the European level (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001), Héritier’s dynamic influence of EU on Member States' structures (Héritier, 2001: 3), Buller and Gamble's distinct states of European governance and transformation of national structures, Olsen and Gualini’s political integration, integration and parallel development at the European level and local structures (Olsen, 2002; Gualini, 2003), and Salgado and Wool’s multidirectional reaction to European integration (Salgado Sanchez, 2004).

In Radaelli’s words, Europeanisation is a process marked by stages construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things "and shared beliefs and
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and subsequently incorporated in the local policy, structures and public policies. (Radaelli, 2004).

Europeanisation, although related to different areas of the European project, is not explicitly connected with the issues of the Common Security and Defence and internal Security. Regarding the issue of Common Foreign and Security policy an initial analytic attempt was made by Exadaktylos and Radaelli in 2010. The reason why there seems to be no connection is that Common Defence and Security and Internal Security acquired prevalence in the 1990s (though as concepts they have been worked out by the end of the 1940s) when transnational security issues had to be confronted by NATO and the UN.

The change followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which led NATO to the search for a new role. During that decade, there were many who argued that the EU should seek its own role as a global security "player". During that time the term "Fortress Europe" emerged. As a result, this term was interconnected with the European integration while it incorporated conceptual elements of border security from the period of WWII. Today the term is used to criticize EU immigration policy. But is this characterisation of the EU valid or is it more appropriate for some Member States whose governments reacted belatedly to the need for common management of migration flows? Moreover, as we will see below, there have been indications of the risks associated with migratory flows at the EU level since 2003. However, blaming a "faceless EU" seems to exempt from criticism for inaction national political actors. But let's take things in turn.

The concept of “common security and defence” was introduced by the Treaty of St. Malo, 1998, and has been legitimised by numerous decisions of EU Member States emphasizing its a voluntary character in terms of "sharing and pooling of forces". Since then there have been numerous developments, both at the conceptual development level and as well as that of clarification concerning the joint meaning of Security and Defence of Member States. Although it may sound paradoxical, a shared understanding of Member States on common Security and Defences, given the differing views of those states, was an innovative and difficult process, which is still evolving. This process is reflected in the adoption and revision of the Common Security and Defence, Foreign Policy and Security and Internal Security reports. These documents, along with the implementation of EU strategies and of the security
structures they describe (based on the definition of Radaelli) constitute proof of Europeanisation of Security and Defence of Member States.

**Defence, Security and Internal Security Strategy and Migration**

The European Security Strategy, as reflected in the 2003 document presented by Javier Solana entitled "A secure Europe in a better world» (EUROPA, 2003), is a "common" position and reflects the acceptance by EU Member States of what constitutes threats to European security. This text indicates that illegal immigration is a threat to the security of the EU countries, being linked to organised crime, terrorism and state failure (fail state) (EUROPA, 2003: 4,5).

In the 2008 revision of policy, illegal immigration remains amongst the security threats to Member States and its causes are extensively discussed therein. More importantly, illegal immigration is linked with natural disasters, environmental pollution, and competition for natural resources in a poverty-stricken environment as well as with the humanitarian crisis (European Council, 2008). In the 2008 revision, the main objective is the prevention and management of a potential crisis and the development of skills of early diagnosis of such crisis (European Council, 2008). It is stressed that this objective cannot be achieved without the input of Member States and international cooperation with the UN and other regional organisations (European Council, 2008: 15). Specific reference is made to the Mediterranean region, which according to the latest review, is a region of high priority due to the complex challenges inherently connected with insufficient political reform and illegal migration (European Council, 2008: 18). It is noteworthy that in both the 2003 Strategy and the 2008 revision, illegal immigration is related to organised crime and the weakening and collapse of the state (European Council, 2008: 32). Indeed, as noted in the review, "such actions undermine both the rule of law and social cohesion”.

In the most recent revision of the Strategy, on June 28, 2016, explicit reference is made to the need for improvement of migration policy in Europe and its partners through the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Union, 2016). The revision highlights the need for more cooperation in the area of EU external policies, between Member States and EU institutions and for harmonisation between external and internal dimensions of policies. It also stresses the need for "systematic routing of issues -especially in the migration- related to human rights and gender, in all policy
areas and institutions» (European Union, 2016). As characteristically stated: "In order to preserve the quality of our democracies, we must respect the local, European and international law in all its dimensions, from the immigration, asylum, energy, counter terrorism and trade" (European Union, 2016: 15).

In this context, as stated in the review of 2016, the EU will focus on efforts to support states which are transit areas for migrants and refugees (European Union, 2016: 27) by providing humanitarian assistance for education and vulnerable groups such as women and children. It is also expected that, in cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries, there will be initiatives concerning diplomacy, legal migration, border management and resettlement (European Union, 2016: 27). The report also stresses the need to support migrants and to alleviate the financial burden imposed on those member states which are most affected through solidarity mechanisms. It is worth noting that the revision of 2016 strongly reflects the need for further joint action by Member States in the area of both internal and external policies. This indicates both the lack of substantial EU cohesion and the preference for individual policies and actions, which becomes evident the handling of immigration. As emphasised in the report, "immigration needs a balanced policy, based on human rights" that targets the management of flows and the structural causes of such dislocations which, in turn, means that we have to overcome the fragmentation of policy on immigration (European Union, 2016: 50). There are similar remarks in the report on Internal Security.

The report on Internal Security (2010-2014) also links organised crime with illegal immigration. However the report goes a step further in setting the objective of dismantling international smuggling operations of illegal migrants. In this context, as indicated in the conclusions of the Council meeting of the 6-7th July 2013, the top priorities are: tackling of illegal and irregular migration flows and tackling of human trafficking (European Commission, 2014: 4). Concerning trafficking, the main goal of EU policy is summarised under four principles: "Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, and Partnerships” (European Commission, 2014: 8). In this context, over the period 2010-2014, partnerships were enhanced to create border management strategy. Indeed, as noted in this document, there is a provision for increased activity of Frontex to deal with the pressure of migratory flows in the Greek-Turkish border along the Aegean (Commission, 2013: 9).
The case of Turkey:

Since Turkey was declared to be a candidate for accession to the EU (in line with the theoretical model of security communities (Koukoudakis, 2011: 71,84,303)), she was expected to adopt the scientific and regulatory standards of EU, especially regarding neighbouring Greece. This was confirmed by the President of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan, in a statement made at Oxford in May 2004, in which he noted that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement is based on "common ground on which common perceptions are generated more accurately. This common ground is the EU." This position was consistent with the 62% of the Turkish public, which was in favour of joining the EU (Eurobarometer, 2004: 5). However, although this may sound reasonable for a country which was just declared to be a candidate, it is noteworthy that the Turkish public –at that time- was not very familiar with EU institutions (Eurobarometer, 2004: 4). Thus, EU institutions, for Turkish public, were considered to be of less importance and not fully trustworthy (Eurobarometer, 2004: 4). These points are important for the establishment of mutual trust amongst EU-Turkey and for the emergence of Europeanisation. In this regard, a closer monitoring of progress in EU-Turkey negotiations appears necessary to safeguard the right atmosphere as well as Turkey’s better acquaintance with EU values.

The initial mood between EU – Turkey (in the early 2000s) may be considered very positive due to the presence of political will (as expressed through political statements) and widespread public support for EU membership. This climate was captured in the Commission’s 2003 report, in which Turkey’s “significant progress in preparing for membership” was highlighted (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). As of yet, however, Turkey had several obstacles to cope with, so that accession wasn’t expected prior to 2014 while several EU leaders intended to put the issue of Turkish accession to national referenda (Dahlman, 2004). The above did not alter the initial aim of the Turkish government to carry forward reforms described in the 2003 report (Commission of the European Communities, 2003: 15). As Time magazine noted in its 2004 celebratory (Time 100) edition, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is “a deeply religious man with a talent for the rough and tumble of democratic politics [...] a bridge builder.” (Purvis, 2004). The propitious climate, as mentioned by Radaelli (Radaelli, 2004), was the basis for learning, change and Europeanisation. What then has changed since that time?
Despite the fact that the migration issue was not new, the ongoing war in Syria (begun in 2011) and the strong migration flows into Turkey have significantly altered the setting. Ozcurumez and Şenses, already in 2011, linked the irregular migration flows out of Turkey to the country’s Europeanisation. According to them, the Europeanisation of Turkish policies dealing with irregular migration is linked to the country’s EU membership and is important due to shift in Turkey’s role from a sending country to a receiving country (Ozcurumez and Şenses, 2011: 247). Therefore, as long as Turkey’s intends to pursue EU Membership, the Europeanisation of its national policies, including migration policies can be expected to continue.

The present study does not examine the role of Turkey in the war with Syria, however, Turkey's relationship to migration is analysed. Hence, for Turkey the relevant aspects may be summarised as follows: migratory flows are a means for extracting economic benefits from the EU, for exerting pressure to speed up the negotiations for EU candidacy, and for promoting Turkey's interests within NATO as well as for expanding Turkey’s influence in Syria. But how far would Turkey go in order to capture such gains and what would this mean for EU Member States? The answer is partially given by the Asian Times Survey and Europeanisation progress.

As recorded by the Asian Times, war with Syria had a negative impact on Turkey but also affected adversely EU's image within Turkey, especially post-2015. The good climate which was identified by President Erdogan as one of his top priorities in his 2014 election campaign and which was visible during the visit of Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn to Turkey in December 8th, 2014 (Wedekind, 2015), didn’t last long. The first incident (not related with the war in Syria) came a few days later (December 14th, 2014) and altered the climate for worse. The incident had to do with the arrest of 24 leading journalists (on the suspicion of being linked to a terrorist organisation), and was considered as an act which was incompatible with one of the core conditions for EU-membership (Wedekind, 2015). The events that followed in conjunction with the rhetoric of president Erdogan admit of a certain interpretation which can be aptly summarised by one of Erdogan’s statements: “If you oppose Islamophobia, then you must admit Turkey into the EU” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015). This is a message addressed to several recipients: his own followers, the EU and Muslims in other
countries, all at once. In this phrase, Erdogan communicates his willingness to construct a Post-Kemal political Identity for Turkish citizens based on Islam, which should be accepted by EU Member States. In this effort, he positions himself as a safe-keeper of Islam against the Christian EU. This became evident in the light of the January 7th, 2015 killings at the French satirical magazine, when “Turkey’s government went on a mission: to defend its brand of political Islam” (Harvey, 2015). A few days later, Erdogan hardened his position by arguing that “Turkey is not a country that could beg for accession to European Union” (DAILY SABAH, 2015). During that time, Turkey had already 1,700,000 Syrian refugees which cost the country, according to Erdogan, $5.5 billion (DAILY SABAH, 2015). But was this intense situation what triggered the change in climate? As Akyol argues, Erdogan, beginning in 2010, begun to attack the old Kemalist establishment and when he thought that he had come to “full power”, he simply refused to tolerate the limits on his power anticipated by the international community and the EU (Akyol, 2015). This shift had also an impact on Turkish public opinion whose support for EU membership in 2015 dropped to 47.5% down from the 2004 figure of 62%. Thus, the initial impact of Europeanisation on Turkish policies (Laws, Legislation and technical capacity), as identified by Ozcurumez and Şenses in 2011 (Ozcurumez and Şenses, 2011: 247), was being undermined by events and an alternative path to that of Turkey’s EU candidacy was being developed.

According to the study of Atlı, for the Asian Times in 2016, 61.8% of the Turkish public opinion was in favour of joining the EU (compared to 47.5% in 2015) mainly due to the prospect of economic gains (Atlı, 2016). Other results of the same study indicate that building the European identity of Turkey is a priority only for the 24.4% of the public (Atlı, 2016) and that only a small percentage of the Turkish public (15.3%) believes that the EU is handling Turkey's candidacy fairly (Atlı, 2016). Therefore, one may come to the conclusion that, for Turkey, EU-Turkey relations are mainly on the economic grounds.

These new data call into question the "social learning” process in Turkey (Koukoudakis, 2011: 332) which is confirmed by the insistence of President Erdogan, to circumvent formal Visas requirements for the entry of Turkish citizens into the EU. As a result, the existing institutional arrangements between Turkey and EU appear to be insufficient to encourage mutual trust and collective identity; consequently it is hard to register progress in terms of Europeanisation. Ozcurumez and Şenses, also
noted that Turkey showed moderate levels of Europeanisation and slow pace of progress in institutional convergence and developments of new policy tools (Ozcuruméz and Şenses, 2011: 247). This explains the reaction of Turkey to EU’s objective of establishing a civilian border control administration, which was perceived as a challenge by the Turkish government concerning “how Turkey conceptualises border security and administers it in line with concerns over national security” (Ozcuruméz and Şenses, 2011: 247). Hence, Turkey’s perception of national security, (which is linked to national sovereignty), seems to collide with certain EU values as well as the common/joint security approach when it comes to border control. This position was confirmed by the (silent) refusal of Turkey to impose (initial) control on migration flows to Greece. It is noteworthy that illegal border crossing in the Eastern Mediterranean were recorded by Frontex, since 2008.

![Illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route in numbers.](Frontex, 2016)

However, after the outbreak of war in Syria in 2011 and the establishment of the ISIS Caliphate in June 29th, 2014 over captured territory, the migration situation became tenser. Thus, the Erdogan administration put increased pressure on the EU for financial assistance and for waving visa requirements in exchange for stricter control on migratory flows. As a result, Erdogan’s (initial) unwillingness to control migration flows to Europe resulted in hundreds of thousands of immigrants entering Greek territory in an effort to reach Germany and other northern Member States. As
UNHCR noted, almost 703,374 sea arrivals were recorded in Greece as of 19 November (UNHCR, 2015). The final number of immigrants for 2015 was 885,000, which was 17 times the number of those who arrived in 2014 (Frontex, 2016).

EU Member States reactions

This situation was profoundly disruptive for EU Member States, who needed to react much faster to the migration problem than they did in the past. On the other hand, the European Commission exhibited faster reflexes and announced the “European Agenda on Migration 2015” as an immediate response to the migration crisis (European Commission, 2015). The agenda included initiatives such as: new “hotspot” facilities (under the coordination of the Commission, EASO, Frontex and EUROPOL), making of funds available for frontline Member States, CSDP operation in the Mediterranean and deployment of European migration officers in EU delegations in key countries of transit (European Commission, 2015). In view of the above, the Commission released a Communication with the title “A European Agenda on Migration’. The Communication called for immediate action and European cooperation that would allow Europe to move forward in the area of migration (European Commission, 2015). These actions included: border management and increased budget for the Frontex joint-operations, targeting criminal networks/smugglers who exploit migrants, initiatives on reallocation and resettlement (including budget allocation), New Hotspot approach (EU Asylum, Frontex, Europol coordination), incentives for reducing irregular migration, a common asylum policy and a new policy on legal migration (European Commission, 2015).

However, these initiatives didn’t receive proper attention from all Member States due to the fact that only Greece and Italy were affected at that time. Pousother highlights this point and notes that Greece and Italy are a natural endpoint for refugees crossing the sea; consequently, they absorb (initially) the largest number of refugees and attend burden in contrast to other Member States (Pousother, 2015). As Mouzeviris noted, it has “become evident that Europe’s leaders cannot ignore this reality any longer” (Mouzeviris, 2015). These arguments and the fact that Italy and Greece had to (initially) tackle the migration problem on their own indicate lack of solidarity amongst Member States, therefore lack of Europeanisation.

A similar conclusion may be drawn from the Visegrad Group and the 2015 Bratislava Declaration made by the Visegrad heads of government. The Visegrad
Group comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia that are meant to work together in a number of fields of common interest within the integrated European framework (Visegrad Group, 2000-2015; Group, 2015). The 2015 declaration highlighted as indispensable the need for effective coordination of different EU policies and for stronger EU cooperation with partners in tackling current and emerging issues, such as (amongst others) irregular migration and border management (Visegrad Group, 2000-2015; Group, 2015). With this action, the Visegrad Group aimed to encourage solidarity and joint action by EU Member States on such issues. As a result, the conclusions of the 25-26th June EU Council meeting contained a special reference to migration. Therein, special attention was given to the prevention of loss of life at sea, finding new ways of confronting smugglers, intensification of cooperation with countries of origin/transit, reallocation/resettlement and return/readmission (European Council, 2015). Hence, the launch of the EUNAVFOR MED mission, decided on 22 June by the Council, was considered as an important contribution to the migration problem and to the management of the Union’s external borders. Despite this initiative, the migration problem continued to grow.

During that time, Greece had already received the vast majority of immigrants, who arrived at several Greek islands, most in Lesbos. Prior to this situation there had been several warnings of the forthcoming refugee crisis (Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2015) with Greece, however, already caught in the throes of its own economic and humanitarian crisis. This resulted in poor preparation for the newly arrived. As a result, hundreds of thousands of immigrants were flooding into Europe provoking a variety of responses by EU Member States. E.g. Hungary built a fence at its border with Serbia as a means to repel the thousands of migrants arriving via the Balkans (UNHCR, 2015). Austrian authorities disrupted traffic from Hungary, causing backups of at least 12 miles with trains from Hungary packed with migrants, many apparently seeking refuge in Germany, being stalled at the Hungary-Austria frontier for hours while German and Austrian officials increased controls in their border region (Alison Smale, 2015). Clearly, at that time each Member State preferred to tackle the migration problem on its own instead of

67 EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia is but one element of a broader EU comprehensive response to the migration issue, which seeks to address not only its physical component, but also its root causes as well including conflict, poverty, climate change and persecution.
undertaking joint action. Clearly, any initiatives that might have occurred would have been much more effective if taken by the EU as a whole (UNHCR, 2015).

This climate is depicted in the final conclusions of the September 2015 Interparliamentary conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, in Luxemburg. As noted in the conclusions, the June 2015 European Council failed “to inject new political stimulus in matters of security and defence [...] in spite of the ever closer threats and challenges that face us”; consequently, the EU Council was urged to revisit “defence issues no longer that June 2016” (EU Council Presidency, 2015). These notes reveal Member State’s reticence when it comes to joint efforts and their preference for individual actions. This is clear from the request to the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) for the preparation of an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy” (EU Council Presidency, 2015) meant to be discussed (with emphasis on issues of permanently structured cooperation and political decision-making in the area of security and defence) during the April 2016 Interparliamentary Council. Clearly, the migration problem was too complex to be effectively resolved by Member States within the limited amount of time at their disposal. On the other hand, Turkey’s unwillingness to control its borders and attendant migration flows was not helpful either. On the contrary, the more immigrants that were entering EU territory, less likely became the prospect of joint action by Member States.

In this context, the European Commission released the 2015 Joint Communication under the title “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action” (European Commission, 2015). The Communication identified the size of the migration problem and introduced the EU’s policy framework and response through the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015: 4-5). More significantly, in regard to Turkey, as the Communication noted, there has been a “dedicated dialogue” so as to “identify ways to support Syrian refugees as well as to enhance border control and fight organised crime responsible for smuggling of irregular migrants” (European Commission, 2015: 5-6). This was considered a big breakthrough in terms of joint action towards the migration problem as was the 2015 EU-Turkey joint action plan. The plan was presented as a major stepping up of “EU-Turkey cooperation in support of refugees and migration management in view of the situation in Syria and Iraq” (European Commission, 2015). The plan was threefold and aimed at: (a) address the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b)
support Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey (Part I) and (c) strengthen cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU (Part II)” (European Commission, 2015).

Although these facts constitute solid evidence of Europeanisation both for Member States and for the Candidate Country (Turkey), several contentious issues have occurred since the cooperation between EU-Turkey was finalised. Such issues include the behaviour of less migrant-friendly EU states. Hence, “Hungary has constructed ragged border fences, spurring a contagion of regional border-tightening; neighbouring Balkan states and, in recent days, Dutch and French politicians have threatened to thwart migration with ramped-up border patrols” (Chen, 2015). This situation indicated that despite the deal with Turkey, the migration problem didn’t end at the external borders of EU. In this regard, Jean-Claude Junker argued that EU’s “first priority is and must be tackling the refugee crisis” (European Commission, 2015). As the Eurobarometer reported, over the indicated period, Junker’s argument was correct. For the period of November-December 2015, as Eurobarometer indicates, immigration was considered to be the most important issue facing the EU. The 20-point increase since spring 2015 is, indeed, noteworthy.
The most important issues facing the EU (autumn – spring 2015) (European Commission, 2015).

As a result, in December 15th, the Commission presented an ambitious proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard with the objective of managing EU’s external borders and protecting the Schengen area (European Commission, 2015). According to the proposal the new Border and Coast Guard will: possess its own reserve pool of border guards and technical equipment, have a monitoring and supervisory role, have the right to intervene, have the duty of coast guard surveillance and a mandate to work in third countries, have a stronger role in repatriation and will guarantee Internal Security (European Commission, 2015). This initiative constitutes an important breakthrough in terms of Europeanisation and gives proof of an improving climate.

This good climate and the EU efforts in tackling the refugee problem are reflected in the statement of Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitrios Avramopoulos, who argued that an EU-Turkey agreement on a joint-action plan is in place and that “the European Commission has reinforced its support for cooperation on return between EU Member States and Turkey” (European Commission, 2016). The repatriation of 308 irregular migrants to Turkey in March 2016 is evidence that the plan is operational, which in turn, is a process crucial for the Common European Asylum System to work (European Commission, 2016). The initiatives continued with the 2016 Commission’s Roadmap proposal, for restoring a fully functioning Schengen system reflects the continuation of joint initiatives undertaken by the EU (European Commission, 2016). It is noteworthy that the roadmap highlighted as a prerequisite the “Securing the EU’s external borders and ensuring efficient border controls” while asking the EU parliament and the Council to adopt the proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard (to be operational by June 2016) (European Commission, 2016). In accordance with the Roadmap proposal, the EU announced “first projects under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey,” according to which €95 million was being provided for immediate educational and humanitarian assistance of the refugees (European Commission, 2016). This good climate provided ground for another breakthrough.
An important breakthrough was made in terms of cooperation between Frontex and NATO in the Aegean Sea. This breakthrough was hailed by High Representative Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Dimitrios Avramopoulos. In their joint statement they argued that the operational modalities of the cooperation between NATO and Frontex were expected to “ensure consistency and complementarity” of the Frontex operation against smuggling and irregular migration in the Aegean Sea in the context of the refugee crisis (European Union - EEAS, 2016). However, this agreement was not welcomed by Turkey which (initially) rejected the presence of NATO vessels in its territorial waters for refugee-related operations (Pappas, 2016). Furthermore, Turkey, as noted by Agence France Presse (AFP) “is showing little to no interest in taking back migrants picked up by the NATO vessels at sea as they attempt to make the perilous crossing to Greece” (AFP, 2016).

As a result, during the same month, High Representative Federica Mogherini met with representatives from Turkey in terms of “making sure that all that has been agreed with Turkey is implemented” (European Union - EEAS, 2016). Following this meeting, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides met with the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in Athens, in an attempt to “reaffirm the European Commission's full partnership and solidarity with Greece in addressing the humanitarian needs of refugees stranded in the country”. During this meeting, Stylianides presented a new funding instrument (in conjunction with the UN and other humanitarian organisations) for supporting financial and administrative capacities related to the refugee crisis (European Commission, 2016).

Considering these visits, one may conclude that EU stands in solidarity with Greece, which shouldered the biggest burden of the migration crisis. Furthermore, the fact that EU Member States find it difficult to follow a common strategy to confront the problem of migration flows reflects the inherent problems of European structures and the mistakes of the past (Lymperiou, 2016). This results in the EU’s inability to create a common defence policy in contrast to the unification of Member States’ economies (Lymperiou, 2016). Thus, the ambiguity concerning a joint solution to the migration problem remained.

---

The cooperation was encouraged by the Greek Government.
This ambiguity was reflected in the reports of the Greek Media on Greece’s direct involvement in the migration problem. As the Greek Newspaper “To Vima” noted, there was ambiguity as to the result of the 17-18th March European Council for finding a solution to the migration crisis (TO VIMA, 2016). Nevertheless, the conclusions of the 2016 European Council (17-18 March 2016) were encouraging. The conclusions reflect the willingness of EU Member States to “provide Greece at short notice with the necessary means, including border guards, asylum experts and interpreters” and contribute to the “accelerated relocation from Greece” under the coordination of the Commission (European Council, 2016). These conclusions indicate clearly the existence of Europeanisation, in terms of joint actions and common policy making in view of the migration problem. On the other hand, Europeanisation of Turkey seems to be in doubt.

The initial good climate seemed to have been disrupted by Turkey’s request to end NATO’s refugee mission in the Aegean, but the alliance appeared reluctant to comply in such a short time (Yinanç, 2016). As Holehouse has pointed out, president Erdogan is prepared to abandon the agreement on migratory flows and threatens to open the gates to such flows (Holehouse, 2016). The end of the cordial atmosphere was confirmed by German politicians who indicated that Turkey will never join the EU with Erdogan as president (NAFTEMPORIKI, 2016).

Nevertheless, shortly thereafter a major breakthrough occurred. In June, 26 Mogherini announced the New Strategy of the EU under the title “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. In her preface she noted that the strategy was the result of an open and transparent process which lasted over a year and incorporated the output of extensive consultations amongst the EU Member States, the European institutions (including the European Commission and the European Parliament), the European civil society at large and several think thanks (Mogherini, 2016). The novelty of the New Strategy is that it seeks to find EU’s place in the world by linking internal and external security of the Union: “Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: Our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions” (Mogherini, 2016).

Regarding migration policy, the New Strategy focuses on the origin and transit countries where humanitarian assistance will be provided with emphasis on education, women and children (Mogherini, 2016: 27). In addition, the new strategy emphasises
the importance of stemming irregular flows by “making returns more effective as well as by ensuring regular channels for human mobility” (Mogherini, 2016: 28). Hence, a “balanced and human rights compliant policy mix is required (so as to address the management of the flows and the structural causes) which includes external policies and instruments migration-sensitive – from diplomacy and CSDP to development and climate – and ensure their coherence with internal ones regarding border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and education” (Mogherini, 2016: 50). Hence, for this mix to have results time is needed, and keeping in mind that structural factors, policies and instrument setting are all linked to learning and change, time to adjust may be bigger than usual. Drawing on Sabatier, Radaelli concludes that for clear results to obtain the time frame required should be approximately a decade (Radaelli, 2009: 1147,1148).

However, in the case of UK time was not enough. During the same month another major shock occurred – though negative in terms of Europeanisation and joint actions: that was the outcome of the referendum held in the UK on the country’s EU Membership. The UK referendum took place on 23 June 2016 and resulted in favour of United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, the option commonly known as Brexit. An important contributing factor to this result was that part of the Brexit campaign leadership used immigration as a means of intimidation of public opinion. Hence, the fear factor which was incorporated in the Brexit campaign message contributed to the referendum’s outcome. In this case, Europeanisation had to confront the fear factor within the relatively short time allowed for by the referendum Their campaign included photographs of immigrants and was criticized by the English media for xenophobic tendencies (Daily Mail, 2016).

Conclusions

Considering the fact that change and Europeanisation take time –roughly a decade- for concrete results, while the migration problem was already knocking on the UK’s door, it would have been extremely difficult to avert the negative result of the referendum (especially when it comes to campaigns with fear-related rhetoric). Therefore, the political unwillingness, from the first moment, to utilise CSDP as a means to confront the migration flows provided a window of opportunity for Euroscepticism. This Euroscepticism was being expressed through fast rising far-right parties across Member States (Yasmeh, 2016; Fenton-Harvey, 2016; Hahnenkamp,
The UK referendum provided an alternative means of expression (other than regular elections) for Euroscepticism.

Another point which is important and contributed to the rise of Euroscepticism is the fact that in the 2003 European Security Strategy and in its 2008 revision, in the last 2016 Global Strategy, and the Internal Security report, Illegal migration has been identified inter alia as a risk for the EU Security. This risk is directly linked to the collapse of law and order, society and ultimately the state. Hence, legitimate questions emerge regarding the lack of (or reduced) action on the part of EU Member States (and to a lesser degree on the part of EU). Considering the warnings (issued at least since 2003), regarding the dangers associated with illegal immigration, and given that EU decisions require an absolute majority, along with the tendency of Member States toward individual action/response further questions arise concerning the viability and the future of the Union. Thus, the rise of Euroscepticism and the outcome of the UK referendum favour of Brexit cannot be disregarded.

As a result, what started as Turkey’s unwillingness to control migration flows into Europe, resulted on the one hand in the (further) enhancement of Euroscepticism and the rise of far-right-parties (and the decision of one Member State to leave the EU), while on the other hand contributed to: the establishment of an EU coast guard, closer cooperation of Frontex-NATO, the emergence of a New EU Global Strategy and a deal with Turkey to control the refugee flows. All in all, one may conclude that on balance the outcome might have been in favour of Europeanisation; nevertheless the occurrence of Brexit changes everything. Furthermore, lack of control (or delay to control) irregular migration contributed to the rise of the far-right parties. This situation could deteriorate in case Turkey decides (as threatened by President Erdogan) to abandon the deal with the EU. This scenario cannot be ruled out given Turkey’s volatile domestic state.

The impact on Turkish society, in the aftermath of the agreement with the EU can be states in the following terms: 57.7% of responders stated that they do not feel comfortable with the Syrians in Turkey, 45.2% (an especially large percentage) said that they do not want other immigrants, while 57% believe that the agreement on immigration with the EU was not "a wise move" since it will lead to increased migratory flows (Ath, 2016). This fragile balance and "the fluctuations of public opinion" reflected in the 61.8% of respondents in favour of accession in 2016 as opposed to only 47.5% in 2015 indicates President Erdogan’s ongoing attempt to
control public opinion, but also the existence of a strong, potential base for Europeanisation. It is noteworthy that this potential base for Europeanisation (to say nothing of EU values) is not compatible with Erdogan’s aim to control Turkish society via a new political identity based on Islam. These elements are important for understanding Turkey’s policy shift on the candidacy issue and Turkey’s role as a deviant force, in terms of CSDP Europeanisation implementation. Thus, the refugee crisis and Turkey’s role can be seen as an external and internal threat to the EU.
Bibliography


European Commission (2015) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the


THE DAY (2016) *Europe’s right turn alarms political elites*, 15 March, [Online], Available: [http://theday.co.uk/international/europe-s-right-turn-alarms-political-elites] [19 June 2016].


TO VIMA (2016) *The critical summit for the refugee in Brussels - Common position of the 28 Member States towards Turkey*, 17 March, [Online], Available: [http://www.tovima.gr/PrintArticle/?aid=785153] [16 June 2016].


Ευρώπη, or: The Border that therefore I am

Dr. Sebastian Weier
Independent Researcher

sebastianweier@web.de

9, Rue Crespin du Gast
75011 Paris
France

Abstract:
The contribution engages the question What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? to trace different notions of borders and subjectivity active in decolonial border thinking and (often) eurocentric thinking about borders. To do this, it looks at discourses on Europe and borders by Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida and Étienne Balibar. Beginning with the differentiation of Europe as continent, the Real Existing Europeanism of the European Union and the mythico-ideological concept of Ευρώπη, the contribution traces concepts of Europe as heritage and borders built to sustain community-ipseity on the one hand, and Ευρώπη as a futurity bend towards the event of a radically Other to encounter through the border on the other hand. In so doing, the relationship between European borders and European subjects is scrutinized and the concept of the border that therefore I am advanced to analyze their enmeshment and the role of the nation-state form therein. This analysis is refined through a critique of notions of sacrifice and repentance. Returning to Derrida’s connection of “white male Europeans” with “sacrifice” and the problematics of the ethico-epistemic closed-circuit of eurocentrism, the contribution delineates a corpo-reality based epistemic divide. To conclude, opacity and relationality are proposed as possible approaches to the realities and potentialities of border thinking / thinking about borders from inside Europe and potential practical consequences of this are advanced.
Keywords:
#Borders
#Europe
#Decolonial Theory
#Corpo-Reality
#Epistemic Divide

1. Directives

What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? This question that appears to be about epistemic positionality challenges orthodox assumptions of academic knowledge and academic writing by suggesting that how we think what we think depends upon a location that could be read as both geo-political and ideological, but certainly not universal. It suggests that there is a border at work in how borders are and can be thought, that there are epistemic limits to knowledge accessibility and (re-)production. It is this latter border and its limits that the present contribution will theorize in order to articulate a tentative answer to the question at hand and to gauge its practical implications. What, indeed, is “Europe”? What is a “border”?

After decades of border related work across the political and artistic spectrum, of writing by authors such as Frantz Fanon, Gloria Anzaldúa or Walter Mignolo, approaching the border has to be considered not simply as negotiating space, territory and governmental and economic institutions, but also epistemology and, ultimately, subjectivity. To ask *What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?* is therefore not simply a question of utility or scientific significance, but first and foremost a question of epistemology and methodology: how to think and write about something that defies assumptions of scientific objectivity and universalism not simply in terms of procedure and positionality, but as a political contestation of western forms of subject and knowledge formation? Decolonial thinkers have challenged their audience to commit to border thinking as one potential option to engage this problematic:
Border thinking or theorizing emerged from and as a response to the violence (frontiers) of imperial/territorial epistemology and the rhetoric of modernity (and globalization) of salvation that continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the Other and, therefore, continues to justify exploitation as well as eradication of the difference. Border thinking is the epistemology of the exteriority; that is, of the outside created from the inside; and as such it is always a decolonial project…. ‘Critical Border Thinking’ instead is grounded in the experiences of the colonies and subaltern empires. (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006, p.206)

Border thinking challenges the notion of a holistic and universally valid and transferable knowledge as being a product of colonial modernity precisely by emphasizing the non-universal “experiences of the colonies and subaltern empires” (emphasis added). It questions the idea of a single form of knowledge and modes of knowing as being valid for or accessible to all in the same manner and argues instead for a “pluriversality” (2006, p.210) that allows for many inter-existing and enmeshed but also mutually irreducible forms of knowledge that are always overlapping, but never identical, always deferred, never total. Pluriversal knowledges range from academic knowledge as it is taught at universities throughout the world, to forms of knowing informed by cultural traditions and corpo-real forms of knowing that can not be transferred across bodies and cultures (e.g. experiences of racism or sexism). In asking how thinking from within Europe affects that process of thinking by asking what that “within” refers to, this paper will align itself with and elaborate on the idea that a pluriversality of knowledge is the conditio sine qua non of thinking about borders and border thinking.

When thus considering the locality, experiential character and limited transferability of knowledge, the question arises whether or not border thinking as a critical methodology can travel to Europe from the colonies and subaltern empires. Can, one question of this contribution is, dominant structural and epistemic positions such as white heterosexual middle-class European males access the same forms of border thinking as those made disposable and dispensable at Europe’s external borders? Do and can those whose phenotypes and passports make Schengen a virtually borderless space for them think about Europe’s internal borders in the same modes and manners as those living and thinking without legal documentation? Should they? If border
thinking, according to Tlostanova and Mignolo, means an “epistemology of the exteriority”, then, can those who have no exteriority vis-à-vis Europe because Europe is the foundation of their very own subjectivity (rather than, for example, a forcefully imposed colonial dispositive erasing their communities, cultures & genealogies) only think about borders, but not border think?

This is not a question asked in order to redress eurocentrism by portraying it as inevitably enmeshed with certain subjectivities. Rather, it is a propaedeutic question deemed necessary to learn and act and ultimately teach about borders from within Europe. It ultimately means to ask whether those in structurally dominant positions can be allies with the oppressed and exploited in contesting border politics, or whether they are epistemically damned to participate in the upholding of borders through their very own subjectivities. This is the question this contribution will develop through the concept of the border that therefore I am, and its political implications and consequences.

Rather than wanting to redeem Europe as a dominant (structural) position from whence to think, the question of the border that therefore I am seeks to trace exactly those epistemological fallacies active where attempts to ignore Europe constitute in fact invisible (and unintended) reiterations of eurocentrism and its borders and eurogenetic subjectivities. In looking at theorizations of Europe (as myth and political reality), its borders and their crises in Jürgen Habermas, Jacques Derrida and Etienne Balibar (section 2) as well as modes of critical positionality and/as a white ritual symbolic (self-)sacrifice and repentance that ultimately consolidate eurocentrism (section 4), this contribution will show why eurocentrism and its borders can be neither unthought nor undone without also engaging Europe from within. In so doing, the paper will trace how through the border national territoriality and subject temporality are merged, thus making the border constitutive of the relationship between national subject and the nation state form, rather than reducing it (the border) to an internalized representation or ideological reproduction of a pre-existing State apparatus. It is this that will be theorized as the border that therefore I am (section 3). This constitutional character of the border to the European subject will be combined with the afore-mentioned decolonial observations concerning the pluriversality of knowledge and the role of experiences and corpo-reality therein. Section 5 will introduce the notion of the epistemic divide to conceptualize the role of the corpo-real
in constituting the border that therefore I am and its consequences for the epistemological and methodological dimensions of the lead question *What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?* The paper will conclude by arguing that academia and activism will remain eurocentric and bordering as long as positionality is ritualized at the cost of relationality and will advance a series of practical impulses concerning thinking borders from inside Europe in light of Ἑυρώπη, or the border that therefore I am (section 6).

2. Ἑυρώπη and the poly-crisis of Real Existing Europeanism

To write about Europe today requires one more than ever to distinguish within its name a geographic location (the continent of Europe), an actually existing political entity (the European Union) and the political ideal of eternal peace and prosperity for all beyond the differential othering produced by nationalism and their borders articulated among others, by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet and which, based on its mythico-ideological character and historical location (more on this later), this text will refer to as Ἑυρώπη. Writing about Ἑυρώπη after the BREXIT referendum of June 2016, in times of increasing border securitization and “poly-crisis” (as president of the EU commission Jean-Claude Juncker has taken to calling the current situation on the continent), obligates one even more to distinguish between the transnational and borderless Ἑυρώπη and what can be described as the Real Existing Europeanism (R.E.E.) of “Fortress Europe”–just as, during the Cold War, it was not unusual to distinguish between the internationalist socialist ideal and the real existing socialism of the USSR and its Iron Curtain.

Ἑυρώπη has served as Europe’s very own internal externality, as a deferred position for R.E.E. to gauge itself it serves to create the non-self-identity from which Europe is able to criticize itself without having to refer and open itself to a radically Other, a move that would question European modernity’s claims to universality. Only by locating its externality in its non-identity with itself, does the European cognitive circuit remain a closed-circuit able to maintain a universalism in which Europe is both center and periphery, ego and other of a world to be read through European epistemologies such as enlightenment rationality and European social and political models such as the nation state.

The basis for this self-deferment and the closed-circuit it creates has often been temporal rather than territorial, with Ἑυρώπη referring both to a supposedly shared
continental cultural heritage (the Greek and Roman empires and their democratic ideals) and a principle of both determined (i.e. in the sense of Marxian historical materialism or Christian teleology) or indetermined (e.g. in Jacques Derrida’s notion of a future-to-come, of an à-venir) futurity. It is by looking into the mirror of its own past or future rather than referring to the presence of others that Europe maintains its self-contained discourse of being a universal, self-reliant and self-contained beacon of humanity, from science (enlightenment and rationalism) to politics (Ευρώπη democracies). Only by looking into the mirage of its mirror can Europe uphold the idea of an identity that finds its ideal-self (past, present & future) in Ευρώπη in spite of the social and geo-political realities of R.E.E.. It is on the grounds of Ευρώπη’s infallibility that R.E.E. can be described as merely in “poly-crisis” with its connotations of being an exceptional event (respectively a cluster of interwoven events) contained in time (and thus not encroaching and potentially undermining either heritage or futurity), rather than structurally and inherently dysfunctional. How this is the case, can be seen by engaging discourses on other moments of European crises, such as the heritage-directed intervention by Jürgen Habermas in 2003 (when Europe’s governments failed to adopt a common position towards the Iraq Invasion) and an intervention theorizing self-deferment and futurity by Jacques Derrida in 1990 (after the fall of the Iron Curtain).

In 2003, Jacques Derrida offered his signature to an article written by Jürgen Habermas titled “February 15, or, What binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe”. The date in the title refers to the European instances of what were global protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The upcoming war had split European states into those whose governments supported the invasion and those who opposed them. Habermas wrote that the demonstrations against the war “may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public sphere”(2005, p.4). The anti-war demonstrations, as the immediate manifestations of this public sphere and an actualization of Ευρώπη, would become the stem tissue from whence to regenerate Real Existing Europeanism. This public sphere would give the people the power and instruments to reform the European institutions and allow them to build a Europe more in synch with Ευρώπη, an R.E.E. whose local laws it would bend towards universal justice.
This proposition seems doubly problematic. The first problematic appears as early as the title of his intervention: the suggestion that Europeans would be bound together by a common foreign policy, or, in other words, the suggestion that the European community and public sphere will define itself negatively in relation to an outside (in this case, in distancing itself from the war-bound United States and its allies). This outside is further nuanced by differentiating not only between Europe and its other, but between “Core Europe”, what could be described as a peripheral ‘Rest’ (of) Europe and non-Europe. In reading Habermas’ intervention, it is abundantly clear that core Europe refers to those European countries pursuing the ideal of Ευρώπη, while ‘Rest’ or peripheral Europe (mostly the at the time soon to adhere new Eastern European member states) has somewhat less of Ευρώπη in it. This emphasis on reading the European community through difference with an-Other defined not by its own identity but its non-identity with Ευρώπη is all the more striking considering that Habermas is careful to define social-democracy as one of the core legacies of a continental European identity. Why, it must be asked, is the European public sphere “bound together” not through Europe-wide social policies of care that define community through positive bonds (a question even more pertinent in the post-2008 recession European poly-crisis and, for example, in how Europe has defined and designed its relationship with Greece—e.g. Eurobonds vs. austerity—within this poly-crisis), but through a double negation (toward the ‘rest’ of Europe and the outside of Europe) in and through foreign policy? Why does Habermas gear the maieutic function of public protest towards the inflection of State policies rather than engaging its unmediated experiential communal character? In other words, why does he feel the need to suggest that Ευρώπη directs itself (or must direct itself) towards R.E.E. rather than away from it? How does Ευρώπη become an apology for the State and a principle of connecting civil society to the State apparatus, rather than a moment of the impossibility (i.e. constitutional injustice) of the State?

This question leads us to the second mayor problematic aspect of the text, Habermas’ idea of the European and what constitutes legible and legitimate knowledge and political protocol within the European public sphere. By referring to a “European” public sphere, a “European” heritage and “Europeans”, Habermas is looking at a realm of encounter and negotiation that already has preset (“European”) rules of communication (i.e. what is a sensible and sense-full political statement and what isn’t), and thus a limited horizon of possible outcomes, with (e.g.) Ευρώπη as a
platform for the withering away of the State not being one among them. Thus, to name just one of the more important aspects of such a precluded horizon, a European public sphere would by definition be secular and humanist. Habermas implicitly admits this limited and limiting character of a European public sphere by considering the potential character of a European identity that would inspire such rules in the second part of his intervention. Although he explicitly calls for “the rejection of Eurocentrism” (2005, p.12) he does so by positing as universal values and modes of knowing, living, being and making sense that others have criticized as inherently European (for example the exclusive focus on rational and academic modes of knowledge, or of the citizen as a post-enlightenment secular rational choice actor; see sections below). Habermas himself saw his proposals as going beyond R.E.E. in that the Europe he imagined remained open for whoever wanted to commit to a European project defined by Еврώпη.

Derrida, who cosigned Habermas’ 2003 intervention but had not part in writing it, articulated a similarly heritage-conscious but ultimately futurity-focused vision of Europe in a 1990 speech published originally as L’Autre Cap (1991) and translated into English as The Other Heading. In this piece, Derrida defines Europe not as a public sphere with a set political epistemology that strives to merge R.E.E. and Еврώпη, ego and ideal, but as a socio-political ensemble whose central characteristic is its capability to continuously not be identical with itself precisely by referring to "heading towards" another rather than deferring (to) itself. As opposed to a public sphere that seeks to fusion Europe and Еврώпη, Derrida insists that Еврώпη is an ideal that not only cannot be realized but that also remains a creative and positive political force only in and because of this impossibility. Any attempt to fusion reality and ideal would amount to a totalitarian foreclosure of the future and the politics and ethics it grounds. Thus, Еврώпη is not a heritage that pre-scribes a constitutional catalogue, but describes an ideal of “openness and non-exclusion”(1991, p.22; translation S.W.). Contemporary Europe, Derrida argues, has no capital: neither in the sense of a hegemonic or over-determining cultural center or ideal (and he here also explicitly refuses the idea of a capital language dominating meaning (1991, p.48)), nor in the sense of a given or ontico-political nature or quasi essentialist socio-economic order, and it is precisely this lack of a capital which enables an utopian Еврώпη. Еврώпη’s (N.B. Derrida refers simply to “Europe” in his text) cap or heading is to direct itself and be responsible towards a truly radically Other (rather
than just a non-self), to make that Other one’s heading and direct oneself towards what one is not, and to respond to it (1991, p.20). Ευρώπη thus relies on response in terms of both a heritage to take responsibility of (i.e. the horrors of colonialism and the World Wars) and as a relationship towards an Other that is supposed to undo eurocentrism by breaking the ethico-epistemic closed-circuit of Eurocentrism and directing Europe away from itself.

In both Habermas and Derrida’s model, the border appears as integral to European identity and community. Always already implicit in the notion of Foreign Policy, Habermas summons the border as an epistemico-political principle in his proposal of “Core Europe”. Derrida, on the other hand, touches on the border not as a differential principle to create a European community as defined by a heritage that separates Core Europe from Other, but quite to the contrary mobilizes the border as a zone where such self-identity must be and always is destabilized and subverted and a self-transformative response to the Other upheld that makes Ευρώπη a powerful political principle but an impossible presence. Though Derrida’s comments on Europe may, then, at first glance seem similar to Habermas’ proposal in that they define Europe through Ευρώπη, the crucial difference lies in the form and function of the border within the articulation of Ευρώπη. While for Habermas the border is the foundation of Core Europe as the nesting place for realizing Ευρώπη through a European public sphere, for Derrida the border is the locus of the impossibility of Ευρώπη’s de facto realization. While for Habermas the border describes the field of Ευρώπη as structure, for Derrida Ευρώπη defines the horizon of an as yet unthinkable event to come that co-determines a structure in that it forbids its closure, but it is not identical to it and ultimately replaces structure and positionality and even identity with relationality and becoming. This is a crucial difference, when considering Europe and its borders from within Europe in times of poly-crisis. Arguably, from a Habermasian perspective the poly-crisis is the result of the failure of R.E.E. to realize Ευρώπη (e.g. a democracy deficit of the European Institutions). From a Derridean perspective, however, the poly-crises, in being a term –and thus a symptom–of intra-European negotiations of its own impossible identity, may show not only the insufficiencies of R.E.E. but also actually prove the futurity that is Ευρώπη, because a) the poly-crisis, by including refugee and border policies, challenges Europe’s relation to the Other and b) from within the poly-crisis, Ευρώπη still functions as a beacon of policy debate that may serve as a bulwark against the revival of neo-nationalist identitarian discourses on the
continent. In other words, while for Habermas the poly-crises marks a structural deficit, for Derrida it marks a potential relationality. It is for this reason that Derrida already noted in 1990 that in speaking about Europe after the end of the Cold War and the passing of the clear delimitations of Europe as a geo-political and ideological (i.e. non-communist) entity that it offered, the notion of crisis may no longer be appropriate (1991, p.34).

While Habermas’ proposal of a European public sphere harks back to Ευρώπη and its universal values, Derrida always turns to an à-venir rather than a future, that is, to universality as an aspiration that drives processes but is not only impossible to realize, but whose impossibility is the very condition of possibility of freedom, ethics and politics. When Derrida speaks of “openness and non-exclusion” (1991, p.22; translation S.W.), it is the openness to the event of this impossible and as yet unthinkable universal, the willingness to engage thinking from the opacity of contingency rather than the transparency of universalist teleologies that he has in mind. As opposed to Habermas, Derrida, in stating that Europe has no heading, is constantly seeking to undermine and subvert the universalistic assumptions of Europe, its knowledges, its languages and its laws. Pointing to his Algerian roots and Jewish creed, Derrida thus self-identifies with a bit of irony:

I am European, I am without a doubt a European intellectual ... but I am not, nor do I feel like a European with all of my parts. By which I want to say, it is important for me, I have to say it: I do not want to be and I should not be European with all of my parts. (1991, p.80. Emphasis added, translation S.W.)

This ironic self-identification is important in two ways. First and foremost, because Derrida here speaks about Europe from his own identity, joining the necessary incompleteness of Ευρώπη as futurity, to the incompleteness of his own Europeanness (“not … with all of my parts”) and thus implicitly re-framing Europe as a matter of the constitution of the subject as well as the State or, more broadly, the governance of the subject. Europe is not simply a question of heritage, but a question of being, both in terms of what is or is not, and in terms of what should and should not be. Secondly, this comment is important because by connecting Europe and his own identity, Derrida connects the question of Europe to that of “the” European, echoing a comment he made around the same time (and later published as “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”): “Moreover, there was a time, not long ago and
not yet over, in which ‘we, men’ meant ‘we adult white male Europeans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice’” (1989/1990, p.951).

Beginning the analysis of the question *What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?* by considering the concept of Europe has shown how different conceptions of Europe carry different conceptions of the border and its role in the constitution of Europe. The following section will look to Etienne Balibar’s writing on borders in order to follow Derrida’s impulse to connect matters of Europe/ Ἑυρώπη with matters of identity. The relationship between European borders and European subjects and their capacity to sacrifice will be explored by cross-reading notions of internal and internalized borders and introducing the concept of the border that therefore I am. Thus, the next section will offer a tracing of the intersections of subject, identity, R.E.E. and Ἑυρώπη, that will permit returning to Derrida’s connection of “white male Europeans” with “sacrifice” in section 4. and the problematics of the ethico-epistemic closed-circuit of eurocentrism and the epistemic divide in section 5. before the final section will use the insights gained to suggest thinking in and through relationality as one possible approach to the realities and potentialities of border thinking / thinking borders from inside Europe.

**3. The border that therefore I am**

*The border that therefore I am* both intercuts and supersedes notions of internal and internalized borders and to understand the former, one needs to engage the latter. In a close reading of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s notion of the “internal border”, Étienne Balibar writes:

> But above all, there is the necessary equivocality of the apposition “internal borders” (in the plural): whether by this we understand the borders that *divide* the interior of a territory or empire (*Boden, Reich*) into determinate domains (*Gebiet*), or the borders that isolate a region from a surrounding “milieu” and thus individualize it, *as expressions of the very constitution of the subject.* “Internal borders” represents in some sense the *nonrepresentable* limit of every border, as it would be seen “from within” its lines. (1994, p.63; underlining added)

In pursuing the question *What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?*, the problematic of a “nonrepresentable limit of every border, as it would be seen ‘from within’ its lines” is of outmost importance. The internal border as described by
Balibar refers to geo-political and territorial borders as well as borders that constitute a subject and are internal (or interior) in the sense that they pertain to the “inside” of the subject. At the same time, the expression “as it would be seen ‘from within its lines’” both indicates the role of positionality in the perception of the border and performs a distinction between the seeing and the seen, between the subject constituted by the border and the border itself. As will be argued below, it is this subject/border distinction that makes the internal border something different from the border that therefore I am, which is a concept proposed precisely to advance analysis of the enweavement of subject and border. Before we can expand on this, though, it is necessary to follow Balibar’s reading of Fichte a bit further.

The “internal border” per Fichte, Balibar writes, refers to a national border defined by language and culture, rather than territorial dispositives of State sovereignty and thus signals the non-identity of the two. The internal border is not an internalized territorial border, but rather the opposite: the territorial border is an externalized internal border. In other words, national territory is defined by the presence of a national community bound together by the internal borders of language and culture, not the other way around. Fichte’s internal border thus seems similar to Habermas’ territorially expandable European public sphere based on a Ευρώπη constitutional patriotism. Even though Fichte considers the border to articulate a form of German nationalism, while Habermas seeks to think a European “postnational constellation” (1991), both authors describe a formation whose geo-political borders are not forever set, but arise out of culture as heritage. Both border formations—and it is important not to forget that Habermas does not explicitly refer to borders, though they are implicit in his text engaged here—describe not a state of being, but a heritage that defines a community that needs to constantly reconstitute itself through the realization of that heritage, for example through education or political acts such as the 2003 demonstrations. Fichte, Balibar observes, asked Germans to defend an internal border during the Napoleonic occupation of Germany, by refusing a cooperation that would add internal to external occupation:

*But the internal borders remain:* provided that the Germans remain invincible within themselves—something which is always within a man’s power—this fortress cannot be taken (like Luther’s faith: *ein’ feste Burg*), these borders cannot be crossed. (1994, p.66; underlining mine)
This leads Balibar to comment that the internal border proposed by Fichte describes not a constellation of space or territory, but of time:

It is then necessary to say that this ‘border’ does not separate spaces, (whether it is a matter of territorial spaces or, metaphorically, of cultural universes), but rather represents the point or moment of conversion from constituted space to constituting time, which is the time of projection, of decision, of action, of the future, of spiritual future. (1994, p.81+82)

The internal border does not exist simply by and out of itself. It relates to the temporality of a community and its subjects defined in terms of linguistic and cultural heritage and continuity and upheld through individual acts, first and foremost those arising out of the “identification” of the ego with the border (1994, p.81).

As the geo-political internal borders of Europe have become porous for holders of European passports, while its external borders turn the regions surrounding it—e.g. the Mediterranean—into killing fields and neo-liberal processing and racialization zones for non-Europeans who want to cross them, it is important to note this connection between internal and external borders through temporality and identification. The fact that the internal border is not set but reproduced from a common heritage, makes the internal border (and thus access to the community it defines) hard to acquire for those without that heritage (if at all) and easy to lose for those who have it. The externalized territorial border serves as a fortification for this vulnerable internal spiritual border, Fortress Europe supplements the feste Burg (while, in Fichte, the feste Burg of the internal border was the holdout of the already broken external border). Breaching the external border therefore is not just a violation of territory, but puts at risk a nation’s temporality, viz. the ability of the subjects that constitute it to project their identity as well as their community’s continuity in time. The violation of national territory deterritorializes the subject by colonizing its externalized constituents and leaving it only with the internal, viz. its language and culture. In other words, the geo-political border is inherently enmeshed with the subject’s temporality, and any modification of the territorial border impacts form and function of that temporality and the subjectivity and identity it engenders. Arguably, this is the point of greatest divergence between the heritage focused border temporalities of Fichte and Habermas, and Derrida’s border futurity, between the European poly-crisis as spiritual and identity crisis on the one hand, or as moment of Εὐρώπη’s greatest
actuality on the other. While with Habermas and Fichte, the border serves to make possible the reproduction of the heritage of a community as its ipseity, and thus the reproduction of the community or nation and its subjects as such, in Derrida the border makes possible the event by undermining this (always already mythological) reproduction of ipseity.

It is here that any transgression of the border becomes either a transgression or a transformation of the subject, that any uncontrolled non-national presence within the territory defined by the externalized border threatens not only territorial sovereignty, but also subject-temporality, that this presence threatens to disrupt the re-iterations of the heritage that sustain the nation and its subjects. The presence of the Other, for short, is experienced as a disruption of the future that creates either death (Habermas/Fichte) or the to-come (à venir) that is the only true futurity in the sense of an event of the new and yet unthinkable rather than a foreseeable reiterative permutation of the same. In order to properly assess the implications of this for this text’s lead question (What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?), it is necessary to radicalize the notion of the internal border and continue developing the concept of the border that therefore I am. As noted above, the internal border as originally proposed by Fichte still considered the subject and the border as two separate entities that combined and merged through processes of identification and cultural reproduction.

In reading this through Balibar’s proposal concerning the temporality of the internal border, it became clear however, how much the subject as such is constituted by rather than just connected to the border. This is what Derrida advanced with his focus on the futurity rather than heritage of borders, and the concept of the border that therefore I am will further develop this. Shortly looking at another piece by Etienne Balibar will help as a transition point between the “internal border” and its connection between national heritage on the one hand, and a more radical assertion of the futurity of the border on the other. To ask What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? thus requires thinking about borders as the interiority of Europe (as they are of any nation-state formation), or, to put this differently, requires asking if Europe and European subjects can be thought without borders. If Europe’s borders constitute Europe’s subjects, both temporally and territorially, then to think about borders from inside Europe and/or as a European is always to think about one self. The question, as the engagement with Fichte, Habermas and Derrida has shown, then is: how does one undo this eurocentrism in thinking about borders? What are its consequences in terms
of academic practice and methodology? How can one break the circle of thinking about one self through the border without ignoring the role of (one’s own) subjectivity in the border? One factor to consider in looking for an answer to this is the role of the State that was present in both the notion of foreign policy and of territoriality.

In “What is a border?” Etienne Balibar engages the question of the State that Fichte excluded from his proposals concerning the “internal border”. Insisting on the contingent nature of borders, Balibar here considers the often forced and violent mode of their creation as well as the conditions of violence that determine the (im)possibilities of identification with them and ensure the creation and maintenance of “non-identities” (2002, p.77) as well as “anti-citizenship” (2002, p.78) in the same process that creates identities and citizens. While the temporal dimension of the nation is re-produced in individual subjects through language and culture, it is only at the State level that this temporality becomes tied to space through territoriality, a process of conversion, which—as mentioned—Balibar locates in the border. It is the nation state form that merges the “internal border” with the externalized borders, that merges subjectivity and geo-politics and in the process transforms the externalized border into an external border that seems to exist by its own force, rather than being part of a collective act of community formation. More than a violent State act, however, this is a process that has to be taken up by the subject of the nation-state in order to be possible:

But there can be no doubt that, in national normality, the normality of the national citizen-subject, such an appropriation [of the subject by the State opposed to multiple nationality] is also internalized by individuals, as it becomes a condition, an essential reference of their collective, communal sense, and hence, once again, of their identity (or of the order the ranking by which they arrange their multiple identities). As a consequence, borders cease to be purely external realities. They become also [...] invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. (2002, p.78)

The national citizen-subject is not only created through the identification with the “internal border” of language and culture, but is complicit in internalizing the identification performed by the State of the externalized or territorial border with that internal border and thus of logically conjoining his or her identity with an external border that ties the national citizen-subject to only one possible national temporality
and territory (hence, the rejection of multiple nationality). In this process, the question of the (in)visibility of borders is pointed to once again, interrogating the relation between subjectivity and thinking about borders. If a border is defined as an external rather than externalized reality, it becomes both fetishized and perpetuated. While the externalized border itself does not become invisible, its temporal dimension and origin in the subject do as do its performative nature. The nation-state form is thus essential to questions of internal and externalized as well as internalized borders and their perpetuation. As an epistemological paradigm, the nation state form renders the externalized character of borders invisible and/or unthinkable by reducing them to the fetish of external borders. The State therewith also naturalizes its own form and legitimacy, by appearing as the guardian of the external border and *eo ipso* the national citizen-subject’s temporality and continuity. As a result of this, any critical theoretical engagement with borders must necessarily include not only a critical engagement with the nation state form as such, but also with its modes of subjection and how State territoriality and subject temporality are interlinked through the border.

To think borders from inside Europe, then, and in a non-positivist manner, requires the thinking instance to interrogate the potentially nationalist and/or statist foundations of its own subjectivity and to tackle the problematic of borders invisible to it, due to the mode of its very own constitution. Considering the border that therefore I am, to engage borders, I must face and methodologically frame my very own epistemic limits as well as the political implications of my subjectivity, as the border marks not simply my limits but also the limits of my ap/perception. In being the border, I am also the State that fetishizes it, but I am not only and exclusively that State (viz. the result of identification is not identity). Only by working on this matrix or ethico-epistemic dispositive of \{subject<border>nation-state\} does Ευρώπη as a name for *le cap de l’autre* become precisely not a heritage defining what the subject is, but a futurity that draws the European subject’s limitations in order to surpass them. The difference between such a futurity and the continuity assured by the nation state border is that the latter works for and the former against ipseity. Border thinking here precisely situates itself between the subject and the dispositives of the nation-state to break that link, while thinking borders only traces that link.

Ευρώπη as it will be theorized below through an engagement with the concepts of sacrifice and repentance, marks the mythological foundation of power and law as
opposed to the law making power of the police incarnated in R.E.E., i.e. it does not conceal and contain but reveal and subvert that power. While, at first glance, the institution of R.E.E. with its explicitly legal branches (i.e. the European Parliament) may seem difficult to reduce to the police, this suggestion becomes clearer when one identifies the police as that instance that is designed to prevent any futurity, i.e. designed to prevent and, at worst, contain, any event. How that applies to R.E.E. and all branches of the nation-state form will be shown below. At this moment, it is important to underline once more how the futurity of the event is thus a combination of both power (the im/possibility of the event) and–first and foremost–knowledge, or, more precisely, epistemology (the im/perceptibility of the event). To oppose Ευρώπη to the police is to disconnect it from its theorization as heritage in Fichte and Habermas, to break its instrumentalization as a deferential instance that permits the creation of a closed-circuit eurocentric epistemology (or even ontology) and to therewith refuse to see in it a differential principle that finds its incarnation the borders of R.E.E. and the subjects they sustain. To continue speaking of Ευρώπη in spite of this considerable adaptation is to make sure, however, that the historical location, genealogy and responsibility of the model to be developed is not lost, to make sure the mythological force harnessed to understand what it means to think borders from inside Europe is not able to degenerate into a new universalizing and colonizing principle that polices the futurity of an à venir, that polices the border in order to control the Other, both temporally and territorially. By making sure the border does not become the location where Europe bends back onto itself to close the eurocentric braces excluding the other, but the place where the European ego, by recognizing its limits, also recognizes the space of the Other, Ευρώπη thus makes the border not a trace of universalist expansion but recognizes it and lets it be a platform for encounter(s) (see section 6).

4. Sacrifice / Repentance

As mentioned earlier, in Force of Law (1989/1990) Jacques Derrida connects the question of Europe to the ability to sacrifice. This section will combine his comments on sacrifice with his elaborations on the implicit eurocentrism of acts of repentance and forgiving in On Forgiveness (2001) in order to further elaborate a critique of the intersections of territoriality and temporality in and through the border. In cross-
reading sacrifice and repentance, this section looks at both the subject and the State. To do so, it focuses on the role of language understood as an ethico-epistemical dispositive at large that always already implies all parts of the ensemble \{subject<border>nation-state\} by interrogating exactly that part in which State and Subject are one through an identification that this text has been tracing in the form of the border.

In *Force of Law*, Derrida offers a critique of that notion of a language that will later become for Habermas the common heritage (paste Fichte’s internal border) that founds the possibility of Core Europe and the European public sphere. Derrida insists: “it is unjust to judge someone who does not understand the language in which the law is inscribed or the judgment pronounced …” (1989/1990, p. 951). Justice (which would be the location of Ευρώπη) is opposed to positive law here (which would be the location of R.E.E.) and language refers not simply to language in the common sense (English, Cantonese, Wolof, Arab ...), but to a logic of legibility, legitimacy and sense making. To “not understand the language” means to not share its ethico-epistemic dispositives. Derrida specifically targets European notions of rationality and modernity and their exclusion of corpo-real and indigenous knowledges as well as other forms of doing, thinking, making sense that are not part of enlightenment reasoning for critique, deconstructing how their suggested universalism both is the effect of and serves to reiterate the projection of eurocentric power. In this context, Derrida’s remarks on sacrifice posit it as a crucial act in establishing the power of a language by concealing the violent foundations of its legitimacy and legibility. As the ultimate exercise of signification, sacrifice describes the ability to communicate with a higher spiritual order that is, in the last instance, the guarantee of the legitimacy of an existing “language”, precisely because it is not man-made. Reading sacrifice through language as ethico-epistemic dispositive, this means that he who has the right and ability to sacrifice both denies his own role in (re-)producing a language, yet insists on his privileged access to the original source. He has not made it, so he cannot change it, but he is needed to tame it. In sacrifice, the order of things is portrayed as external, viz. it is externalized and fetishized. Language becomes not an object of change, but an agent to defer to; it becomes a matter of faith rather than knowing. Sacrifice is thus an essential part of translating the mythological foundation of power and its dispositives, the violence of its founding events, into a police order that prevents an-Other event, i.e. the foundation of an-Other power that will undermine
that of the police which, again, is not the maker of that order, but its guardian. Sacrifice is nothing else than the effort to eliminate the event, in as far as the event is not simply any occurrence (i.e. rain, rich harvest) but an ethico-epistemical rupture described in relation to Derrida’s notion of the event above.

To claim the ability to perform sacrifice, and first and foremost sacrifice-as-repentance, is ultimately always a denial of one’s responsibility for the cruelty and violence foundation of an existing order. As Derrida goes on to show in Force of Law, law and language need to base themselves on such an externalized higher universal order so as not to summon their own vulnerability and contestation, in order not to permit even the thinkability of an alternative founding violence that would undo its own force and possibly eliminate its existence. Cross-reading this critique of language, law and the public sphere with Derrida’s comments on being a European, we thus encounter matters not simply of positionality, but of vulnerability. The act of sacrifice protects Europe from vulnerability by summoning the protection of a universal that knows no legible antagonism except evil. In adapting another Derrida lecture title (2006), I see this as one of many moments where he struggles with how the limits of his subjectivity and his identity may be the limits of his thought, and how he risks being the police containing rather than the good-wife facilitating the to come of the event and the politics and ethics it founds.

Another significant site of this struggle is On Forgiveness, where Derrida continues to oppose positive law and justice and wonders how the “globalization” (2001, p.28) of repentance and asking for forgiveness is in fact the globalization of a (western) form of justice inspired by “Pauline Christianity” (2001, p.19). This he describes as an internationalized:

Abrahamic language [...] which has already become the universal idiom of law, of politics, of the economy, or of diplomacy: at the same time the agent and symptom of this internationalization. This proliferation of scenes of repentance, or of asking ‘forgiveness’, signifies a doubt, a universal urgence of memory, of self-accusation, of ‘repentance’ of appearance [comparation] the same time beyond the juridical instance of the nation-state. (2001, p.28)

Of interest for Ευρώπη and the border that therefore I am are the intersection of power and subject within the spectacle of sacrifice and repentance. Derrida argues that repentance signifies a sort of conscience of both the finitude and mythical foundation
of positive law, a longing to bring that law closer to the justice that inspired it, but which is itself only a universalized particular language and potentially little more than of the order of law (rather than justice). Derrida thus indicates that repentance, like sacrifice, is a form of self-critique based on the sort of self-deferral criticized above as creating an ethico-epistemic closed-circuit, rather than a heading towards an Other. Both sacrifice and repentance consolidate pre-existing hegemonic dispositives by positing injustices as the result of individual failures and transgression or temporally limited crisis or decadence rather than inherent structural deficiencies. The language that has become the idiom of law suggests not an identity between law and justice, but casts itself as a higher order of law, an order recognized and reiterated in repentance and sacrifice, a heritage made futurity in the act of building the future in its image. In repentance and sacrifice, the sin, the sentence and the absolution are of the same order and to accept repentance as repentance (rather than, say, as evil cunning), then, amounts to recognizing as just that order that gives them legibility and legitimacy.

What are the consequences of this for the lead question of this enquiry: What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? To think borders from inside Europe may mean participating in a reinforcement of the eurocentric ethico-epistemic closed-circuit and the borders that constitute it, as even radical criticism may amount to little more than derivatives of sacrifice/repentance. This is not border thinking, but thinking about borders. However, the above analysis has also indicated that border thinking from within Europe is possible, if Ευρώπη is mobilized not as a heritage that determines the future (as in the both Abrahamic and modern post-enlightenment language of Habermas’ public sphere), but as a radical futurity of an as yet unthinkable à venir and heading towards an Other. How can this be done?

5. Corpo-reality and the Epistemic Divide

As mentioned earlier, one foundational current of for border thinking has been decolonial thought and its commitment to the critique and deconstruction of Europe. It was pointed out that such approaches avoid the closed-circuits of self-deferral by relying, among other things, on non-European corpo-realities and indigenous knowledges and forms of doing, being, making sense that would be illegitimate and illegible by the standards of the language of the European public sphere. This is what
was at the beginning of the question of this contribution *What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe?*

In this white, male, European author’s work, as well as many of my activist encounters, it regularly happens that students or comrades question my right to not only be there (at the gathering, the rally …), but to engage with questions of borders and decoloniality at all. This is due to their experiences of how even critical academia as a form of sacrifice/repentance often consolidates Europe. As a normal/normative European, these comrades argue, I not only do not have the necessary experiential access to critical border thinking, but constitute a risk to its very possibility. They diagnose an *epistemic divide* that is ultimately based on body related corpo-realities that insist on the presence of an Other beyond the language of Europe and see me as a potential agent of denial of that divide or border, of the other that it projects and protects and of the event it enables. To them, the border that therefore I am is a risk. Potentially, I am the police that bends language (e.g. academic discourse) back on myself to (re-)close the ethico-epistemic circuit and make them disappear.

To be very clear: corpo-realities are socio-genetic, so the epistemic divide, though body-related, does not arise out of the body as such, but of its social and ethico-epistemic enmeshment. It is part of the ethico-epistemic dispositive {subject<border>nation-state} in as far as it pertains to how this specific form of enmeshment of power and knowledge creates bordered subjectivities in which personal experience and socio-politics are merged to obliterate the Other. The epistemic divide insists that, for example, experiences of racism cannot be reduced to their intellectual and empathic imagining, i.e. that there is knowledge activated by and lived in and through the body that cannot travel outside of it. This divide is connected to the body, but pertains to the corpo-real, viz. to a body-based reality that refers to how the world makes the body and how the body makes the world. It implies a notion of limits and liminality that undermines universalism and leads towards pluriversalism; it is not an internal, but a (generally violently) internalized border whose factual form is white (US-European) supremacy. By insisting on the corpo-real here, the border that therefore I am is complicated as I am cast back on my own corpo-reality in a mode that does not universalize my whiteness and thus undermines its mythological foundation (i.e. the heritage of Ευρώπη) and history of violent hegemony. When Derrida asks:
Can there be, in one way or another, a scene of forgiveness without a shared language? This sharing is not only that of a national language or an idiom, but that of an agreement on the meanings of words, their connotations, rhetoric, the aim of reference, etc. (Derrida, 2001, p.48), he reminds us that that the existence of a common language such as that of the European public sphere always already implies a situation of imperfect recognition of the Other in as far as it denies the epistemic divide. Bar universalisms such as humanism, religion or modernity (e.g. historical materialism) and there is no shared language with the radically Other. Performances of sacrifice and repentance such as positionality therefore always already imply or impose a form of ethico-epistemic (or even ethnico-epistemic) dominance. The fetish of language as public sphere and critical positionality as well as other rites of passage (see below) do nothing else than jealously guard the border that therefore I am from the event of the Other.

In face of this, insisting on the epistemic divide and the pluriversality it signals, proposes a concept of the border in which competing ethico-epistemic constellations co-exist. Here, the border constitutes a platform of recognition of the Other as other, rather than the moment of their erasure and/or assimilation. To recognize and respect the opacity of the Other expressed in the concept of the epistemic divide (and to therewith renounce the control always already implicit in the concept of transparency) is both the essence of heading towards the other and the reason why it is so forcefully rejected. I want to conclude by suggesting that the form of border thinking theorized through Ευρώπη as heading towards the other is nothing else than recognizing, respecting and working from the epistemic divide and the opacity and pluriversality it indicates. This, however, requires not positionality, but relationality.

6. Relationality (Impulses)

Relationality is fundamentally different from the incantations of positionality that derive from sacrifice and repentance. While relationality insists on the un-mediated and un-located presence of an Other, positionality activates a structure within which someone or something is situated. Positionality defines a relation passing through and determined by a third (which is generally a constellation of more than one), i.e. it determines both the I and the Other not as such but through itself, for example by defining the two in degrees of more or less identity with itself (more or less
enlightened, civilized, European …). Inside Europe, such positionality is precisely the closed-circuit in which the European subject relates itself to that which it is made of and which it makes. There is no structure-external (viz. radically) Other here. Even though it has become widespread practice to critically recite one’s positionality when participating in activist and academic exchanges as if these incantations were corpo-real rites of passage, they are not for the simple reason that they can’t be once the hypothesis of the corpo-real epistemic divide has been accepted. The fact that a person of color recognizes and respects you as an ally does not make you a person of color and does not open/make available or appropriable to you its corpo-reality. To think otherwise signals an attachment to and investment in a universal language of knowledge and experience that is generally a structure of white universalism with a violent history of universalization (e.g. the spread of Christianity and Christian modes of sacrifice and repentance during colonization). But if sacrifice, repentance and positionality do not transcend but confirm the border that therefore I am, then how can one border think from inside Europe? What would relationality look like and imply?

As has been repeatedly suggested, the potential answer may lie in thinking Ευρώπη not as heritage but as futurity and to consider a border not as a differential protecting principle, but as a platform of encounter with the Other. Considering the ethico-epistemic dispositive of {subject<border>nation-state} and its function in merging subject-citizen temporality and nation-state territoriality, this means that relationality requires us to propose a politics beyond the nation-state form. Only when the border loses its halo of protecting a heritage based futurity can it become the platform for an à venir and its event/s.

In order to re-think borders from inside Europe so as to permit imagining relationality instead of the positionality of the closed-circuit, Ευρώπη must be read free of territorial or institutional referent. Ευρώπη is not R.E.E.. Nor is it the Europe that permits subject and nation state ipseity by territorial integrity and continuity. What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? is approached through a term such as Ευρώπη in order not to insist on a positive heritage or language (i.e. an internal border), but on the historical location and formation of that which heads towards the other, of a futurity implied in and co-determined by the border that therefore I am, a border whose form and consequences must precisely not be universalized. In
introducing the notion of Ευρώπη as futurity, this contribution doesid precisely not seek to re-center Europe to universalize it but to mark it limits in respect to and respect of the epistemic divide and to thus think towards pluriversality.

Ευρώπη, or the border that therefore I am means reckoning with opacity as a necessary political fact rather than a deficiency. It means reckoning with opacity as the live of the other rather than the dead of the subject. Relationality thus connotes the transcendental, but not the religious, in that it bases politics on an unfathomable presence beyond our ethico-epistemic dispositives without seeking to structure it into a hierarchical apparatus of translation. This is especially true of the aura academic activism too often attributes itself, in its modes of colonial repentance, white self-sacrifice and corpo-real rites of passage.

If asking What does it mean to think borders from inside Europe? forces “us” Europeans to think of the border that therefore I am, that means that it forces “me” to think of my complicity in border regimes, both as subject, but also in terms of my notions of scientific reasoning and methodology, in terms of what constitutes legible and legitimate knowledge in the public spheres within which I locate myself, my work and what I might consider my political struggles. The challenges this poses were indicated by the suggestion to move from positionality to relationality. Considering the critique of language elaborated above, it is clear that this contribution cannot capture (and thus contain) the form of relationality, but may only seek to set impulses towards it. It seeks precisely not to profess academic authority, but to engage an à venir that always already undermines authority by underlining the internal limits set by the border that therefore I am. Accordingly, one such impulse may be to suggest that reckoning with the epistemic divide and its imperative of pluriversality means that thinking borders from inside Europe cannot take the form of single authored works if it wants to avoid the closed-circuit of merely thinking about borders. Academic papers themselves must be platforms of relationality rather than authority. Another impulse may be to start thinking borders as platforms not just through any critique of the nation-state form, but through a critique that looks at commons and communalization theories to include engagements with labor regimes, as well as regimes of racialization performed at and through the border in its current form. This includes the hope of finding common ground, of working on a new common language, but like the à venir theorized by Derrida, it is an im/possible horizon that
can never really come. However, these impulses, too, must be considered merely exploratory steps on a path described by Frantz Fanon as having ultimately to lead to “new humans, a new language, a new humanity.” (2002, p.40; translation mine).

Sources:


**Author Biography**

Dr. Sebastian Weier is currently an independent researcher in the field of Border Studies and American Studies. He studied Political Sciences and Cultural Studies and obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Bremen for a dissertation on “Cyborg Black Studies: Tracing the Impact of Technological Change on the Constitution of Blackness”.
Greece. The Birthplace of a New Cultural Revolution

Evy Yannas, Talanton Consulting

Postal Address: Unit 7, 13 Fyfe Street, Reservoir, Victoria, Australia, 3073
Email Address: e.yannas@talantonconsulting.com.au

Abstract
A most poignant outcome from the worst economic and humanitarian disasters of our time, is the humanity and solidarity that has emerged out of both these crises. By remarkable coincidence both have culminated in Greece, and this has paradoxically created the circumstances through which a leading example of a greater global humanity has transpired.
Contrary to the false and often racist narratives perpetuated by the global media, the way in which ordinary Greeks have responded to these crises, has provided invaluable insights into the human possibilities, and the underlying values and behaviours that can drive the cultural change required to reverse the current state of inhumanity in Europe and beyond. Despite their own and seldom reported humanitarian crisis, the Greeks have exemplified true leadership in humanity, and while their wealthy European and other counterparts have largely turned their backs on refugees, they have risen above their struggles to help those in need.
At the core of this cultural change, is the underlying value rooted deeply in the Greek Philotimo or honour for doing the right thing, which provides a guiding principle placing the human above the financial imperative. The Greek people’s “No” vote in the historic 5th July 2015 referendum, highlights Courage as another cornerstone value to be drawn upon for putting an end to the deliberate policies that perpetuate human suffering.

Achieving successful cultural change requires engagement to such and other core values and behaviours at both leadership and grass-roots levels. In the current context of a leadership crisis, mobilising collective efforts that influence the right leadership are critical. Shaping the mainstream discourse through integrated global narratives and stories that connect with people at the emotional level, presents a key strategy towards realizing this aim.
Keywords: Greeks, cultural change, humanity, leadership, grass-roots

Introduction

For almost a decade, the world has experienced the most unprecedented crises since World War II. The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 triggered global economic shockwaves, prompting the European Economic Crisis and an ongoing “Greek tragedy” which has not only resulted in huge economic devastation (including 25% loss to GDP, 45% drop in income, 25% unemployment and 24% increase in long term unemployment) 1 but also a humanitarian crisis and almost a quarter (36%) 2 of the Greek population now living on the poverty line, with extreme poverty increasing significantly (from 2% to 15%) 3, all the while harsh austerity continues to be imposed by European leadership. As the European crisis was unfolding, the Syrian Civil War was also beginning to take shape, in the context of the Arab Spring protests and the relentless military conflict in Syria causing almost half of the population to be displaced (4.8 million people) and around 1 million Syrians and other migrants 4 to arrive in Greece during 2015 and 2016, in the hope of finding a better future in northern Europe. Following an initial welcoming of refugees by countries such as Germany and Sweden, European borders with Greece eventually closed and affluent Europe ultimately turned its back on refugees. In March 2016, EU leaders made a deal to relocate refugees back to Turkey, a country known for its substandard human rights record. The UN criticized Europe’s response to the refugee crisis and for abandoning Greece to deal with the migrant crisis on its own, also warning of the illegality of sending migrants back in exchange of financial and political rewards 5.

Paradoxically, one of the most successful multicultural societies in the world Australia, and also one of the world’s wealthiest nations, has been adopting offshore processing of refugees since 2001. In 2015 the UN found that various aspects of Australia’s asylum seeker policies violated the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 6. A report by Amnesty International in August 2016 found that the Australian government is responsible for the deliberate and systematic torture of refugees on Nauru and should be held accountable under International Law 7.

Based on the above, it is argued that the world is currently experiencing a global state of inhumanity and that a cultural revolution is required to reverse it. Essentially what this requires is a fundamental shift in the collective values and behaviours of our global society. This paper proposes that there is substantial evidence to support that

---

1. Source: National Bank of Greece
2. Source: Eurostat
3. Source: Eurostat
4. Source: United Nations
5. Source: UNHCR
6. Source: UNHCR
7. Source: Amnesty International
despite their current economic and social challenges, the Greek people through their response to the financial and refugee crisis, provide a leading example for inspiring a cultural revolution toward greater global humanity.

**The Greek Example**

**Financial Crisis**

In response to Greek Financial Crisis, the Greek people have shown remarkable solidarity, resilience and courage. Since 2010, the Greek crisis has had a detrimental impact on a large part of Greek society and given rise to unprecedented adversity within the social fabric. Though devastating, the crisis has also generated a new spirit of solidarity and volunteerism in Greece (although charity has long been practiced informally through the traditional church and family network). A recent survey has shown a 44 percent increase in the number of Greeks taking part in volunteer projects during this time, also coinciding with the new emergence of community-based and volunteer-run organisations being established throughout Greece to deliver services that the impoverished Greek state could no longer provide.

Examples include the formation of volunteer and bartering networks for the exchange of goods and services, make-shift clinics or “Social Medical Centres” run by volunteer doctors and other medical professionals, offering free health care to anyone who needs it (including the unemployed and uninsured), “Social Pharmacies” run by volunteer pharmacists providing free medicines that have been donated by citizens or private companies, and informal networks of volunteers who act as intermediaries between shelters for the homeless, food banks for poor households, and restaurants, hotels and bakeries to aid the provision of food.

> “Citizens are desperately looking for a way to make themselves useful and to get a sense of achievement,” (Karabela, 2013)

> “But there is also a more existential aspect to this development as it indicates a growing willingness for people to trust each other and wean themselves off a dependence on political parties to act as their social networks and providers.” (Malkoutzis, 2013)

In response to the harsh austerity that had been crippling the nation for over 5 years, a large majority of the Greek people (61.3%) rose above all expectations on July 5th 2015, and voted a big and defiant “No” to further austerity in a historic referendum. In the context of bank closures, capital controls and fear mongering of a looming
Grexit in the lead up to the referendum, this vote although not followed through with by the Greek government, was etched in history as a truly courageous act.

Refugee Crisis
In response to the Refugee Crisis, the Greeks have shown outstanding leadership in humanity. Ironically, it is the Greeks who have been grappling with their own devastating economic and humanitarian crisis, who have shown remarkable resilience in rising above their own struggles to offer help to refugees. In comparison to their wealthy European and other counterparts who largely turned their backs on refugees, the Greeks have shown that you don’t need money to do the right thing.

“The country least prepared, the population least prepared to shoulder this crisis has shown an enormous preparedness to shoulder it actually” (Seferiadis, 2016)

“Since 2015, the solidarity movements which became Greece’s first line of defence over the past years in response to the EU-imposed austerity cuts, have also extended their support to refugees” (Mizara, 2016)

A small army of activists, aid workers, doctors and ordinary citizens have once again filled the holes in the state’s ability to cope with this crisis. They have provided support to refugees in need of medical aid, food, shelter, clothing and legal counselling. Locals have also self-organised to donate and distribute warm clothes and provide cooked meals. Some have even allowed refugees and volunteers to shower and stay in their own homes. Such hospitality has been quite a unique characteristic of the Greek response to the refugee crisis which has not been observed in any other country who has hosted refugees.

“The Greek couple cared for the refugee children as if the youngsters were part of their own family… because of the refugee crisis, tourism was weak this year, and they were going through economic hardships. Yet, despite facing adversity themselves, and perhaps partly as a result of their own hardships, they were able to support “the other” family. In their perception, this response is the most natural and only way to approach those who are in need” (Kadletz, 2016)

In addition, a recent poll has shown that around 5,000,000 people (almost half of Greece's population) have undertaken at least one act of solidarity towards the refugees, 84% of the respondents have positive feelings towards refugees. 66% have a positive stance towards "migrants" and 62% ask the Greek state not to close its
borders 12. This is in stark contrast to the attitudes of only 32% of Germans 13 and 26% of Swedes 14, who until recently have been considered to be amongst the most embracing of refugees, but who’s beliefs about welcoming them have deteriorated sharply since the beginning of the crisis.

The generosity and hospitality of the Greek people, and particularly that of the locals and volunteers from the island of Lesvos which has had the largest intake of refugees during the crisis, was recently recognised through the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize nomination. In September 2016, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)’s Nansen Refugee Award was given to the Hellenic Rescue Team (HRT) and “PIKPA village” a community-run accommodation area, for their efforts in saving refugees in distress from the sea and for the care provided to the most vulnerable refugees arriving on the island of Lesvos 15. The following comments highlight the volunteers and locals sentiments about helping refugees:

"On Friday, when they give the Nobel, bombs will still fall and people will still get killed… I will feel neither happy nor sad. I just know I did the right thing." (Valamios, 2016)

“I believe it’s something in your heart that moves you and makes you volunteer and I can say our volunteers are heroes. No matter where someone comes from, or their religion, as a rescue organization we have to be there. We have to be united in periods of crisis.” (Mitragas, 2016)

“For me supporting refugees is not something exceptional, it’s something that we have to do. I think the reason that Greek and international volunteers come to the island every day has to do with solidarity. I think this is something that comes in our blood. There is a face of Europe that is very human and it’s amazing. It can do miracles and this is a miracle.” (Latsoudi, 2016)

A Cultural Revolution
According to a systems approach to cultural transformation, for a cultural shift to occur the whole system must change. This involves a fundamental shift in the underlying values and behaviours of a sufficient number of people to create a shift in the collective or group culture 16. For the cultural change to be successful, there must also be a “burning platform” or “sense of urgency” to drive the catalyst for change 18. Key factors that drive cultural change are strong leadership for creating a sustainable environment to facilitate the change, and engaging a critical mass of people to a common vision through compelling messages and narratives 17.
This paper has presented the current state of global inhumanity as the burning platform for cultural change. The next section will discuss the key factors pertaining to the success of the change including the guiding values and behaviors, the type of leadership required, and the environment and narratives that will engage and mobilise people towards this change.

**Values & Behaviours**

Four guiding principles can be drawn from the Greek example to define the underlying values and behaviors that can be aspired to for creating a greater global humanity: *Philotimo, Solidarity, Courage* and *Resilience*. Their definitions and interrelationships are illustrated in the diagram below.

First and foremost, the Greeks have shown a strong bias for doing the right thing towards their fellow human beings in the face of both the financial and refugee crises. Such leadership is deeply rooted in the Greek culture through the ancient value of *Philotimo*, or honour for doing the right thing. This value should become the hallmark and central driving force for creating a cultural change towards global humanity and the key response to any social crisis.

The other key attributes that the Greeks have exemplified are *Solidarity, Courage* and *Resilience*, all of which are critical to supporting doing the right thing (*Philotimo*). To sustain *Philotimo*, there needs to be a continuation and further building of the existing *Solidarity* efforts through the further engagement of people and citizens. This is particularly important considering the lack of leadership support that is evident today, and a key reason we continue to face these crises. To overcome this, it’s critical that people and citizens have the *Courage* to stand up to the current injustices and to demand from their leaders that they do the right thing. To achieve this, they must be empowered to draw on their skills and resources to do so. Building people’s *Resilience*, and particularly involving those who are directly affected by the crises, will be a core way to effectively facilitate this process.

**The Role of Leadership**

Leaders play a critical role in driving sustainable culture change. The values and behaviours of leaders can significantly impact the values and behaviours of the collective. Leaders also create the environment that facilitates change. Yet when it comes to leadership on humanity one can point to many gaps today. According to
Barrett, our society as a whole is currently facing a crisis in leadership that requires a completely new leadership paradigm 18:

“If, as a global society, we really do want to build a sustainable future for humanity, there needs to be a seismic shift in the psychological development of our political leaders: A shift from a focus on “I” to “we”; and a shift in attitude from what’s in it for me, to what’s best for the common good. It is very clear we will not solve the issues we face as a global society until we experience an evolution of human consciousness” (Barrett, 2010)

In response to both the financial and humanitarian crises, we have seen leaders place the financial over the human imperative, the use of racist rhetoric and fear to convince citizens of draconian policies, and most concerning the contravention of international laws and conventions even where there has been full knowledge of the human cost in doing so. Whilst we have seen solidarity from ordinary people and volunteer agencies at the grass-roots levels, the response of the leadership of affluent nations who have the capacity and resources to make material change, has largely been absent.

One such example is Australia where the use of its strict “turn back the boats” policy is still being presented by successive Prime Ministers as way of defending the integrity of Australian borders and “preventing deaths at sea”. Whilst the poor treatment of refugees in overseas detention centres has been kept hidden until recently under whistle-blower protection laws, Australia’s previous Prime Minister has been sought for advice by EU leaders on his “successful refugee policy” 19 and such policies have even been replicated in some cases 20:

“When Denmark recently introduced a bill to take refugees’ valuable belongings in order to pay for their time in detention camps, this was remarkably similar to Australia charging asylum seekers for their stay behind bars. Either directly or indirectly, Europe is following Australia’s draconian lead.” (Loewenstein, 2016)

During the 2016 election campaign, the Australian Immigration Minister voiced concerns that an increase in the humanitarian intake of refugees would lead them to "taking Australian jobs", and he described many as being illiterate 21. While this was met by huge public backlash particularly by Australia’s large multicultural community, this issue in and of itself did not prevent this party from being returned to government in the July 2016 election.
Even when some leaders have done the right thing, this has not led to substantial change in international policy. For example, prominent leaders such as Pope Francis visited Lesvos in early 2016 to raise awareness of the refugee crisis. Later in 2016, the UN Secretary General also visited the island to highlight the need for a humane and human rights approach and to encourage European countries to focus on resettlement and integration rather than on detention 22:

“Detention is not the answer. It should end immediately. Let us work together to resettle more people, provide legal pathways, and better integrate refugees. I recognize the difficulties. But the world has the wealth, the capacity and the duty to meet this challenge.” (Ban Ki-moon, 2016)

Such advice has not been adopted by Europe. Next month, the outgoing president of the United States President, Barack Obama is also expected to visit Lesvos as part of a broader visit to Greece to discuss the Greek debt, the refugee crisis and the political instability in Turkey. Whilst Obama has publicly expressed concerns about the refugee crisis and encouraged nations to do more on refugees at the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees in September 2016, his own commitment to resettling refugees and that of his peers has been very limited 23.

“This week’s summits only served to expose the leadership crisis. With few exceptions, many world leaders failed to rise to the occasion, making commitments that still leave millions of refugees staring into the abyss. Wealthy countries cannot only commit money and walk away… And those countries that are amongst the world’s worst abusers of refugee rights, such as Australia and EU states, cannot be allowed to tout small offers of help as a generous response to the crisis.” (Shetty, 2016)

The Right Environment

Trust in political leadership across the globe has been falling and since the Global Financial Crisis, is at an all-time low. Research has shown that trust levels are at approximately 30% in Europe 24 and Australia 25 and 20% in Britain 26 and the United States 27.

According to Edelman, the 2008 financial crisis has caused widespread suspicion among citizens that elites act in their own interests and not in those of the people, and this has led to the large demise of trust in government around the world 28:

“… (there is) proof of a new “world of self-reference” that … helps explain everything from Donald Trump’s appeal to Britain’s vote to exit the European
Elites used to possess outsized influence and authority, but now they only have a monopoly on authority. Influence largely rests with the broader population. People trust their peers much more than they trust their political leaders or news organizations. “ (Friedman, 2016)

In this climate, there has been a rise in support for non-establishment political parties across Europe and elsewhere, both on the left and right side of politics. Despite the leadership challenges, this provides real opportunities for creating meaningful change. Coupled with a rise in a social consciousness and an ethical consumerism which has been seen to translate to purchasing behaviour 29, provides the right environment today more than ever for people to be mobilised to create positive change and for citizens to influence outcomes through the political process.

The real challenge currently is that ultra-conservative politicians are gaining ground by using a culture of fear to advance their extremist ideologies. This phenomenon is occurring in Europe, in the United States, as well as in Australia. Events such as the Brexit in Britain has widely been interpreted as a protest vote to the authoritarianism of EU leadership, but also as a negative response to increased immigration. In this context, politicians used Brexit to reinforce the need for stable borders 30. Similarly, the rise of Donald Trump’s popularity in the United States has been attributed to voter frustration with the political establishment as well nationalistic support for his own version of closed border politics 31.

To counter this, and to ensure that distrust does not escalate to exclusion, division and extremism, it is critical to engage citizens using a positive narrative that reinforces hope, unity and humanity. Importantly, to ensure that distrust does not fall into complacency but rather encourages active citizenship, it is also critical that citizens are empowered to recognise their own influence and agency within the democratic process.

An effective strategy for promoting such messages is through leveraging positive examples of leadership. One example that stands out is the Canadian leadership towards the refugee crisis. In fact Canada’s government campaigned on a promise to accept 25,000 refugees and won the election. The Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau has actively shown his support of refugees by welcoming them at the airport and made very public and inclusive statements that very clearly demonstrated his “Philotimo” or value for doing the right thing by the refugees 32:
"I am more than comfortable that … accepting 25,000 Syrian refugees does right by both the safety of Canadians and by the values that define us as a nation."

"Ultimately being open and respectful towards each other is a much more powerful way to diffuse hatred and anger than ... big walls and oppressive policies"

“I stand firmly against the politics of division, the politics of fear, the politics of intolerance or hateful rhetoric. If we allow politicians to succeed by scaring people, we don’t actually end up any safer. It makes us weaker”. (Trudeau, 2015)

However, this is one of the few examples that global narratives can be anchored upon. As we have learned from the British, Australian and American experiences, citizens are still voting for politicians who are tough on migration, refugees and a range of other social imperatives. To address this, what is required is a global narrative that engages a critical mass of people to the vision of a greater humanity.

**A Global Narrative**

To engage a critical mass of people to this common vision, a communication strategy needs to be developed that not only mobilises people, but that also provides an accurate and unbiased view of events. One major obstacle in implementing such a strategy is dealing with the flawed narratives perpetuated by the existing media. Arguably no country in Europe has struggled more than Greece in recovering from the financial crisis, nor has been blamed as much for its own suffering. Most concerning is that the Greek population has been experiencing a humanitarian crisis as a result of the financial crisis, but this has seldom been reported in the media. Reporting has instead focused on victimising the Greek people by shifting the blame for a failing European and world economy solely on a Greek crisis that was caused by so-called lazy, corrupt and incompetent Greeks 33. Hidden behind such narratives is a full story that also implicates the global banking system as well as European leadership 33.

A similar startling disconnect in narratives between the reality on the ground and what the media portrays has also taken place with regard to the refugee crisis. Very little coverage has focused on the push factors driving the population flows and the conflict, and the human rights abuses and inequalities that have created this crisis.
Instead, the media has focused its reporting on a generic debate about immigration and how those seeking asylum should be treated according to each country’s domestic policy, interwoven with messages about the terrorist fear and islamophobia. Interestingly, the media has also not widely reported Greece’s impressive response and heroic efforts in handling the refugee crisis.

This highlights the importance of reclaiming the public narrative from a flawed media. That means communicating a message that competes with existing opposing narratives as well as filling the gaps where the full story is not reported. In essence this must be part of an education campaign that focuses on addressing the false stereotypes and narratives. To increase the sense of urgency on issues as well as to heighten the pressure on politicians to act, the message must also be part of a whole and unified story. Having a global strategy will help to ensure that such a narrative is most impactful, as highlighting the interconnectedness between the issues is more likely to recruit and mobilise people to causes across borders. To be successful in engaging a critical mass of people, the message however must also reach the mainstream.

Engaging the heart and appealing to the emotions facilitates change, therefore using messages and media that connect with people at the emotional level are not only very engaging, but can also propel them into action. For example, one of the most important events that saw tens of thousands rally in all cities around Australia and which influenced a shift in Australian policy towards refugees, forcing the government to agree to take 12,000 Syrians on top its usual humanitarian intake, was the circulation of the photo of drowned baby Aylan in early 2015.

An effective approach for facilitating emotional connections and for also providing accurate reporting of the realities on the ground, is the use of storytelling. For example, an Australian documentary (Chasing Asylum) was released in mainstream cinemas in the lead up to the federal election in 2016. This documentary which aimed at shaming Australia by exposing the deprivation of human rights in offshore detention centres, was based solely on the stories of staff who revealed the poor conditions and mistreatment of refugees. Following this, there has been a greater public discourse about the treatment of refugees in Australia, as well as a government inquiry into the detention centres.

To inspire people to participate in a cultural revolution towards a greater humanity, the vision communicated must be an aspirational one:
"Transformations must be driven by people’s heart, passion, emotion and aspirations, to do something extraordinary, as opposed to fear based burning platforms.” (Carder, 2015)

Research conducted by the Asylum Seekers Resource Centre in Australia, to uncover the best ways to put forward the most compelling case for a more humane approach to people seeking asylum, found that the most persuasive messages are those that lead with values, provide aspirational calls to do something good and that seize the moral high ground by talking about what’s right.

To achieve this, it is recommended that stories about the heroes of the crises are used as a key vehicle for inspiring change. The stories should firstly showcase the Greek heroes to highlight the good examples of humanity that we should aspire to, and the practical ways in which the key values and behaviours of Philotimo, Solidarity, Courage, and Resilience can be demonstrated. Secondly the stories should feature the heroes of the crises (in this case both the Greeks and the refugees), to give a voice to the real and personal experiences and realities on the ground. This will not only help to empower those experiencing the crises to become active participants in the process of creating positive change, but it will also contribute to overcoming their trauma through building a sense of personal agency and resilience. In terms of influencing public perceptions, this will facilitate a shift away from negative stereotypes and messages and towards more favourable views, therefore encouraging positive actions.

**Conclusions**

The most devastating crises of our times have given rise to a global state of inhumanity that requires a new cultural revolution to reverse it.

Such a revolution can be inspired by the remarkable example of the Greek people as demonstrated by their response to both financial and refugee crises.

Four guiding principles can be drawn from the Greek example to define the values and behaviours that will create a greater global humanity:

I. Philotimo - Doing the right thing
II. Solidarity - Helping each other
III. Courage - Standing up to injustice
Iς. Resilience - Bouncing back from adversity
To successfully achieve this change, these values and behaviours must be driven from the top-down and bottom-up. In the absence of strong leadership and in the context of low trust in political leadership, the time is ripe for citizens to demand change. A global narrative will be key to engaging and mobilising a critical mass of people towards this vision. The media is a key obstacle that must be addressed, but also a key tool to be used to communicate this message in the mainstream. Showcasing the heroes of the Greek and refugee crisis through storytelling, will be a key strategy for facilitating change, as well as promoting empowerment and resilience for those affected most by the crises.

Reference List

7. UNHCR. Syria Refugee Response. Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal. unchr.or. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#ga=1.219537625.1504790720.1473744083


32. Ramyaka, Liza. The Guardian. The rise and rise of the ethical consumer. theguardian.com. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/nov/06/


Author Biography

Evy Yannas is a psychologist and Organisational Development Specialist with more than fifteen years of experience in some of Australia’s largest organisations across the public and private sector. Her areas of expertise are culture change, capability development and wellbeing. As Founder and Principal Consultant of Talanton Consulting, she assists both people and organisations to build the right capabilities to be the best they can be, through drawing on an underlying philosophy that balances achieving high performance with developing wellbeing and a culture that supports, engages and brings out the best in people.

For over two decades Evy has actively participated in and led community development programs that have promoted diversity in the areas of multiculturalism, disability and social inclusion. In 2012, the Greek crisis inspired her to establish an independent not-for-profit organisation Greek Ambassadors (Every Greek Is An Ambassador For Greece Inc.), for the purpose of uniting Greeks to the common purpose of taking positive action and supporting Greece throughout the crisis. During a time when the pervading message in the world's media was negative and demoralizing for Greeks, the organization’s aim has been to inspire a sense of pride and to create a network of advocates and role models who are Ambassadors for Greece.

In its short time of operation Greek Ambassadors has attracted many to its cause in Australia, in Greece and in other countries, and has implemented a number of meaningful projects including media lobbying to the Australian media regarding their negative and false portrayals of Greeks, fundraising through community groups to support unemployed Greeks gain free access to health care, whilst also supporting the Greek economy via the purchase of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment in Greece, supporting the global effort for the Return of the Parthenon Marbles to their rightful home in Athens, through their Free The Marbles Campaign, and supporting the plight of refugees through participating in Melbourne rallies and asking the Australian government to follow the Greek example by accepting their fair share of refugees.
In 2014, Evy was invited to give a talk at the Third Culture Kids Seminar in Athens. Being a fourth generation Greek of the diaspora who migrated from Egypt to Australia, she shared her intimate knowledge about the challenges of migration, cultural transitions and her experience in helping people move from grief to the development of strengths, cultural integration and the celebration of cultural identity. In 2015, on the eve of the historic Greek referendum, Evy organised Australia’s largest solidarity rally in Melbourne, in support of the people of Greece! In 2016 she presented this paper at the Crossing Borders Conference in Lesvos.